paper: position the two-disciplines bridge explicitly (intro, 2 sentences)

The LTL does not mechanize cryptographic security proofs (EasyCrypt and
relatives own that bridge, now cited); it bridges the adjacent, mostly
empty gap - type-theory-certified artifacts have no distribution
infrastructure, and cryptographic transparency infrastructure has never
carried kernel-checked mathematics. Fit maintained at 4 pages (bottom
margin 1.95cm, bibliography scriptsize); pages 1 and 4 visually
inspected; 18 references.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mrwulf 2026-07-07 10:06:12 +02:00
parent 3aa8d4b2bf
commit d4872b140a
2 changed files with 13 additions and 3 deletions

Binary file not shown.

View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
\documentclass[10pt,twocolumn]{article}
\usepackage[margin=1.7cm,bottom=2.1cm]{geometry}
\usepackage[margin=1.7cm,bottom=1.95cm]{geometry}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{lmodern}
\usepackage{microtype}
@ -134,7 +134,13 @@ databases---applied to a payload with different trust semantics:
exact assumption set}. We claim no novelty for any component (the hash
structure and proof algorithms are RFC~9162 verbatim); the contribution
is the composition, its trust model, and a deployed, reproducible
instance.
instance. The LTL does not mechanize cryptographic security
proofs---that inter-disciplinary bridge is already being built by
EasyCrypt and its relatives~\cite{easycrypt}. It bridges the adjacent,
mostly empty gap: type-theory-certified artifacts have no distribution
infrastructure, and cryptographic transparency infrastructure has never
carried kernel-checked mathematics---each discipline solving the
other's problem.
\S\ref{sec:log} describes the log and its trust model,
\S\ref{sec:dogfood} the self-referential signing loop,
@ -400,7 +406,7 @@ and this paper were produced with substantial assistance from Claude
(Anthropic). All claims are enforced by the referenced check scripts and
are independently re-checkable from the public artifacts.
\begin{thebibliography}{19}\footnotesize
\begin{thebibliography}{19}\scriptsize
\setlength{\itemsep}{1pt}
\bibitem{rfc6962} B.~Laurie, A.~Langley, E.~K\"asper.
@ -428,6 +434,10 @@ Users. \emph{USENIX Security}, 2015.
Automatic verification of transparency protocols.
\emph{IEEE EuroS\&P}, 2023. arXiv:2303.04500.
\bibitem{easycrypt} G.~Barthe, B.~Gr\'egoire, S.~Heraud,
S.~Zanella~B\'eguelin. Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working
Cryptographer. \emph{CRYPTO}, LNCS 6841, pp.~71--90, 2011.
\bibitem{aeneas} S.~Ho, J.~Protzenko.
Aeneas: Rust verification by functional translation.
\emph{Proc.\ ACM Program.\ Lang.} 6 (ICFP): 711--741, 2022.