

# Accountable Distribution of Machine-Checked Correctness Evidence

A Transparency Model and the Lean Transparency Log

Olaf Horvath

Olaf.Horvath@zkdefi.org   ORCID 0009-0004-8008-5805

July 2026   (v0.4)

## Abstract

Formal verification produces machine-checkable evidence, but consuming that evidence usually requires the original prover, dependency graph, source checkout, and substantial replay time. This paper studies a distinct cryptographic problem: how can a lightweight consumer obtain precise and accountable assurance about a deterministic proof replay without executing the verifier and without reducing the result to an opaque provider label?

We define *accountable replay attestation*. A specialized operator performs an expensive replay once and publishes a structured observation through a signed append-only log. Consumers verify a signed tree head and logarithmic inclusion proof, pin history, and apply their own policy to the exact reported axiom-name sets for each theorem. The construction does not prove that the operator’s observation is true. It makes the claim immutable within a signed view, comparable across consumers, and attributable when incompatible signed views are compared.

We instantiate the model as the Lean Transparency Log (LTL), using Lean 4 replay attestations and an RFC 9162 Merkle tree. We give explicit collision-extracting arguments for inclusion and consistency, formalize the consumer pinning and policy boundaries, and evaluate a live deployment over four production Ed25519 codebases. The public log contains thirteen leaves; its thirteenth leaf attests a Lean mechanization of the accumulator’s own security arguments (222 inventoried environment constants, 61 human-reviewed assumption cones, and a single uninterpreted SHA-256 axiom). The mechanization effort also exposed, via differential testing, a nontrivial implementation boundary: the deployed iterative consistency verifier is not extensionally equal to the recursive model on malformed size claims. The leaf records this limitation explicitly. The resulting contribution is a cryptographic distribution model for machine-checked correctness evidence, together with an end-to-end deployed instantiation that carries scoped proofs about its own accountability machinery.

## 1 Introduction

Formal verification has made it possible to connect production cryptographic software to machine-checked mathematics. Systems such as HACLS\*, EverCrypt, Fiat-Crypto, and Aeneas demonstrate different routes from implementation to proof [13, 14, 15, 11]. Yet the standard assurance story quietly assumes a capable consumer: one that can retrieve the exact source, reconstruct the verifier environment, resolve dependencies, and spend minutes or hours replaying a corpus.

That assumption is often false. A package resolver selecting a cryptographic backend, a deployment controller enforcing a proof requirement, or an autonomous custody agent may have milliseconds and a small trusted computing base, not a theorem prover and thirty minutes of kernel time per candidate. This creates a problem that is logically downstream of proof construction:

*How can a consumer that cannot execute the prover obtain precise, accountable evidence about a proof replay, without collapsing the result into an opaque provider verdict?*

A detached signature on the word “verified” authenticates an issuer but does not bind an ordered history, expose silent replacement, or give consumers a compact state that can be pinned and required to grow. Shipping the complete proof and checker preserves direct verification but may defeat the cost and portability objective. Committees distribute trust but do not themselves fix the semantics of the attested result. Succinct proofs of verifier execution would provide validity rather than mere accountability, but require a circuit or verified-VM representation of the prover and are not yet the deployment assumption of the artifacts studied here.

We therefore study a narrower primitive: *accountable delegation of deterministic proof replay*. The operator still observes the replay. The cryptographic layer does not make that observation true. Instead, it makes the observation exact, persistent, attributable, and locally policy-checkable. Independent replay remains the mechanism for challenging a fabricated observation.

**Central thesis.** The contribution is not a new Merkle tree and not a new theorem prover. It is a trust decomposition for distributing machine-checked correctness evidence:

**Expensive deterministic verification produces an observation. Transparency makes that observation accountable. Consumer-local policy decides whether the observation is acceptable.**

The Lean Transparency Log (LTL)<sup>1</sup> is the complete instantiation evaluated in this paper. Its subjects are four Rust Ed25519 codebases with Lean 4 [12] certificates against extracted models. Its thirteenth public leaf attests the Lean corpus that mechanizes the log’s own accumulator arguments. Thus the paper’s central claim survives replacement of Lean, Ed25519, or RFC 9162 by other components; what is essential is the distribution and accountability model.

## Contributions.

1. **A distribution model for machine-checked evidence.** We define replay attestations, distinguish observation from verdict, and state what a lightweight consumer learns without executing Lean.
2. **A cryptographic accountability layer.** Using the RFC 9162 tree unchanged, we define signed views, inclusion receipts, local history pinning, and transferable same-size fork evidence. We give explicit collision-extracting soundness arguments specialized to the consumer algorithms.
3. **Boundary-conformance policy.** Each leaf records the exact axiom names reported by Lean. Consumers compare those observations with their own policy; operator labels can veto but cannot grant acceptance. We state clearly that axiom-name equality is not semantic identity of theorem statements.
4. **A deployed cryptographic case study.** The log contains twelve historical replay leaves for four verified Ed25519 codebases and a thirteenth leaf for the accumulator’s own Lean corpus. The entry-13 corpus carries an environment-derived audit inventory of 222 compiled constants, 61 human-reviewed certificate cones, and a single uninterpreted SHA-256 axiom.

