proof-aware-crypto-tooling-.../llms.txt
mrwulf 3d81d5380c paper v4.3: Batch A — six reader-driven hardening edits (18->19pp)
All six originated from the author's own adversarial read-through:
1. SS9: retrievability decay — leaves whose pinned commits are no longer
   distributed (0-7 post-rewrite) decay to historical record.
2. SS4.3: why-a-tree — per-item signatures cannot evidence deletion,
   expose forks, or provide pinnable state; dishonesty-evidence, not
   scale, is the motivation.
3. SS1: curve/signature crate parenthetical (one implementation).
4. SS8: ~1,800s/fork corroborated by inter-leaf issued_at spacing
   (within-run gaps 29m35s-30m40s).
5. SS5.1: git commit ids are hardened SHA-1 — said before a referee
   says it.
6. App A box fidelity: logical-vs-canonical order declared; ellipsis
   markers inside cert objects and at attestation level (covers
   diagnostics + inner schema_version); '(14 more)' -> '(14
   certificates elided)'.
Visual inspection: all changed pages (1,5,6,13,15,16,17) plus spill
pages 18-19 read with own eyes; p.19 is a light final page (App D
table), accepted over spacing tricks. 106 tests green, accumulator
untouched. Page-count refs updated (webdocs, llms.txt).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 23:14:45 +02:00

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# pacta — proof-aware crypto tooling agent
> Tooling for autonomous agents that must choose, and then run on, a
> cryptographic library they can trust with money. Evidence of formal
> verification is turned into machine-readable claim cards, scored R0R5,
> with every verdict re-derived locally from observed Lean axiom cones —
> never taken on a provider's word. The `warden` product builds a custody
> wallet whose Ed25519 boundary is a quorum of four independently proven
> curve25519-dalek forks.
## Start here
- [README.md](README.md): what pacta is, the R0R5 risk model, the dogfood loop.
- [WALLET.md](WALLET.md): warden, the verified-custody wallet — the quorum boundary, the signing firewall, the R4 gate, the MCP surface.
- [docs/agent-native.md](docs/agent-native.md): why the wallet is agent-native first (AX, MCP, A2A, AP2, x402, ERC-8004) and what each idea became.
- [docs/products.md](docs/products.md): the four warden deployment profiles.
## Live evidence
- Transparency log (RFC 9162): https://ltl.zkdefi.org — signed replay attestations of the Lean proofs, one leaf per fork.
- The paper: https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper — "The Lean Transparency Log: Distributing Kernel-Checked Correctness Evidence for Deployed Ed25519 Implementations" (revised, with security proofs, 19 pages; prior version at /paper/v0.1).
## For agents
warden speaks MCP over stdio: `pacta wallet mcp --wallet <dir>`. Tools:
`wallet_status`, `verify_inbound`, `request_signature`, `custody_card`,
`posture_challenge`, `list_incidents`, `explain_refusal`. Errors are
structured objects (code / missing / remediation). The custody card at
`.well-known/custody-card.json` is self-proving: it embeds transparency-log
inclusion proofs a counterparty recomputes rather than trusts.
## Honesty boundary
Verification paths are certificate-covered; signing is trusted base (the
attested artifact, fenced by the firewall). SHA-512 is an opaque oracle;
wire parsers are hypotheses; reproducible builds and side channels are R5,
not claimed; ML-DSA (PQC) fails closed — no proven implementation exists.