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d331ba17d9 Dogfood cryptography: pacta verifies signatures through the PROVEN code path
"Eat your own dogfood": pacta consumes certificates about a verified
Ed25519 implementation while checking those certificates' signatures
with OpenSSL. Now it can use the object of its own evidence:

- dogfood/pacta-verified-verify: a ~90-line Rust binary built against
  the PINNED proven source workspace (saymrwulf/curve25519-dalek-source
  at the exact commit the dalek certificates pin - the build records it:
  aa0f6ab...) with the serial backend pinned via RUSTFLAGS exactly as
  the verified extraction pins it. Cargo.toml is committed as a template
  ({{SOURCE}} placeholder) so no machine path is hardcoded; the rendered
  file, target/, and the built binary are gitignored.
- pacta dogfood-build --source <workspace>: renders, builds, installs
  to dogfood/state/, and writes a provenance sidecar (source commit,
  backend cfg, rustc, and an honest coverage note: the certificates
  cover verify_sha512, the extraction-refactored image of this verify
  path; SHA-512 and the wire glue remain the theorems' documented
  boundary). pacta dogfood-status reports the active backend.
- signing.verify_payload_ed25519_detailed: dispatch - the dogfood
  binary when present (backend "verified-dalek-serial"), OpenSSL
  fallback otherwise, and the backend that ACTUALLY ran is recorded in
  receipt signature statuses and attestation evidence. Fallback is
  never silent.
- --require-verified-verifier (receipt-verify + agent): policy fails
  closed when verification did not run on the certificate-covered
  path.
- ML-DSA is deliberately unchanged: no proven implementation exists,
  so the slot stays fail-closed "unavailable" - the honest hybrid-PQC
  posture is one proven-classical signature plus one required-but-
  unproven PQC slot, never a pretend backend.

Validated live: receipt verification through the proven verifier
(backend recorded), a corrupted signature bit rejected BY the proven
binary, tampered attestations rejected, and the policy failing closed
when the binary is absent. 49/49 tests green (incl. PEM-SPKI raw-key
cross-check against openssl, dispatch/backend recording with a stub,
and a real-binary roundtrip that skips gracefully where unbuilt).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 10:13:48 +02:00