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<sup>1</sup>The acronym collides with linear temporal logic [20]; we note the collision once and rely on context.

5. **A negative deployment result.** Differential testing found that the deployed iterative RFC-style consistency verifier and the recursive model proved in Lean are not extensionally equal: there are malformed size/root combinations accepted only by the deployed verifier. We characterize 3,867 divergences in 73,573 pinned boundary tests — every one deployed-accepts-only — and scope the public attestation accordingly.

**Non-claims.** LTL does not prove that the operator honestly reported a kernel run; independent replay remains the way to detect a fabricated observation. It does not prove binary correspondence, compiler correctness, extraction faithfulness, side-channel resistance, SHA-512 correctness, or execution provenance of the signing binary. The present leaf schema identifies theorem declarations by repository commit and name, not by a canonical digest of their elaborated Lean types. These are explicit boundaries, not hidden qualifications.

## 2 The distribution problem

### 2.1 Three evidence modes

Let a subject repository at commit  $g$  contain theorem declarations  $T_1, \dots, T_q$ . A deterministic verifier execution produces an observation  $O_g$  containing success/failure and the reported assumption cone of each  $T_i$ . There are three natural ways to consume this result.

**Direct replay.** The consumer reconstructs the verifier environment and checks  $O_g$  itself. This gives the strongest provenance, but has high operational cost.

**Detached attestation.** A provider signs  $O_g$ . This is cheap to consume, but provides no append-only history and no common value for clients to pin.

**Transparent attestation.** The provider signs a tree head committing  $O_g$  as one leaf among an ordered history. A consumer verifies inclusion and persists a head. Incompatible views become attributable when compared.

The third mode is useful precisely when replay is expensive but the result is stable and deterministic. It does not dominate direct replay: it replaces local computation with a narrower trust in the replay provider.

### 2.2 Why transparency rather than a signature database?

Suppose an operator signs every replay result independently. Authenticity of an individual record follows from signature verification, but four properties are absent:

1. no signed value commits to the ordered set of all records;
2. the signer commits to no complete ordered history, so omission or replacement is not detectable by a fresh consumer and carries no compact consistency proof;
3. two consumers cannot compare a single compact view identifier;
4. a consumer cannot demand that its previously accepted history only grow.

An append-only Merkle tree supplies these missing interfaces. At the current deployment size, logarithmic proof size is not the decisive benefit; *history binding* is.

| Mechanism                | Consumer cost | Semantic checker                           | History account-ability        | Main cost                   | residual |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------|
| Local replay             | high          | consumer                                   | local only                     | prover/toolchain deployment |          |
| Proof transport / PCC    | medium-high   | consumer checker                           | optional                       | proof/checker portability   |          |
| Detached signed result   | low           | provider                                   | statement-level only           | replaceable                 | history  |
| Committee replay         | low           | committee                                  | none without an additional log | membership trust            |          |
| Succinct proof of replay | low           | circuit/VM verifier                        | optional                       | proving the prover          | the      |
| LTL                      | low           | provider observes; consumer applies policy | signed append-only views       | observation honesty         |          |

Table 1: Evidence-distribution alternatives. LTL targets low-cost consumers while retaining an attributable history; it does not remove trust in the replay observation.

### 2.3 Design alternatives

Table 1 places the construction among the natural alternatives, read as a design taxonomy rather than an empirical comparison. Local replay and proof transport keep semantic checking with the consumer at high operational cost; detached signatures and committees lower consumer cost but commit to no ordered history (a committee distributes trust in the observation; it does not by itself make the record’s history accountable); succinct proofs of replay would upgrade accountability to validity at the price of proving the prover. LTL occupies the low-consumer-cost point that still binds an ordered, signed, pinnable history — and deliberately does not buy validity of the observation itself.

## 3 Model and trust decomposition

### 3.1 Roles and objects

The system has three logical roles.

**Subject maintainer.** Publishes source and proof artifacts at a commit.

**Replay operator.** Executes the declared verifier procedure, constructs an attestation, appends it to the log, and signs tree heads.

**Consumer.** Holds the log public key and a local policy; verifies receipts and optionally persists a previous head.

A replay attestation  $a$  contains at least

$$(\text{repo}, g, \text{toolchain}, \text{environment}, [(N_i, s_i, A_i)]_{i=1}^q),$$

where  $N_i$  is a declaration name,  $s_i$  is replay status, and  $A_i$  is the observed axiom-name set. The deployed schema additionally carries diagnostics, resource controls, scope, and exclusions.

