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Reconciliation first: the two round-13 reviews CONTRADICT on FORK. Opus (flagged mid-review as flipped, per operator): 'frame-resistance unsound as stated' because payloads carry timestamps. GPT: 'the right EUF-CMA form.' Independent re-derivation sides with GPT: a winning head needs a VALID SIGNATURE on its never-queried exact payload bytes — a forgery regardless of timestamp; Opus's no-forgery scenario never produces the valid signature it presupposes, and its own fix paragraph concedes the win condition already means exact-payload freshness. Its real residue (the (n,r)-injectivity parenthetical was a red herring in that proof) is adopted: the parenthetical is gone, injectivity is now its own lemma where it belongs. GPT findings, all verified then fixed: - Theorem 5 formal error (CONFIRMED): the proof applied transport to same-size transitions outside the lemma's n0<n1 hypothesis, and the lemma's last line smuggled that case. Lemma restated for n0<=n1 with the equal case explicit; HIST proof now case-splits (equal: Ext forces equal roots, opening carries over; growth: transport). - Prefix transport (CONFIRMED under-proved; Opus concurs): the frontier narrative is replaced by a FULL induction over the ConsRec recursion, with the verifier recursions displayed, the value-equality invariant (rho = y) threaded exactly as the corpus's extractConsNode analysis identified, explicit P0 assembly per branch, the no-mismatched- stopping-points argument (shapes are integer-determined), and the power-of-two split-stability step credited to the corpus's mechanized kbelow lemma. - FORK cross-log framing flaw (CONFIRMED): evidence predicate now context-scoped — fixed chi = (log id, schema/type, hash-alg, pk) declared once, encoded in every head; one key running two logs can no longer be classified as equivocating. Prose corrected to 'issued-message attribution' (no more 'never equivocated' oracle mismatch). - HEAD-AUTH game added (CONFIRMED gap): outsider forging one ordinary head reduces to EUF-CMA; G1's forgery leg is now discharged by an actual game, closing the network-attacker hole. - Two-level formalization (CONFIRMED): Definition 3 = collision- extractable accountability (unconditional, explicit reductions with stated costs); NEW security corollary = what human-ignorance CR + EUF-CMA + correct key + fixed context then rule out. Extractability no longer masquerades as hardness. - Composition mapping made precise: G1 narrowed to authentic position binding (HEAD + PB opening-uniqueness; full-list membership is a system property of the published mirror, said so); G2 split into syntactic pin rule vs semantic HIST content; monotone-extensions and payload-injectivity as one-line lemmas; HIST game syntax lists C_i and 0<=a<b<=k; Adv defined for the two keyed games; PB cost notes retained intermediates; Rogaway bibitem gains the DOI (211-228 reconfirmed by GPT: Springer/DBLP vs the author's list-page typo). 21 pages, 0 overfull, suite 115 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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PACTA Proof Check Provider
This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.
It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.
It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today and records an ML-DSA/FIPS 204 signature slot as unavailable unless a real backend is present. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.
Commands
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
--config examples/repos.yaml \
--repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
--repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml
Transparency log:
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.
The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.
The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.