proof-aware-crypto-tooling-.../provider
mrwulf 60f291bdf0 paper v0.8: readability pass — reader aids + two graphic bugs, zero semantic change
Operator-ordered UX audit (full linear read + every page rendered and
visually inspected + both reviewers' 'visually clear' certifications
spot-checked). Scope: no theorem, proof, or scope sentence changed in
meaning.

BUGS FIXED (both missed by both round-12/13/14 reviewers):
- Deployment figure: leaf 11 was CLIPPED to 'clea' by the overlapping
  1.3cm 'accumulator' box — box now standard width, label 'accum.'
  Verified fixed by render.
- The sentence 'Leaf 12 attests the accumulator corpus at commit' was
  split from its hash by a float/page break, stranding the bare commit
  after the figure — now wrapped in samepage. Verified by render.
- 'signing- library' hyphenation artifact in §6.3.

READER AIDS (for adjacent-field experts; verifiability up, rigor
untouched):
- Notation summary table (12 rows) at the end of §4, right before the
  security analysis that uses every symbol.
- NEW transport figure (now Fig. 2): the 6->8 instance with the opening
  path (red), frontier values A,B (blue), consumed proof value (dashed),
  kept siblings (orange), and the r0/P0 assembly inset — §5.4's five
  pages previously had zero figures. Hand-verified by render;
  referenced from the transport-algorithm paragraph.
- 'Games at a glance' table (game/adversary/secrets/wins-by/consequence)
  after the §5.4 intro.
- One-sentence reading guide at the top of §5.4.
- 2->3 tie-in after the transport proof (the log's own transition as the
  smallest growth case; seam subsection gains a label).
- 'assumption cone' defined at first use (§2.1).

DE-SEDIMENTATION (three review rounds of accreted hedges, reorganized
with all semantic content kept):
- §5.4 intro: one 14-line wall -> four short paragraphs (context /
  two levels / non-interactivity), duplicated hardness sentence merged.
- HIST game: definition crisp, commentary moved to a parenthetical.
- Abstract: ~15% tighter (inventory numbers -> '61 human-reviewed
  certificates over a single uninterpreted SHA-256 axiom'; run-on
  split). All boundary/honesty sentences retained.
22 pages, 0 overfull, suite 115 green. Deployment figure renumbered
2->3 (no numeric figure cross-references existed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 19:23:08 +02:00
..
src/pacta_provider paper v0.8: readability pass — reader aids + two graphic bugs, zero semantic change 2026-07-17 19:23:08 +02:00
pyproject.toml add nested proof check provider 2026-07-03 13:03:58 +02:00
README.md add transparency log trust provider 2026-07-03 14:09:34 +02:00

PACTA Proof Check Provider

This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.

It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.

It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today and records an ML-DSA/FIPS 204 signature slot as unavailable unless a real backend is present. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.

Commands

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
  --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml

Transparency log:

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.

The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.

The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.