**Definition 1** (Attestation-transparency scheme). *An attestation-transparency scheme is a tuple*

$$\Pi = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Append}, \text{ProveIncl}, \text{VerifyIncl}, \text{ProveCons}, \text{VerifyCons}, \text{Verdict})$$

*over a hash function and signature scheme. Append commits the canonical serialization of an attestation as the next leaf and returns a signed tree head. Verdict is parameterized by consumer-local policy and does not consume an operator verdict as positive evidence.*




Figure 1: Trust decomposition. The log authenticates and orders the replay operator’s observation; it does not replace the theorem prover or make the observation true.

**Definition 2** (Accountable replay distribution). *Fix an operator public key and a consumer that persists accepted signed heads. A replay-distribution scheme is accountable if the following hold: (i) every accepted attestation is position-bound to a signed view; (ii) a consumer accepts a later view only as the same view or a verified extension; (iii) two valid equal-size heads with unequal roots form transferable evidence that the key holder signed incompatible views; and (iv) positive acceptance of a theorem boundary is a function of recorded observations and consumer-local policy, not of an operator verdict.*

The definition is intentionally an accountability property, not a validity property. It says when conflicting claims become attributable; it does not cryptographically prove that the replay observation was honestly produced. Throughout, “accountability” means signed-view and history accountability; observation validity remains external to the mechanism.

### 3.2 What is and is not transferred

A verified receipt establishes a statement of the form:

The holder of public key  $pk$  signed a tree head committing, at position  $m$ , to a leaf in which the operator reports that the named declarations at commit  $g$  replayed with the recorded axiom-name sets.

It does not establish that the operator’s report is true. Nor does it identify the semantics of a theorem from its name alone. This separation is central:

| Layer                 | What it contributes                                            |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| Lean kernel           | validity of a checked term relative to declarations and axioms |
| Replay pipeline       | binding of source, toolchain, theorem names, and observations  |
| Attestation signature | attribution of one replay statement                            |
| Merkle log            | position binding and append-only view commitments              |
| Consumer policy       | acceptability of the recorded boundary                         |
| Independent replay    | detection of fabricated operator observations                  |

### 3.3 Adversary model

The network adversary may replay, delay, suppress, or substitute messages. The operator may be malicious: it may construct arbitrary leaves, sign arbitrary heads, label results arbitrarily, and present different signed views to different consumers. We assume collision resistance of SHA-256 for the log, EUF-CMA security of the head-signature scheme, and correct initial acquisition of the operator public key.

The model deliberately does not cryptographically exclude fabricated kernel observations. That is a statement about a physical execution on the operator’s machine. The mechanism instead makes the claimed execution target precise enough for a third party to replay.

### 3.4 Consumer goals

**G1: Position-bound membership.** If a consumer accepts leaf  $d$  at index  $m$  against signed head  $(n, r)$ , then  $d$  occupies position  $m$  in a leaf list committed by  $r$ , except under hash collision or signature forgery.

**G2: Local append-only history.** A consumer that persists  $(n, r)$  accepts a later view only if it is the same view or a verified extension. Two valid heads of equal size and unequal roots are transferable evidence that the key holder signed incompatible views. Unequal-size forks require retained history, gossip, or a witness.

**G3: Policy separation.** The operator’s positive label cannot make a certificate acceptable. The consumer recomputes boundary conformance from observations and local policy. Operator failure labels may be treated as a conservative veto.

### 3.5 Boundary conformance, not semantic identity

For certificate  $c$ , let  $\text{Obs}_a(c)$  be the axiom-name set recorded in leaf  $a$ , and let  $\text{Policy}(c)$  be the consumer’s allowed set. Define

$$\text{boundary\_ok}_a(c) \iff \text{Obs}_a(c) = \text{Policy}(c).$$

Exact equality detects both additional assumptions and drift in the declared assurance interface. A missing expected axiom is not automatically a logical defect: it may indicate a strengthened theorem, a changed statement, a bypassed abstraction boundary, or stale policy. The consumer therefore rejects or requires review rather than interpreting the drift.

This predicate is intentionally narrower than “the intended theorem was proved.” The deployed system identifies a declaration by repository commit and name. A stronger future schema should include canonical digests of the elaborated theorem type and of the types of declarations in its axiom cone.

## 4 Construction

### 4.1 RFC 9162 tree

Let  $H$  be SHA-256. For byte string  $d$  and 32-byte values  $x, y$  define

$$h_{\text{leaf}}(d) = H(0x00 \parallel d), \quad h_{\text{node}}(x, y) = H(0x01 \parallel x \parallel y).$$

For leaf list  $D = [d_0, \dots, d_{n-1}]$ :

$$\text{MTH}([]) = H(\epsilon), \quad \text{MTH}([d]) = h_{\text{leaf}}(d),$$

and for  $n > 1$ ,

$$\text{MTH}(D) = h_{\text{node}}(\text{MTH}(D[0:k]), \text{MTH}(D[k:n])),$$

where  $k$  is the largest power of two strictly smaller than  $n$ . Inclusion and consistency proofs are the RFC 9162 algorithms [2].

