site language: 'additive' retired, sibling keys get sibling names

Operator: 'additive' explains nothing to a newcomer, and Key 2 carried
its full parameter-set name while Key 1 was just 'Ed25519' — unequal
treatment. Now: 'Key 1 — Ed25519, required' / 'Key 2 — SLH-DSA
(FIPS 205), post-quantum'; the second signature is called exactly that,
'the second (post-quantum) signature'; parameter-set precision stays in
the artifacts where it belongs. Same cleanup in the OpenAPI summary and
the CLI help.
This commit is contained in:
mrwulf 2026-08-17 10:41:18 +02:00
parent bcbf929045
commit c5268ef46c
3 changed files with 6 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ def _openapi_document(base: str) -> dict:
"servers": [{"url": "https://ltl.zkdefi.org" + base}],
"paths": {
"/log-public-key": {"get": {"summary": "Required Ed25519 public key (PEM)", "responses": ok}},
"/log-slhdsa-public-key": {"get": {"summary": "Additive post-quantum SLH-DSA public key (PEM)", "responses": ok}},
"/log-slhdsa-public-key": {"get": {"summary": "Post-quantum SLH-DSA public key (PEM)", "responses": ok}},
"/healthz": {"get": {"summary": "Liveness and current tree size", "responses": ok}},
"/paper": {"get": {"summary": "The current paper (PDF)", "responses": ok}},
f"/{API_VERSION}/metadata": {"get": {"summary": "Log identity", "responses": ok}},

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@ -151,8 +151,7 @@ def _trust_anchor_html(log: TransparencyLog, metadata: dict[str, Any], base: str
slh_pem = escape(slh_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip())
slh_fp = _h.sha256(slh_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
slh_block = f"""<hr style="border:none;border-top:1px solid #ddd;margin:.8rem 0">
<p style="margin-top:0"><strong>Key&nbsp;2 SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s (FIPS&nbsp;205), additive
post-quantum.</strong> Heads from tree size&nbsp;14 on carry a second signature from this key;
<p style="margin-top:0"><strong>Key&nbsp;2 SLH-DSA (FIPS&nbsp;205), post-quantum.</strong> Heads from tree size&nbsp;14 on carry a second signature from this key;
older heads legitimately have none an append-only log keeps its history. Check it where your
tooling allows (OpenSSL&nbsp;&nbsp;3.5). The kind of code that verifies such signatures is itself
a proof subject of this log (leaf&nbsp;18).</p>
@ -256,8 +255,8 @@ You still trust: that the operator&rsquo;s recorded observation is honest.<br>
You need: four small files from the tables below the two public keys, plus one library&rsquo;s
claim file (&ldquo;attestation&rdquo;) and its proof of inclusion (&ldquo;receipt&rdquo;).
<pre>pacta receipt-verify --attestation --receipt --log-public-key provider.ed25519.pub --slhdsa-public-key provider.slhdsa.pub</pre>
<span class="muted">Your machine checks the required Ed25519 signature, the additive
post-quantum co-signature (needs OpenSSL&nbsp;&nbsp;3.5; drop the second flag to skip it), and
<span class="muted">Your machine checks the required Ed25519 signature, the second (post-quantum) signature
(needs OpenSSL&nbsp;&nbsp;3.5; drop the second flag to skip it), and
~{max(1,(latest.get('tree_size') or 1).bit_length())} hashes no proof assistant involved.
The <code>pacta</code> tool ships in the
<a href="https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent">pacta repository</a>
@ -320,7 +319,7 @@ log id <code>{escape(str(metadata.get('log_id',''))[:16])}…</code>.</p>
<h2>What do I download? the three artifacts, unambiguously</h2>
<p>To benefit from the accumulator you need <strong>exactly three files</strong> per
library, plus optionally the additive post-quantum key
library, plus optionally the post-quantum key
(<code>provider.slhdsa.pub</code>) and the whole mirror. Nothing else.</p>
<table>
<tr><th>#</th><th>Artifact</th><th>What it is</th><th>Where</th></tr>

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@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
receipt_verify.add_argument("--receipt", required=True)
receipt_verify.add_argument("--log-public-key", required=True)
receipt_verify.add_argument("--require-signatures", choices=["ed25519", "both"], default="ed25519")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--slhdsa-public-key", help="Also verify the additive SLH-DSA head co-signature against this public key (OpenSSL >= 3.5; heads before tree size 14 report absent, not failed).")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--slhdsa-public-key", help="Also verify the second (post-quantum, SLH-DSA) head signature against this public key (OpenSSL >= 3.5; heads before tree size 14 report absent, not failed).")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--sth-store", help="Path to the local STH pin store (split-view/rollback defense).")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--consistency-proof", help="File with a hex consistency proof from the pinned tree size (provider: log-consistency).")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--max-sth-age-seconds", type=int, help="Reject signed tree heads older than this (freshness policy).")