Socratic pass over everything this public repo reveals, adversary-first:
- DEPLOY.md no longer names the hosting provider or the server's other
software inventory (that sentence was NEW public information - the
site's front page does not advertise it). It now states its own
redaction policy up front, leads with a Caddy proxy config (matching
what the target site actually fronts with), adds rate-limiting and
proxy timeouts for the stdlib backend, generalizes the second-mirror
section, and gains an explicit key-hygiene section (the signing key
never touches the public server; a compromised box has nothing to
rotate).
- Future attestations stop leaking provider-machine paths: the
machine_protection guard path is recorded repo-relative and the Lean
project dir is recorded in its configured env-var form, never
machine-resolved. (The 12 already-published leaves containing local
home paths are immutable by design - severity assessed low: a local
username on a non-addressable dev box, no credentials - and an
append-only log does not rewrite its history.)
Audited clean: no keys, tokens, or credential-named files anywhere in
git history; no public IPs; loopback-only binds; commit identity is the
owner's long-standing public one. 54/54 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust:
- PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file
per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as
the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the
provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer
README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis:
8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head).
- ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency
HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for
zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history,
/v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries,
/v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation
at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify-
without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean
boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed
offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning +
freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded
append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the
existing log).
- AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly
UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and
pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via
an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed).
- WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror
recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every
historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the
leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the
leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives
customers the same audit with zero installation.
- DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org -
reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server
stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy
path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update
cycle, and remote smoke tests.
Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched
proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning,
online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught,
standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dogfood principle now runs in BOTH directions. Agents already
verified signatures through the proven dalek path; now the provider
SIGNS with it too, and proves to itself that the signing code is in its
own log before every signature:
- dogfood binary gains a `sign` mode (seed over stdin, never argv;
ed25519_dalek::SigningKey from the same pinned merkleized workspace).
Honesty ledger unchanged: the library's VERIFY path is
certificate-covered; its signing path is declared trusted base - but
it is the ATTESTED artifact, not an un-attested third implementation.
- sign_payload_ed25519_detailed: signing dispatch mirroring the verify
dispatch; the backend that actually signed is recorded in every
attestation signature block and STH.
- THE SELF-REFERENTIAL CHECK: before signing any tree head, the
provider runs the SAME Merkle inclusion verification an agent runs -
against the very tree it is about to sign - for the newest leaf
attesting the signing library itself, and embeds the result in the
signature block:
signing_provenance:
signing_backend: verified-dalek-serial
signing_library_component: dalek-ed25519-verified
signing_library_source_commit: aa0f6ab...
self_inclusion: verified
signing_library_leaf_index: 4
signing_library_certificates_proven: 16/16
A root signature that names the leaf vouching for the code that
produced it. First-append chicken-and-egg is handled honestly
(self_inclusion: library_not_in_log).
- Evidence refreshed: all four receipts re-issued under dogfood-signed
STHs; the full agent verify loop re-run green.
50/50 tests (new signing roundtrip test, skip-safe where unbuilt).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pacta's replay invoked `lake env lean` bare - on the reference machine
that is exactly the pattern that once OOM-crashed the host (see the
corpus' POSTMORTEM). New RepoConfig.lean_guard (set for all five repos
in examples/repos.yaml: verification/lean-guard): when configured,
every compile and axiom audit runs `lake env <guard> <file> --root=...`
instead of bare lean - hard memory cap via systemd scope + lean -M,
core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock, free-RAM preflight with the
Guard-3a retry ladder, all tuned via LEAN_MEM_MB / LEAN_MIN_FREE_MB /
LEAN_MEM_WAIT_SEC / LEAN_TIMEOUT / LEAN_MAX_CORES. Provider
attestations now record a machine_protection block naming the guard
(or "UNGUARDED"). Smoke-tested live on the real dalek repo: clamping
trace visible, compile green. 49/49 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A transparency log without split-view defense is just a signature with
extra steps: the provider could serve one tree to the agent and another
to the world, or roll the log back, and standalone receipt verification
would never notice. The primitives (RFC 9162 consistency proofs) were
already implemented and correct; this closes the loop on the AGENT side.