### 4.2 Signed tree heads

A tree head contains schema-version and type tags, a log identifier, tree size, root hash, timestamp, and hash-algorithm identifier. The canonical JSON serialization of those fields is signed with Ed25519. The log identifier and version tag prevent cross-log and cross-protocol replay.

The current implementation records signing-backend provenance alongside the signature, but that provenance is not execution attestation: an Ed25519 signature does not identify the program that produced it. The public system therefore treats the claimed signing implementation as operator-reported context, not as a property proved by the signature.

### 4.3 Receipts and pinning

A receipt contains the leaf index, sibling path, and signed head. A consumer first verifies the head signature and then reconstructs the root. For history, a local pin  $(n_{\text{pin}}, r_{\text{pin}})$  evolves as follows:

- same size: accept iff roots match; otherwise retain both signed heads as same-size fork evidence;
- larger size: accept iff a consistency proof verifies, then update;
- smaller size: reject as rollback.

Freshness is an external availability policy. A persisted pin detects rollback relative to local history; it does not prove that a client sees the globally latest signed head.

## 5 Security analysis

This section states the consumer-facing arguments in the form used by the Lean mechanization. The proofs are elementary but explicit: successful false openings yield concrete SHA-256 collisions rather than appealing to an informal “Merkle trees are secure” statement. The explicitness is load-bearing: over a fixed-width hash a bare “some collision exists” is vacuously true by counting, so each soundness statement is about a named extractor function, and the corpus pins a machine-checked non-vacuity guard for every extractor.

### 5.1 Inclusion

Let  $\text{Root}(v, m, n, P)$  recursively fold value  $v$  at position  $m$  through proof path  $P$  using the same largest-power-of-two decomposition as MTH. Both  $\text{Root}$  and  $\text{ConsRec}$  are partial (the mechanization’s  $\text{Option}$ ): malformed shapes return a distinguished rejection value, and an equation such as  $\text{Root}(\cdot) = \text{MTH}(D)$  asserts acceptance with that output.

**Lemma 1** (Domain separation). *For all byte strings  $d$  and 32-byte values  $x, y$ ,  $0x00 \parallel d \neq 0x01 \parallel x \parallel y$ .*

*Proof.* The first byte differs. □

**Theorem 1** (Inclusion completeness). *For every non-empty  $D$ , every  $m < |D|$ ,*

$$\text{Root}(\text{h}_{\text{leaf}}(D[m]), m, |D|, \text{Path}(m, D)) = \text{MTH}(D).$$

*Proof.* By structural induction on  $|D|$ . The singleton case is immediate. For a split  $D = L \parallel R$ , the honest path is the recursive path inside the side containing  $m$  followed by the other side’s root. The induction hypothesis reconstructs the selected child root, and the final node hash reconstructs  $\text{MTH}(D)$ . □

**Theorem 2** (Inclusion soundness: position binding). *There is an explicit extractor  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{incl}}$  such that, given  $D$ ,  $m < |D|$ ,  $d \neq D[m]$ , and a path  $P$  satisfying*

$$\text{Root}(\text{h}_{\text{leaf}}(d), m, |D|, P) = \text{MTH}(D),$$

*$\mathcal{E}_{\text{incl}}(D, m, d, P)$  returns two distinct SHA-256 preimages with the same digest.*

*Proof.* Recompute the honest tree and replay the accepting reconstruction from the root downward. At each visited internal node, compare the adversarial and honest node preimages. If they differ while their digests agree, output the collision. Otherwise both child values agree and descent continues along the path. At the terminal leaf, equality of digests with  $d \neq D[m]$  yields a leaf-hash collision. Domain separation rules out interpreting a leaf preimage as a node preimage without already producing a collision.  $\square$

## 5.2 Consistency

The recursive verifier  $\text{ConsRec}(n_0, n_1, C, b, r_0)$  reconstructs an old and new root from proof  $C$ , a flag  $b$  indicating whether the old root is implicit, and pinned value  $r_0$ . Malformed shapes return rejection.

**Theorem 3** (Consistency soundness of the recursive model). *There is an explicit extractor  $\mathcal{E}_{\text{cons}}$  such that, whenever  $|D_0| = n_0 \leq n_1 = |D_1|$ ,  $D_0 \neq D_1[0:n_0]$ , and*

$$\text{ConsRec}(n_0, n_1, C, \top, \text{MTH}(D_0)) = (\text{MTH}(D_0), \text{MTH}(D_1)),$$

*$\mathcal{E}_{\text{cons}}(D_0, D_1, C)$  returns a SHA-256 collision.*

*Proof.* The new-root component is a hash fold over the shape of the  $n_1$  tree. Compare it with the honest  $D_1$  tree. Either the first differing preimage gives a collision, or every consumed proof node equals the corresponding honest node. In the latter case, the old-root component is the canonical fold of the honest prefix  $D_1[0:n_0]$ , so acceptance implies  $\text{MTH}(D_0) = \text{MTH}(D_1[0:n_0])$ . The two equal-sized leaf lists differ; descend through their identically shaped honest trees to extract the first hash collision.  $\square$

The theorem’s hypothesis pins the honest old root  $\text{MTH}(D_0)$ . The deployed flow has no mechanized supplier of that pin; the next subsection measures what the iterative verifier does when size claims alone steer its walk.

