proof-aware-crypto-tooling-.../provider
mrwulf 78d785d303 paper v0.4: round-12 fix batch — both reviews absorbed, every blocker verified before fixing
All five GPT blockers, independently confirmed against source before
any edit, plus the real subset of the Opus findings:
- B1/M5: every strict-superset/strictly-more/larger-acceptance-set
  claim (5 sites incl. two that wrap across source lines) replaced by
  witnessed non-equivalence + pinned-family language; the Remark now
  states explicitly that no global inclusion relation is claimed.
- B2: the optimistic-accountability/fraud-proof paragraph is REMOVED
  (operator: bloat; GPT: technically wrong — consumers do not accept
  by default, and a collision refutes the hash assumption rather than
  attributing operator misconduct). The careful long-form analogy
  stays in ltl-accumulator-verified/docs/optimistic-accountability.md.
- B3/M7: claim matrix — kernel-observation row split into operator-
  CLAIMS (established) vs kernel-ACTUALLY-produced (not
  cryptographically established); EUF-CMA/CR added where load-bearing.
- B4: artifact + Appendix C sentences now describe the upgraded
  verifier (lean-transparency-log 52179bd: --all covers every
  published receipt, binding fields required; 11-case adversarial
  selftest GREEN).
- B5: pin-store sketch gains the equal-size/equal-root case via
  whole-tree binding.
- M1 detached-signature honesty; M2 abstract axiom-name-sets +
  compared-views narrowing; M3 kernel time -> end-to-end replay time;
  M4+F4 consumers -> 'Consumer prototypes and version exactness'
  (implemented prototype, informal check, explicit non-evaluation
  disclaimer); M6 Appendix C listing fails closed on short proofs
  (take() guard, verified empirically); M8-partial two alternatives-
  table cells + design-taxonomy prose paragraph (also closes Opus F1
  orphaned header); M9/F5 single experience report; M10 policy-
  separation row in the coverage table; M11 27-line portability
  number restored; F2 abstract 'via differential testing'; F3 linking
  clause after the consistency theorem; Option-valued notation note
  (both reviewers); GPT terminology sentence after Definition 2.
17 pages, 0 overfull, dead-phrase sweep clean. Suite 115 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 11:19:46 +02:00
..
src/pacta_provider paper v0.4: round-12 fix batch — both reviews absorbed, every blocker verified before fixing 2026-07-17 11:19:46 +02:00
pyproject.toml add nested proof check provider 2026-07-03 13:03:58 +02:00
README.md add transparency log trust provider 2026-07-03 14:09:34 +02:00

PACTA Proof Check Provider

This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.

It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.

It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today and records an ML-DSA/FIPS 204 signature slot as unavailable unless a real backend is present. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.

Commands

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
  --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml

Transparency log:

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.

The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.

The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.