mrwulf
962c0fdd41
The consumer verifier now judges the slh_dsa block on every head. The status
taxonomy is the design decision, so it is spelled out and each arm tested:
ABSENT head predates the second signature — allowed (additive posture,
operator decision 2026-08-06); an append-only log keeps history.
VALID verified against provider.slhdsa.pub.
INVALID present and wrong — HARD FAILURE. A bad signature is never a
degradation.
WRONG-KEY head names a different key than the mirror ships — hard failure.
NO-PUBKEY head claims the signature, mirror ships no key — broken
publication, hard failure.
TOOLING OpenSSL < 3.5 cannot read SLH-DSA keys — honest degradation:
one loud NOTE, never counted as verified, never failed; the
required Ed25519 checks still gate the result.
verify_selftest.py gains two adversarial cases, both mutating a full mirror
copy: one flipped signature byte must fail naming slh_dsa:INVALID; deleting
provider.slhdsa.pub while heads claim the signature must fail NO-PUBKEY. On
mirrors without slh blocks the cases record as not-applicable rather than
silently passing. First selftest run caught my own marker bug — the case
grepped for the stored failure string, which is never printed, instead of
the printed status; the printed line is now the assertion target.
README template: SLH-DSA key row, honesty paragraph (verification proven for
both algorithms, signing for neither; leaves Ed25519-signed at issuance
only), and the hardcoded head size is GONE — the README now names no tree
size at all, so this staleness class dies with the instance (it said "tree
size 13" and would have shipped that under a 19-leaf head).
Template is deliberately ahead of the published mirror until the next
publication, which overwrites the mirror from here (the sync rule's
intended direction for pre-publication work). Proven against the scratch
19-leaf mirror: verify.py --all RESULT OK [full] with ABSENT on heads 8-13
and VALID on 14-19; selftest 13/13 GREEN. Backward compat proven against a
copy of the live 13-leaf mirror: RESULT OK [full], selftest GREEN with the
slh cases n/a. Suite 152/0/0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| src/pacta_provider | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
PACTA Proof Check Provider
This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.
It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.
It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today and records an ML-DSA/FIPS 204 signature slot as unavailable unless a real backend is present. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.
Commands
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
--config examples/repos.yaml \
--repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
--repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml
Transparency log:
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.
The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.
The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.