Fifth quorum member, first post-quantum one: verifies an SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
signature by calling slh_verify_128s, the extraction root the eleven fips205
certificates cover (apex fips205.slh_verify_128s_accepts_iff). Verify-only
like the other four: quorum members judge, they never sign.
Build discipline, because "built from the proven source" is a claim that has
to survive a hostile reader: build-verify-slhdsa.sh REFUSES to build if the
pinned checkout is dirty or at any commit other than a3ce8e8, exports the
pinned commit via git archive (never a working copy), applies
expose-mono.patch to that scratch copy, and then DIFFS the patched
verify_mono.rs against the pinned one, aborting if any existing line changed
rather than being appended. The patch is a visibility keyword plus its doc
comment (the crate denies missing_docs, so pub mod alone does not compile)
and one appended argument-assembly function whose body is the crate's own
test helper. The extraction root is provably untouched. A provenance sidecar
lands beside the binary: source commit, patch hash, main.rs hash, rustc, and
a not_covered field naming what no certificate reaches — M-prime assembly
(including the pure/prehash domain-separator byte), hex/file IO, the
compiler; signing and keygen out of scope entirely.
Demonstrated against OpenSSL 3.5.5 on a throwaway key: valid signature OK
both ways, wrong message INVALID, corrupted signature INVALID. The agreement
is itself a finding — this binary assembles M' = 0x00 || 0x00 || payload
(pure variant, empty context) and OpenSSL evidently does the same.
Convention matches the other members: template + main.rs + patch + build
script tracked; rendered Cargo.toml, lock, target/ and the .build-slhdsa
scratch tree ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- dogfood/quorum/verify-{dalek,anza,risc0,betrusted}: verify-only crates
built from the pinned proven source workspaces (serial backends pinned
per fork; anza entry is the certificate-covered verify_sha512, not the
default Zebra-lineage verify())
- src/pacta/quorum.py: unanimity-required acceptance, divergence
taxonomy (semantic-edge vs unexplained/tamper), small-order/canonicity
edge flags, per-member provenance sidecars with binary hashes
- live smoke: 4/4 members agree on accept and reject
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