**Proposition 1** (Pin-store safety). *Assume EUF-CMA security of the head signature and collision resistance of SHA-256. A consumer following the pin transition accepts only a nondecreasing sequence of sizes whose exhibited leaf lists are prefix-related. Two accepted heads under the same key with equal size and unequal roots are transferable evidence that the key holder signed incompatible views.*

*Proof.* Rollback is rejected syntactically. At equal size the transition is accepted only with equal roots; if the two exhibited equal-length leaf lists differed, whole-tree binding would extract a SHA-256 collision, so under collision resistance the lists are equal. A larger head is accepted only after a consistency proof, so non-prefix acceptance yields a collision by the previous theorem. Equal-size unequal roots with valid signatures are two conflicting statements attributable to the key holder, except under signature forgery.  $\square$

**Proposition 2** (Policy separation). *For fixed local policy  $\text{Policy}$ , the boundary-conformance result for every certificate is a function only of  $\text{Obs}_a(c)$  and  $\text{Policy}(c)$ . An operator label cannot change a nonconforming observation into a conforming one.*

*Proof.* The comparison is set equality and takes no positive operator verdict as input. A deployment may conservatively treat an operator failure label as a veto, but a veto cannot grant acceptance.  $\square$

### 5.3 Scope of the deployed consistency claim

The Lean theorem covers the recursive predicate above. The deployed iterative verifier follows the familiar RFC bit-navigation algorithm. Differential testing discovered that the two verifiers are not extensionally equal on malformed size claims, every observed divergence being accepted only by the iterative verifier: for example, a valid proof for a  $2 \rightarrow 3$  transition can be accepted under the false old-size claim  $1 \rightarrow 3$  when paired with the size-2 root. The mechanism is elementary: the iterative algorithm seeds its reconstruction with the supplied old root and consults the size claims only as bit-navigation state, so several distinct old-size claims navigate one proof identically. In 73,573 lied-size boundary cases, 3,867 divergences were observed; all were one-sided (deployed accepts, recursive model rejects).

The intended consumer flow binds  $(n_0, r_0)$  in local persistent state and binds  $(n_1, r_1)$  together in a signed head. The present corpus does not prove a refinement theorem from that operational invariant to the recursive predicate. Consequently the public attestation says exactly this: the model is proved; deployment correspondence is finite-tested and relies on an unmechanized authentic-size/root invariant.

## 6 Lean and Ed25519 instantiation

### 6.1 Proof corpus

The initial subjects are upstream `curve25519-dalek/ed25519-dalek` (one implementation: the curve crate and the signature crate atop it) and three deployed forks: Solana/Anza, RISC Zero, and Betrusted — all implementations of Ed25519 [16, 17]. Aeneas provides a functional translation route from Rust to theorem-prover models; its design uses Rust ownership information to avoid explicit memory reasoning for a large class of safe Rust programs [11]. A recent independent experience report likewise applies a Rust-to-Lean pipeline to cryptographic code [21].

Each fork’s corpus contains sixteen reviewed certificates covering:

- five-limb field arithmetic over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$  with value and bound preservation;
- complete twisted-Edwards group operations [18, 19];
- scalar arithmetic modulo the Ed25519 group order;
- encoding, decoding, and constructive point decompression;
- a four-stage lifting ladder from byte-level verifier acceptance to a mathematical point equation.

The signature apex can be summarized as follows. Let  $k$  be the challenge scalar produced by an opaque SHA-512 boundary and let  $r_1$  be the raw  $R$  bytes from the signature. The corpus separates:

- T1:** acceptance iff the verifier’s recomputed compressed bytes equal  $r_1$ ;
- T2:** those recomputed bytes are the canonical encoding of  $[k](-A) + [s]B$ ;
- T3:** canonical encoding is injective on valid curve points;
- T4:** acceptance iff constructive decompression of  $R$  yields  $[k](-A) + [s]B$ .

The separation keeps residual assumptions visible. SHA-512 and selected wire-format interfaces are opaque boundaries at the apex; lower arithmetic and group certificates use the foundational Lean axioms observed in the corpus.

## 6.2 Replay attestation

For every certificate the operator records:

```
name
status
observed_axioms
expected_axioms          # audit trail; consumer policy is local
axiom_status
diagnostics
```

The attestation also records repository URL and commit, Lean and Lake versions, replay diagnostics, and resource controls. Missing cones are **unverifiable**; they are never interpreted as empty.

## 6.3 Operational self-reference

The service reports that tree heads are generated using a binary built from the same Ed25519 source family whose verification-path certificates appear in the log. Before signing, the operator recomputes inclusion of the newest signing- library leaf in the tree. This is useful operational coherence, but not proof of execution provenance. The signature authenticates the tree-head payload; it does not reveal the program that produced it. Reproducible builds or execution attestation would be required to establish that stronger claim.

