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Public-exposure self-audit: genericize DEPLOY.md, scrub provider paths
Socratic pass over everything this public repo reveals, adversary-first: - DEPLOY.md no longer names the hosting provider or the server's other software inventory (that sentence was NEW public information - the site's front page does not advertise it). It now states its own redaction policy up front, leads with a Caddy proxy config (matching what the target site actually fronts with), adds rate-limiting and proxy timeouts for the stdlib backend, generalizes the second-mirror section, and gains an explicit key-hygiene section (the signing key never touches the public server; a compromised box has nothing to rotate). - Future attestations stop leaking provider-machine paths: the machine_protection guard path is recorded repo-relative and the Lean project dir is recorded in its configured env-var form, never machine-resolved. (The 12 already-published leaves containing local home paths are immutable by design - severity assessed low: a local username on a non-addressable dev box, no credentials - and an append-only log does not rewrite its history.) Audited clean: no keys, tokens, or credential-named files anywhere in git history; no public IPs; loopback-only binds; commit identity is the owner's long-standing public one. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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DEPLOY.md
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DEPLOY.md
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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
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# Deploying the online log at zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log
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Everything below is prepared to run on the DigitalOcean host (the one
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running Forgejo). Nothing here needs to run on the development machine —
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this file is the checklist for the server session.
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Checklist for the server session. Deliberately generic about the host:
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this file is public, so it names only what customers must know anyway
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(the service URL) and standard software layouts - no provider inventory,
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no credentials, nothing an attacker couldn't already get from public DNS.
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## What gets deployed
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@ -72,31 +73,51 @@ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8461/lean-transparency-log/healthz
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## 3. Reverse proxy on zkdefi.org
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nginx (add inside the existing zkdefi.org server block, alongside Forgejo):
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Caddy (inside the existing `zkdefi.org` site block):
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```nginx
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location /lean-transparency-log/ {
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proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8461/lean-transparency-log/;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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}
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location = /lean-transparency-log {
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return 301 /lean-transparency-log/docs;
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```caddy
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redir /lean-transparency-log /lean-transparency-log/docs
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route /lean-transparency-log/* {
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reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8461 {
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transport http {
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response_header_timeout 15s
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}
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}
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}
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```
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(Caddy equivalent: `handle_path` not needed — `reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8461`
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under `route /lean-transparency-log*`.)
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nginx equivalent, with basic rate limiting (the backend is a stdlib
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threading server - let the proxy absorb abuse):
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```nginx
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limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=pactalog:1m rate=20r/s;
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location /lean-transparency-log/ {
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limit_req zone=pactalog burst=40 nodelay;
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proxy_read_timeout 15s;
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proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8461/lean-transparency-log/;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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}
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location = /lean-transparency-log { return 301 /lean-transparency-log/docs; }
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```
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Check: `https://zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log/docs` renders the customer
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documentation; `/v1/sth` returns the dogfood-signed head.
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## 4. Forgejo mirror
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## 4. Second mirror (any Forgejo/Gitea/GitLab you operate)
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In Forgejo: create migration/mirror of
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`https://github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log` (and optionally the
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pacta repo) with periodic sync. The published repo is the witness channel;
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having it on BOTH GitHub and Forgejo means witnesses on two independent
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hosts — exactly the point.
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Create a periodic pull-mirror of
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`https://github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log` on a second,
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independently-operated git host. The published repo is the witness
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channel; two independent mirrors mean split-view lies must fool two
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infrastructures at once — exactly the point.
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## 4b. Key hygiene (non-negotiable)
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The provider SIGNING key never touches this server. The service is
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read-only by construction and the systemd unit mounts the tree read-only;
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keep it that way. If the box is ever compromised, rotate nothing —
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there is nothing to rotate here; verify the published mirror with
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`verify.py --all` and redeploy.
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## 5. Update cycle (provider machine → world)
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@ -106,7 +127,7 @@ After each new proof-check run on the provider machine:
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pacta_provider log-append ... # signs new head (offline, dogfood)
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pacta_provider log-publish --log-dir ... --git-dir <clone of lean-transparency-log> \
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--public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
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cd <clone> && git add -A && git commit -m "log update" && git push # GitHub + Forgejo sync
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cd <clone> && git add -A && git commit -m "log update" && git push # mirrors sync from here
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# on the server: cd /srv/pacta/published && git pull && re-run step 1's reconstruction
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sudo systemctl restart pacta-log
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```
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@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ def build_attestation(
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"provider": provider,
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"issued_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
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"machine_protection": {
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"lean_guard": lean_guard or "UNGUARDED",
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# privacy: record the guard REPO-RELATIVE - attestations are
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# published leaves and must not leak provider-machine paths.
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"lean_guard": (str(Path(lean_guard).relative_to(path.resolve())) if lean_guard and Path(lean_guard).is_relative_to(path.resolve()) else ("configured" if lean_guard else "UNGUARDED")),
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"note": "All Lean compiles route through the repo's lean-guard (memory cap, core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock) when configured.",
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},
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"subject": {
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@ -91,7 +93,9 @@ def build_attestation(
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"lean_version": lean_version,
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"lake_version": lake_version,
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"env_script": str(env_script or repo.env_script or ""),
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"lean_project_dir": str(project_dir or lean_project_dir or repo.lean_project_dir or ""),
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# privacy: record the CONFIGURED value (env-var form), never the
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# machine-resolved absolute path - attestations are published.
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"lean_project_dir": str(lean_project_dir or repo.lean_project_dir or ""),
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},
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"replay": {
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"check_attempted": check.attempted,
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