diff --git a/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py b/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py
index d90ebc4..ffc29dd 100644
--- a/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py
+++ b/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py
@@ -255,8 +255,9 @@ two holders compare.
You still trust: that the operator’s recorded observation is honest.
You need: four small files from the tables below — the two public keys, plus one library’s
claim file (“attestation”) and its proof of inclusion (“receipt”).
-
pacta receipt-verify --attestation … --receipt … --log-public-key provider.ed25519.pub-Your machine checks one Ed25519 signature and +
pacta receipt-verify --attestation … --receipt … --log-public-key provider.ed25519.pub --slhdsa-public-key provider.slhdsa.pub+Your machine checks the required Ed25519 signature, the additive +post-quantum co-signature (needs OpenSSL ≥ 3.5; drop the second flag to skip it), and ~{max(1,(latest.get('tree_size') or 1).bit_length())} hashes — no proof assistant involved. The
pacta tool ships in the
pacta repository
diff --git a/src/pacta/cli.py b/src/pacta/cli.py
index 4cd8803..3c7ac98 100644
--- a/src/pacta/cli.py
+++ b/src/pacta/cli.py
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
receipt_verify.add_argument("--receipt", required=True)
receipt_verify.add_argument("--log-public-key", required=True)
receipt_verify.add_argument("--require-signatures", choices=["ed25519", "both"], default="ed25519")
+ receipt_verify.add_argument("--slhdsa-public-key", help="Also verify the additive SLH-DSA head co-signature against this public key (OpenSSL >= 3.5; heads before tree size 14 report absent, not failed).")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--sth-store", help="Path to the local STH pin store (split-view/rollback defense).")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--consistency-proof", help="File with a hex consistency proof from the pinned tree size (provider: log-consistency).")
receipt_verify.add_argument("--max-sth-age-seconds", type=int, help="Reject signed tree heads older than this (freshness policy).")
@@ -476,7 +477,8 @@ def cmd_score(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
def cmd_receipt_verify(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
attestation = load_attestation(args.attestation)
receipt = load_receipt(args.receipt)
- result = verify_receipt(attestation, receipt, args.log_public_key, require_signatures=args.require_signatures)
+ result = verify_receipt(attestation, receipt, args.log_public_key, require_signatures=args.require_signatures,
+ slhdsa_public_key_path=args.slhdsa_public_key)
accountability_diagnostics = _log_accountability_checks(
receipt,
sth_store=args.sth_store,
diff --git a/src/pacta/transparency.py b/src/pacta/transparency.py
index fa90699..e9a51ed 100644
--- a/src/pacta/transparency.py
+++ b/src/pacta/transparency.py
@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ def verify_receipt(
receipt: dict[str, Any],
log_public_key_path: str | Path,
require_signatures: str = "ed25519",
+ slhdsa_public_key_path: str | Path | None = None,
) -> ReceiptVerificationResult:
diagnostics: list[str] = []
if receipt.get("type") != RECEIPT_TYPE:
@@ -266,6 +267,29 @@ def verify_receipt(
sth = receipt.get("sth") or {}
sth_ok, sth_diagnostics, statuses = verify_signed_tree_head(sth, log_public_key_path, require_signatures=require_signatures)
diagnostics.extend(sth_diagnostics)
+ if slhdsa_public_key_path is not None:
+ # The additive post-quantum co-signature (heads from tree size 14
+ # on). Absent on older heads is NOT a failure - an append-only log
+ # keeps its history; a present-but-bad signature fails closed.
+ from .slhdsa import verify_payload_slhdsa
+
+ slh = (sth.get("signatures") or {}).get("slh_dsa") or {}
+ if str(slh.get("status") or "absent") == "signed":
+ try:
+ slh_ok, slh_error = verify_payload_slhdsa(
+ signed_tree_head_payload(sth),
+ str(slh.get("signature_base64") or ""),
+ slhdsa_public_key_path,
+ )
+ except Exception as exc: # old OpenSSL, unreadable key: fail closed
+ slh_ok, slh_error = False, f"SLH-DSA verification unavailable: {exc}"
+ if slh_ok:
+ statuses["slh_dsa"] = "verified"
+ else:
+ statuses["slh_dsa"] = "failed"
+ diagnostics.append(f"SLH-DSA head co-signature did not verify: {slh_error}")
+ else:
+ statuses["slh_dsa"] = "absent"
try:
tree_size = int(receipt.get("tree_size"))
leaf_index = int(receipt.get("leaf_index"))
diff --git a/tests/test_transparency.py b/tests/test_transparency.py
index 63dd61c..0b1ce4f 100644
--- a/tests/test_transparency.py
+++ b/tests/test_transparency.py
@@ -145,3 +145,42 @@ def test_requiring_both_signatures_fails_without_ml_dsa_backend(tmp_path):
assert not result.accepted
assert result.signatures["ed25519"] == "verified"
assert result.signatures["ml_dsa"] != "verified"
+
+
+def test_receipt_verify_checks_slhdsa_cosignature(tmp_path):
+ # Rung 2 of the site promises both head signatures are checkable;
+ # this binds the promise to the tool (operator-caught 2026-08-16).
+ import pytest
+
+ from pacta import slhdsa
+
+ try:
+ slhdsa.generate_slhdsa_keypair(tmp_path / "slh.key", tmp_path / "slh.pub")
+ except Exception:
+ pytest.skip("OpenSSL without SLH-DSA support on this host")
+ attestation, private_key, public_key = _signed_attestation(tmp_path)
+ from pacta.yamlio import dump_data
+
+ dump_data(attestation, tmp_path / "attestation.yaml")
+ log = TransparencyLog(tmp_path / "log")
+ log.init("local-test-provider", public_key)
+ receipt = log.append_attestation(
+ tmp_path / "attestation.yaml", private_key, public_key,
+ receipt_out=tmp_path / "receipt.yaml",
+ slhdsa_private_key_path=tmp_path / "slh.key",
+ slhdsa_public_key_path=tmp_path / "slh.pub",
+ )
+ result = verify_receipt(attestation, receipt, public_key,
+ slhdsa_public_key_path=tmp_path / "slh.pub")
+ assert result.accepted, result.diagnostics
+ assert result.signatures["slh_dsa"] == "verified"
+
+ tampered = __import__("copy").deepcopy(receipt)
+ sig = tampered["sth"]["signatures"]["slh_dsa"]["signature_base64"]
+ import base64 as _b64
+ raw = bytearray(_b64.b64decode(sig)); raw[0] ^= 0xFF
+ tampered["sth"]["signatures"]["slh_dsa"]["signature_base64"] = _b64.b64encode(bytes(raw)).decode()
+ bad = verify_receipt(attestation, tampered, public_key,
+ slhdsa_public_key_path=tmp_path / "slh.pub")
+ assert not bad.accepted
+ assert bad.signatures["slh_dsa"] == "failed"