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Author SHA1 Message Date
dcb48f453e warden cockpit: local read-only custody UI for the human operator
Operator-ordered milestone, built under an explicit no-risk constraint
while the paper application is in flight: strictly ADDITIVE (one new
module + one CLI subcommand; zero changes to wallet semantics, the
public site, or anything the paper describes), LOCAL-ONLY (never
deployed; binds 127.0.0.1), and READ-ONLY in v1 (human approve/deny is
deliberately deferred — that is a custody-semantics change belonging to
a separately reviewed milestone).

New: src/pacta/walletui.py — four views over an existing wallet:
- Posture: latch state, ledger head with FULL hash-chain
  re-verification, pinned quorum members, spending policy verbatim.
- Signature queue: airgap outbox/inbox, observed never operated.
- Incidents & refusals: verbatim records, newest first.
- Receipt inspector: paste attestation + receipt + log key; verdict,
  per-signature results, and diagnostics come verbatim from
  transparency.verify_receipt — the deployed verifier itself, reused
  not reimplemented.

Design law, stated in the module and enforced by tests: THE COCKPIT
RENDERS EVIDENCE, IT NEVER ASSERTS IT. Every panel recomputes at
request time and carries a provenance line (function + timestamp);
anything unverifiable renders a loud FAILED-TO-VERIFY panel — no cached
green, no neutral gray. Panels state what they do NOT prove (e.g.
binary pinning vs source-to-binary correspondence).

CLI: pacta wallet cockpit --wallet DIR [--host --port].
Tests (10 new, suite 118 -> 128 green): recomputed-evidence rendering,
CHAIN BROKEN on tampered ledger, loud failure on collector error,
latched-state rendering, airgap queue states, verbatim incident/refusal
rendering, fail-closed inspector on garbage, real-evidence roundtrip
(skips if example evidence absent), full-sweep BYTE-LEVEL read-only
guarantee (wallet dir hash-identical after all GETs + a POST), and
fail-fast on non-wallet dirs. Rendering additionally verified visually
against a live demo wallet (posture, quorum table, incidents).

Docs: docs/cockpit.md; WALLET.md section; ESTATE.md + llms.txt updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 18:02:17 +02:00
2f67f14054 docs: 'You hold the ruler' - customer-facing requirements-card box on the LTL page + WALLET.md
The lecture-11 framing where customers actually land: the allowed-axioms
list as a card the customer owns and can rewrite; verdicts re-derived
against THEIR copy; stricter card => itemized gap => relax / walk away /
grow the supply. Links to lecture 11 for the executable walk-through.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 22:32:27 +02:00
65772b3d2e warden hardening round: policy engine, ledger rotation, MCP UX, treasury LIVE, ops docs
Tier 2:
- request_signature decomposed into named gates (latch, freshness,
  intent, policy, signer, firewall)
- ledger: O(1) tail-read appends under a dedicated lock file (survives
  rotation rename); hash-chained segment rotation at policy
  ledger.rotate_at; verify-ledger walks all segments to genesis;
  archive tampering detected (tested)
- docs/threat-model.md (attacker matrix 1-9, proven-vs-trusted, design
  invariants) + docs/runbook-latch.md (diagnose-first recovery)
- lecture 10: executable corrupt-a-member exercise (capsule pin catches
  one appended byte), honest note on what the pin does NOT stop

Lightweight policy engine (POLICY_DENIED wired):
- policy.json: per-request/per-day amount ceilings, counterparty
  allow/deny lists, per-identity overrides; rules make their intent
  fields mandatory; daily sums from the ledger
-

Agent UX:
- signed refusal receipts travel inside MCP errors (receipt +
  receipt_path in structuredContent)
- airgap over MCP: request_signature signer=airgap + request_id,
  new airgap_pending tool; park -> list -> device answers -> complete
  (tested end-to-end)
- all 8 tools carry readOnly/destructive annotations
- sliding-window rate limiter per tool class (custody/verify/liveness);
  RATE_LIMITED refusal code; surface control, not ledgered

warden-treasury LIVE:
- treasury.py: stdlib base58, compact-u16, legacy+v0 wire parsing;
  every required signature quorum-verified over exact message bytes;
  completeness gap named in every verdict; RPC fetch uses response as
  bytes only
-
- live-quorum test: synthetic Solana tx signed with wallet key ->
  authentic via 4 proven forks; flipped byte -> not authentic

100 tests green (was 85).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 13:38:42 +02:00
ba47aa435d warden docs + study material: WALLET.md, products lineup, llms.txt, lecture 10
- WALLET.md: the product manual (one idea, trust posture table, R4 gate,
  quickstart, MCP surface, self-proving card, firewall, taxonomy)
- docs/products.md: four production-ready deployment profiles
  (solo/airgap/treasury/choir) with honest built-vs-wired boundaries
- llms.txt: agent-native discovery manifest at repo root
- README: warden intro + lecture 10 pointer
- notebooks/10_verified_custody_wallet.ipynb: ratchet-rule lecture (toy
  3-of-3 -> real four proven forks -> counterparty recomputes a card's
  inclusion proof); course README + notebook test updated
- 83 tests green

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 23:46:27 +02:00