mrwulf
6cf1694453
Review A (second Fable instance, delivered via USB, findings re-verified by me against the tex before adoption; its frontier lemma re-derived from scratch before applying): - THE REAL FIX: Lemma 2's hash-fold definition did not cover its own two uses (Root recomputes only along the leaf's root path; ConsRec bottoms out at the [0,n0) decomposition and consumes the pinned root, which the old Steps 1-2 never pinned - incl. the degenerate case where the first component IS the pinned root alone). Now: folds shaped by a connected sub-tree S containing the root, children outside S consumed as opaque inputs, conclusion pins emitted values AND all consumed inputs; Thm 2 names its S; Thm 3 pins the consumed anchor and handles the degenerate case; Lemma 1's role stated honestly. - dangling R4/R5 taxonomy labels removed; G3/Prop 2 statements now match their own veto-proof (deny-only, everywhere); Table 1 caption counts boundary+standard-three; r1 defined as raw signature bytes (T1's whole point); Contribution 4 'embedded in every signature' -> 'published alongside'; Figure 1 redrawn in the exact RFC 9162 shape for n=12; Solana error-type nit; App D namespace elision noted. Review B (GPT-5.6, positions defended 2026-07-10, concessions adopted): - abstract + G2 narrowed to what Prop 1 proves (same-size evidence + monotonicity), unequal-size split views routed through the public leaf mirror; residual-trust sentence stated at honest width (checkout, deps, binding, parsing in the trusted observation pipeline); freshness declared an availability policy (freeze attacks not prevented); self-reference verb 'ensures' -> 'enforces and records' + signature reveals nothing about the producing program; novelty softened to 'we are unaware of'; 25-line/150-line accounting in one breath; missing-oracle-axiom = refuse-to-classify drift (keeping the oracle argument); mechanization tone softened; head-encoding reality documented (versioned canonical JSON w/ log id - system was ahead of the paper); NEW claim-matrix table (Table 2) decomposing every consumer conclusion into mechanism + residual assumption, incl. two deliberate not-established rows. Open questions from Review A resolved: black_box 27 lines are per-lemma trusted-base bookkeeping (no published cone contains black_box - verified); T4 x=0 edge case now stated precisely (roots coincide, set sign bit rejected per RFC 8032, covered by the iff over extracted code; Lean sqrt_core handles x=0 explicitly); Cheval pages (DBLP-verified) restored alongside Review A's DOI. 18 pages, 106 tests green, accumulator untouched (12 leaves). webdocs/llms.txt page counts updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| src/pacta_provider | ||
| pyproject.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
PACTA Proof Check Provider
This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.
It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.
It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today and records an ML-DSA/FIPS 204 signature slot as unavailable unless a real backend is present. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.
Commands
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
--config examples/repos.yaml \
--repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
--repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml
Transparency log:
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.
The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.
The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.