# 7 Deployment and evaluation

The evaluation asks four questions: (E1) can substantial proof-replay evidence be consumed without deploying Lean; (E2) does the public history retain failed and superseded observations rather than silently replacing them; (E3) can the accumulator’s own arguments be placed under the same attestation discipline; and (E4) does mechanization expose mismatches between the proved model and the deployed verifier?

## 7.1 Public state

As of 16 July 2026, the public log contains thirteen leaves and current root

3488a2d0ff9f00415bb561d61b01a420e3ca2e0f7b29351ec9ebb3f57319da0d.

Every signed head issued since public mirroring began is retained — six heads, at tree sizes 8 through 13 — together with every leaf and receipt, in an append-only Git mirror; a clone re-verifies the entire log offline with the repository’s standalone verifier. The first twelve leaves are three four-fork replay generations. Leaves 0–3 record a failed audit run and remain permanently visible. Leaves 4–7 record a clean replay. Leaves 8–11 re-attest rewritten repository histories rather than replacing the old leaves. A leaf whose pinned commit ceases to be distributed decays from a replayable claim to a historical record; consumers act only on attestations whose subjects they can retrieve.

Leaf 12 (the thirteenth entry) attests the accumulator corpus at commit

172a1d0653f489d5b7cb73ac7942a57cbb496532

It records 61/61 reviewed certificates as proven with exact expected/observed cones. The corpus audit also inventories 222 compiled environment constants and permits exactly one boundary axiom, `LTLAcc.sha256`.




Figure 2: The public 13-leaf deployment. Failure leaves are retained; entry 13 attests the accumulator corpus itself, scoped to the recursive model.

## 7.2 Mechanization coverage

Entry 13 is not a claim that the whole service is formally verified. The Lean corpus covers the recursive Merkle model, inclusion completeness and collision-extracting soundness, the consistency extractor, and the Merkle-layer share of pin-store safety. The abstract root-binding lemma from the paper is mechanized through the specializations needed by the extractors rather than as one quantified hash-fold theorem. Signature unforgeability, execution provenance, the full signed-head state machine, asymptotic cost, and the refinement from the deployed iterative consistency verifier remain outside the corpus.

| Layer                 | Mechanized evidence                              | Explicit boundary                                                |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Merkle definitions    | MTH, Root, Path, recursive ConsRec               | single SHA-256 boundary axiom                                    |
| Inclusion             | completeness and named collision extractor       | collision resistance interpreted externally                      |
| Consistency           | recursive-model soundness and extractor          | no general consistency-completeness theorem                      |
| Pinning               | per-step monotonicity and prefix correctness     | signature layer and multi-step closure external                  |
| Deployment refinement | finite differential harness                      | no theorem for iterative verifier under authentic-pair invariant |
| Policy separation     | deterministic tooling logic and regression tests | not mechanized in the entry-13 corpus                            |

## 7.3 Cost and reproducibility

A replay of one Ed25519 fork requires approximately 30 minutes of end-to-end guarded replay time under the pinned environment, a figure corroborated by the inter-leaf issuance spacing visible in the published log. Receipt verification requires one Ed25519 signature and a logarithmic number of SHA-256 node computations. The accumulator corpus is independently reviewable with a pinned public Lean release; an environment-derived inventory fails closed on added, removed, or axiom-smuggling declarations.

The fidelity harness compares the Lean-definition transliteration with the deployed Python algorithms over pinned finite families:

| Family                | Cases   | Divergences | Interpretation                     |
|-----------------------|---------|-------------|------------------------------------|
| Inclusion             | 230,271 | 0           | baseline and out-of-range families |
| Consistency baseline  | 230,016 | 0           | honest and mutation families       |
| Lied-size consistency | 73,573  | 3,867       | all deployed-accepts-only          |

Finite testing is not a proof of extensional equality. Here it served a more valuable purpose: it falsified an overbroad equivalence claim and supplied a stable regression boundary.

*Remark 1* (Model/deployment seam). For malformed size claims, the deployed iterative verifier and the recursive model are not extensionally equal. In all 3,867 divergences observed across the pinned families the deployed verifier accepted and the model rejected; the reverse direction was not observed, and no global inclusion relation between the two acceptance sets is claimed. The public attestation therefore scopes soundness to the recursive model and states the additional operational assumption: roots and sizes must be bound by the authenticated pin-store and signed-head flow. This invariant is not mechanized in the present corpus.

## 7.4 Consumer prototypes and version exactness

The implemented internal consumer is a quorum-custody signing prototype: its inbound boundary accepts a log-derived statement only when independently attested verifier backends agree, and its policy consumes recorded observations, never operator labels. Separately, an informal check found a production codebase whose vendored Ed25519 dependency matches an attested subject at family level but not at the attested version; the model treats a family-level match as conferring nothing, because attestations are version-exact by construction. Neither observation is an evaluation claim; both indicate how the policy boundary is consumed in practice.

