mrwulf
4b45ece97b
Operator-caught: 'certificate' used before any definition, 'requirements
card' undefined, and the Attested-libraries table headed 'artifact 2 /
artifact 3' — numbers pointing at a DIFFERENT table. Fixed: certificates
defined in the Merkle intro (each leaf = one proof run, a batch of
certificates: one machine-checked theorem with its assumption list);
the requirements card is now 'a short plain-text file listing, by name,
the assumptions you accept'; table headers are self-describing (library
/ claim (attestation) / proof of inclusion (receipt) / certificates
proven); redundant gloss under the table dropped (say it once). My own
fresh re-read on top: 'head' glossed at first use, keys card says
'entry 18' (leaf comes later, at the Merkle mapping), 'Binds artifact 2'
de-numbered, 'become a witness' now plain ('hold the complete history
yourself, rung 1'), 'risk class R5' dropped from prose, the legend says
'every assumption list exactly as declared' instead of 'boundary-exact'.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| src/pacta_provider | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
PACTA Proof Check Provider
This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.
It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.
It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today; heads are dual-sign capable with an additive SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s slot (proven verify path), and the ML-DSA/FIPS 204 slot stays honestly not_configured/unavailable — never silently filled. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.
Commands
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
--config examples/repos.yaml \
--repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
--repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml
Transparency log:
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.
The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.
The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.