- src/pacta/sthstore.py: a local STH pin store. Unknown log -> pin
(trust-on-first-use, recorded as such). Same tree size -> the root
must match the pin byte-for-byte; a mismatch is named EQUIVOCATION
and is a hard rejection. Larger tree -> a consistency proof FROM THE
PINNED SIZE is required and verified before the pin advances
(receipts already embed a from-previous anchor; the anchor's root is
itself checked against the pin so a lying anchor cannot bridge a
split view). Smaller tree -> LOG ROLLBACK, hard rejection.
- Freshness policy: --max-sth-age-seconds rejects stale (or
future-dated) tree heads - an old-but-valid STH can hide later
entries.
- Wired into receipt-verify, claims, and agent (--sth-store,
--consistency-proof, --max-sth-age-seconds); evidence records the
pin action; any accountability failure fails the receipt closed.
- Provider: log-consistency --from-size N (serve proofs for pinning
agents whose pin is older than the receipt's embedded anchor) and
log-audit (monitor self-check: recompute the tree, verify the stored
STH and per-entry leaf hashes).
Live drill in this commit's validation: pin-on-first-use -> matched ->
grown-with-proof advance -> a real forged same-size split view REJECTED
with the equivocation diagnostic -> freshness rejection -> clean
self-audit. tests/test_sthstore.py covers pin/match/equivocation,
growth-without-proof, lying consistency anchors, rollback, freshness.
45/45 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The verified corpus completed its phase 2 on 2026-07-06: every ed25519
fork now carries FOUR button-enforced apex tiers up to the full lift
(accept <=> decompress(R) = [k](-A)+[s]B as points), the complete scalar
layer, and the constructive encoding/decoding chain. pacta was calibrated
to the pre-apex corpus and - worse - had no vocabulary for
boundary-audited certificates: its axiom audit knew only "clean = exactly
the three standard axioms", so the apex tiers would have scored dirty.
New vocabulary:
- Profile.certificate_axioms: per-certificate ALLOWED axiom sets;
expected_axioms_for(cert) resolves each certificate's own boundary.
- RepoConfig.apex_boundary: a simple per-fork key (dalek-wrappers /
hash3 / anza) expanded by the ed25519 profile into the exact
per-tier allowed sets. AUTHORITY NOTE in profiles/ed25519.py: each
repo's check.sh Phase 3b is the enforcement point; if the button and
this table disagree, the button wins.
- run_axiom_audit compares each certificate against ITS allowed set;
deviation in EITHER direction (extra axiom or missing boundary
axiom) is dirty.
New risk reality:
- R4 is now reachable: full four-tier apex + constructive chain +
scalar arithmetic, all proven with cones pinned to their documented
boundaries. R4 always carries explicit residual blockers (SHA-512
oracle, hypothesis-parametric wire parses, translation faithfulness,
no side-channel/build assurance - those gate R5).
- R3 unchanged (arithmetic pair) and now explains exactly which apex
certificates are missing for R4.
Attestation trust model hardened:
- The provider is trusted for its OBSERVATION, never its VERDICT:
axiom_status is re-derived locally from observed_axioms against the
agent's own boundary policy. A provider that labels a dirty cone
"clean" gains nothing; "proven" with no observed axioms is
"unverifiable".
- Partial attestations degrade instead of being rejected: uncovered
certificates stay unproven and the score caps accordingly (an
arithmetic-only attestation still authorizes an R3 library capsule,
never a wallet).
Also: scripts/mini_pytest.py - a dependency-free test runner (tmp_path,
raises, monkeypatch, capsys) for hosts without pytest; examples
regenerated FROM the tool (dalek/anza fixtures now R4, 16 certs; new
full four-tier attestation example); tests updated + new
tests/test_boundaries.py (lying-provider, missing-boundary-axiom,
partial-coverage cases). 40/40 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