## 7.5 Proof portability across forks

Pure mathematical lemmas are largely reusable, while extraction-facing scripts diverge where code structure and generated names diverge. In the deployed corpora, the RISC Zero and Betrusted signature-layer proof files differ by 27 changed lines (tracking one fork’s optimization barrier and the forks’ differing operation order), other extraction-facing files differ by tens to hundreds of lines, and pure carry and field lemmas remain byte-identical. This supports a practical conclusion: verification is portable above the representation boundary and target-specific where implementation structure actually differs.

# 8 Related work

**Transparency.** Certificate Transparency introduced publicly auditable append-only logs for certificate issuance [1, 2]; Crosby and Wallach developed efficient tamper-evident history trees [3]; Dowling et al. formalized security notions for secure logging and CT [4]. CONIKS applies transparency to key directories [7]. LTL reuses the authenticated data structure but changes the payload and trust semantics: a leaf is an observation of a proof replay, not an issuance event or key binding.

**Software supply-chain attestations.** In-toto expresses supply-chain steps and link meta-data [6]. Sigstore combines ephemeral signing, identity, and transparency to reduce software-signing adoption barriers [5]. LTL is complementary: it concerns what a theorem prover reportedly accepted and which assumptions remained, not who built or signed a binary. A complete assurance chain should eventually combine both.

**Proof transport and verified cryptography.** Proof-carrying code ships a proof to a consumer-side checker [8]. LTL serves consumers that cannot deploy that checker and therefore accepts a different trust trade. HACl\*, EverCrypt, and Fiat-Crypto demonstrate verified cryptographic implementation pipelines [13, 14, 15]; Computer-aided frameworks such as EasyCrypt address scheme-level security proofs [10]; Aeneas targets functional verification of Rust through translation [11]. LTL does not compete with those systems: it distributes accountable statements about their replay.

**Verification of transparency protocols.** Cheval et al. mechanize transparency-protocol reasoning [9]. The entry-13 corpus approaches the composition from the opposite direction: it mechanizes accumulator arguments and then logs that replay result. The remaining refinement from the deployed state machine to the recursive model is explicitly open.

## 9 Limitations and research agenda

The subject corpus maintains a numbered ledger of fifteen known gaps together with their closure options; this section groups the load-bearing ones.

**Operator observation trust.** A malicious operator can fabricate a replay report. Signatures and Merkle proofs make the lie attributable and persistent; they do not make it true. Targeted independent replay is the corrective mechanism.

**Theorem identity.** Names and repository commits are not canonical semantic identifiers, and commit identifiers are SHA-1-based — a weaker binding than the log’s own SHA-256 tree. A future schema should commit to elaborated theorem-type digests, axiom declaration-type digests, and an environment or replay-manifest digest.

**Source-to-binary gap.** The evidence concerns source models at pinned commits. Reproducible builds, compiler validation, binary measurement, and side-channel evidence are outside the present result.

**Witnessing and key distribution.** The deployment has one operator and trust-on-first-use key distribution. A Git mirror gives retaining observers a common public view, but does not force all isolated clients to receive that view. Independent witnesses or gossip are the natural next deployment step.

**Consistency refinement.** The recursive model is proved; the iterative deployment diverges from it on malformed inputs, every observed divergence being deployed-accepts-only. The strongest closure is either to deploy ConsRec-equivalent semantics or to mechanize the signed-head and pin-store flow and prove the authentic-pair refinement theorem.

**Signed provenance.** Signing-backend metadata is operator-provided context and should be committed inside the signed tree-head payload. Even then it would remain an assertion, not execution proof.

**From accountable replay to cryptographic proof of replay.** A longer-term direction is a succinct proof that a fixed proof-checker binary accepted a fixed corpus. Such a system could reduce operator-observation trust, but would introduce a new verified-execution stack. LTL supplies an intermediate accountability layer and a public corpus against which that future system can be evaluated.

## 10 Conclusion

Formal verification solves the production of correctness evidence; it does not by itself solve distribution to consumers that cannot execute the verifier. This paper isolates that second problem and gives a cryptographic answer based on accountable replay attestation. The operator’s observation remains trusted, but its content is structured, its history is signed and

append-only, its assumption boundary is subject to consumer-local policy, and incompatible views become attributable when compared.

The Lean Transparency Log demonstrates the complete construction. It amortizes expensive replay over lightweight consumers, retains failed and superseded observations, and carries a scoped attestation of the accumulator’s own Lean corpus as entry 13. Just as importantly, the mechanization and differential harness exposed a mismatch between the recursive model and the deployed consistency verifier. Recording that mismatch in the public leaf is not a failure of the method; it is evidence that the trust decomposition is doing useful scientific work.

The next step is not to claim trustlessness. It is to close specific boundaries: canonical theorem-type commitments, reproducible source-to-binary linkage, independent witnesses, signed provenance commitments, and a proved refinement between the deployed signed-head flow and the recursive model. Accountable replay attestation provides an immediate infrastructure layer while those stronger validity mechanisms are developed.

