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6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
9acb078844 Serve the paper at /paper; witness mirror must be independently operated
- web.py: /paper (and /paper/ltl.pdf) serve the committed PDF, loaded
  once at startup from the repo checkout; listed in the 404 endpoint
  index; covered by the web roundtrip test
- docs page: 'The paper' card linking the PDF
- DEPLOY.md: the second witness mirror belongs on a host the operator
  does NOT control (a self-hosted mirror adds no equivocation defense)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:44:06 +02:00
47dfb61a7f Move the log service to ltl.zkdefi.org (root path); keep path-mount support
- serve/webdocs/cli default to base_path='' (own subdomain, root serving)
- webdocs link builder handles the empty base like web.py already did
- all docs, paper, notebook 06b, and published-mirror README point at
  https://ltl.zkdefi.org; DEPLOY.md rewritten for subdomain + redirect
- tests: root mount is the production shape; one test keeps exercising
  the path-mounted variant

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 19:14:52 +02:00
159143d297 pacta repo public (owner order); server app is a git clone, update = git pull
The pacta repository is now public on GitHub. The server's app/ was
re-cloned from it (previously shipped via tar+scp while private), so the
production update path is now pure git pull for both app and published
log - no code shipping. Verified live after the switch: internal healthz
and the public docs site both 200, tree size 8. DEPLOY.md runbook
simplified accordingly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 17:42:09 +02:00
53f6c41100 DEPLOY.md: as-built record - the LTL is LIVE at zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log
Deployed from the provider notebook over the dedicated deploy key. The
host runs a compose stack, so the LTL joined it as a read-only container
(read_only: true, :ro volumes, no published ports, compose-network-only)
rather than the host-systemd variant; the domain's Caddy site block
gained a path handle that precedes the existing catch-all, validated in
a throwaway container before reload, with timestamped backups of both
config files. The servable log dir is reconstructed FROM the published
GitHub mirror (the server holds witness-grade data only - no keys).

Live smoke over the public internet from the provider machine: /docs
(the SVG site), /v1/sth, /healthz (tree size 8) all 200; the existing
service on the domain unaffected; and the complete agent flow ran
against the production URL - log-fetch, receipt-verify through the
dogfood verifier with a fresh pin store and freshness policy, and
sth-refresh confirming pin consistency online.

DEPLOY.md now leads with the as-built compose record + update runbook
(reconstruct.py helper installed server-side); the original systemd
variant is kept for docker-less deployments. 54/54 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 17:22:43 +02:00
9092f032e0 Public-exposure self-audit: genericize DEPLOY.md, scrub provider paths
Socratic pass over everything this public repo reveals, adversary-first:

- DEPLOY.md no longer names the hosting provider or the server's other
  software inventory (that sentence was NEW public information - the
  site's front page does not advertise it). It now states its own
  redaction policy up front, leads with a Caddy proxy config (matching
  what the target site actually fronts with), adds rate-limiting and
  proxy timeouts for the stdlib backend, generalizes the second-mirror
  section, and gains an explicit key-hygiene section (the signing key
  never touches the public server; a compromised box has nothing to
  rotate).
- Future attestations stop leaking provider-machine paths: the
  machine_protection guard path is recorded repo-relative and the Lean
  project dir is recorded in its configured env-var form, never
  machine-resolved. (The 12 already-published leaves containing local
  home paths are immutable by design - severity assessed low: a local
  username on a non-addressable dev box, no credentials - and an
  append-only log does not rewrite its history.)

Audited clean: no keys, tokens, or credential-named files anywhere in
git history; no public IPs; loopback-only binds; commit identity is the
owner's long-standing public one. 54/54 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 16:16:10 +02:00
fbe40c3dfe The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses
Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust:

- PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file
  per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as
  the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the
  provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer
  README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis:
  8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head).
- ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency
  HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for
  zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history,
  /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries,
  /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation
  at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify-
  without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean
  boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed
  offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning +
  freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded
  append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the
  existing log).
- AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly
  UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and
  pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via
  an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed).
- WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror
  recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every
  historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the
  leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the
  leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives
  customers the same audit with zero installation.
- DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org -
  reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server
  stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy
  path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update
  cycle, and remote smoke tests.

Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched
proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning,
online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught,
standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 16:05:20 +02:00