mrwulf
0e700841c6
The freeze rationale is gone (review concluded); v0.11 describes the LIVE deployment instead of the July snapshot: - abstract + contributions: nineteen leaves, four Ed25519 corpora at 44 certs, the accumulator's two attestations, leaf 18 = the SLH-DSA verify path; heads dual-signed since size 14 with the parameter set the log itself attests - signed-tree-heads section: the additive deterministic SLH-DSA co-signature, ABSENT-not-failed history honesty, determinism as an audit primitive, the closed loop to leaf 18 - new instantiation subsection 'The SLH-DSA verify path: the method on second terrain': 11 certificates, acceptance characterization, the no-second-semantics honesty (visible-not-correct), exact cone enforcement, scope (mono facade + 137-case bridge, base_2b, no signing) - deployment/public state: 15 August 2026, root 7ee23940, twelve heads 8-19, per-leaf narrative through 18 - NEW Appendix E: the eleven SLH-DSA certificates with their exact oracle cones — the mirror of Appendix D's Ed25519 tiers - title: v0.11; site card + snapshot note + paper/README updated 25pp, zero unresolved refs, Appendix E render-inspected by eye; full test suite green |
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PACTA Proof Check Provider
This nested project is a prototype third-party proof-checking service. It reuses host Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs portable PACTA replay/audit checks, and emits signed attestation certificates.
It does not modify anything outside this repository. It may read configured toolchains such as /Users/oho/GitClone/ClaudeCodeProjects/your-lean-project/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh.
It can also maintain a local transparency log. The log is an RFC 9162-style Merkle accumulator over signed attestations. It emits Signed Tree Heads with Ed25519 today; heads are dual-sign capable with an additive SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s slot (proven verify path), and the ML-DSA/FIPS 204 slot stays honestly not_configured/unavailable — never silently filled. Agents that require both signatures must reject such receipts.
Commands
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/demo-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
--config examples/repos.yaml \
--repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
--repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml
Transparency log:
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--provider local-pacta-provider \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--attestation provider/out/dalek.attestation.yaml \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
--out provider/out/dalek.receipt.yaml
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-sth \
--log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
--private-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
--public-key provider/state/demo-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
The resulting certificate can be consumed by pacta with --attestation, --trust-attestation-provider, and --attestation-public-key.
The receipt can be consumed with --transparency-receipt, --transparency-log-public-key, and --require-transparency-receipt.
The private key must remain provider-side. Downstream agents only need the public key, the inclusion receipt, and a policy decision that the provider name/log key is trusted.