## Artifact availability

The live service is <https://ltl.zkdefi.org>. Entry 13 has leaf hash

8cb258d657f1fd00baaa9e0091e26c316cb69b591cb249a9543f51cade57c50a

and is included in the size-13 head with root

3488a2d0ff9f00415bb561d61b01a420e3ca2e0f7b29351ec9ebb3f57319da0d

The public artifacts are available at:

- append-only mirror: [saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log](#);
- accumulator mechanization: [saymrwulf/ltl-accumulator-verified](#);
- provider and consumer tooling: [saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent](#).

A clone of the mirror re-verifies every numbered leaf, every published signed head, and every published receipt offline via `python3 verify.py --all` (Python standard library plus an `openssl` binary; the verifier fails closed if signature checking is unavailable, and its adversarial self-test ships beside it).

## Acknowledgments

The author designed the system and is responsible for every claim. Claude (Anthropic) and GPT (OpenAI) were used as critical assistants in proof-corpus, tooling, and manuscript review. Their output was not accepted as evidence; claims were retained only after human review or reproducible artifact checks.

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## A End-to-end claim matrix

| Consumer conclusion                                 | Established by                                                       | Remaining assumption                                                                                |
|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Leaf occupies index $m$ under head $h$              | inclusion proof and signed head                                      | SHA-256 collision resistance; correct public key; EUF-CMA of the head signature                     |
| Head was authorized by the log identity             | Ed25519 verification                                                 | correct key acquisition; EUF-CMA                                                                    |
| New pinned head extends old pinned head             | consistency proof                                                    | SHA-256 collision resistance; recursive-model soundness; authentic size/root pairing for deployment |
| Equal-size unequal roots conflict                   | two valid signatures                                                 | correct public key; EUF-CMA; operationally, a retaining observer must compare the heads             |
| Observed cone matches local boundary policy         | exact set equality                                                   | semantic identity of named declarations                                                             |
| Operator claims the kernel produced the observation | attestation signature and leaf inclusion                             | correct provider key; EUF-CMA                                                                       |
| Kernel actually produced the recorded observation   | not cryptographically established; independently checkable by replay | operator and replay-pipeline honesty, or faithful independent replay                                |
| Source corresponds to deployed binary               | not established                                                      | reproducible build and compiler assurance                                                           |
| Claimed signer implementation produced STH          | not established                                                      | execution provenance                                                                                |

## B Deployed entry-13 scope

The thirteenth public leaf contains the following deployment constraint, quoted verbatim, in its machine-readable scope block:

Attestation scope: this corpus kernel-checks the listed theorems about the mechanized recursive accumulator model. Correspondence with the deployed inclusion verifier is supported by finite differential testing over the pinned families. The deployed consistency verifier is not extensionally equal to the model; applying the mechanized soundness result to the deployed consumer flow additionally relies on an unmechanized authentic-size/root invariant (KNOWN-GAPS 14/15).

Its exclusions name SHA-256 collision resistance, deployed-verifier extensional equality, the signature/STH layer, and asymptotic cost claims.

## C Compact receipt-verification core

The following code is only the Merkle inclusion core. A complete receipt verifier must additionally validate the signed tree head, log identifier, tree-size binding, public-key fingerprint or pinned key, leaf hash, and receipt schema. The published log-repository verifier implements that full binding list for every published receipt — the binding fields are required, never compare-if-present — and fails closed when signature checking is unavailable.

```
import hashlib

def H(data):
    return hashlib.sha256(data).digest()

def h_leaf(data):
```

```

    return H(b"\x00" + data)

def h_node(left, right):
    return H(b"\x01" + left + right)

def split_below(n):
    return 1 << ((n - 1).bit_length() - 1)

def take(path, used):
    if used >= len(path):
        raise ValueError("proof exhausted")
    return path[used]

def root(value, index, size, path, used=0):
    if size == 1:
        return value, used
    k = split_below(size)
    if index < k:
        left, used = root(value, index, k, path, used)
        return h_node(left, take(path, used)), used + 1
    right, used = root(value, index-k, size-k, path, used)
    return h_node(take(path, used), right), used + 1

def verify_inclusion(leaf, index, size, path, expected_root):
    if size <= 0 or index < 0 or index >= size:
        return False
    try:
        result, used = root(h_leaf(leaf), index, size, path)
    except ValueError:
        return False
    return used == len(path) and result == expected_root

```

## D Four Ed25519 verification tiers

| Tier | Meaning                         | Upstream Lean declaration                  |
|------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| T1   | byte-level acceptance equation  | <code>verify_accepts_iff</code>            |
| T2   | canonical encoding lift         | <code>verify_accepts_iff_point</code>      |
| T3   | injectivity / point equation    | <code>verify_accepts_iff_point_eq</code>   |
| T4   | constructive decompression lift | <code>verify_accepts_iff_decompress</code> |