diff --git a/docs/warden-lineup.html b/docs/warden-lineup.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..878cebf --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/warden-lineup.html @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +warden — verified-custody wallet + + +
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warden · a pacta product

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Custody that checks its own math.

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A verified-custody Ed25519 wallet whose trust boundary is a quorum of four independently proven curve25519-dalek forks.

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Inbound acceptance requires all four to agree. Every outbound signature must pass the same quorum — a firewall — before it is released. Because each fork is proven to decide the same equation, a disagreement isn't an opinion. It's a caught fault.

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accept(A,m,R,s)  ⇔  decompress(R) = [k](−A) + [s]B
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+ 4  proven forks + R4  end-to-end coverage gate + RFC 9162  transparency-logged evidence + MCP  agent-native surface + 83  tests green +
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The trust posture — read before trusting it

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Strongest exactly where custody needs it. Honest everywhere else.

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The whole design is an asymmetry: the decision of whether an inbound authorization is real stands on machine-checked proofs; the weaker outbound edge is fenced by the same quorum acting as a firewall, and named as trusted base rather than dressed up.

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Inbound verificationquorum of certificate-covered verify paths
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custody-grade · proven
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Outbound firewallverify-after-sign, same quorum
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custody-grade · proven
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Outbound signing itselfthe attested artifact, not a third implementation
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trusted base · fenced
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SHA-512 · wire parsersoracle / hypotheses inside the theorems
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documented boundary
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ML-DSA · post-quantumno proven implementation exists
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fail-closed
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How the boundary works

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Four proofs vote. Unanimity releases. Dissent latches.

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+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + intent + purpose+bytes + + + sign + trusted base + + + + QUORUM FIREWALL + + + dalek + + anza + + risc0 + + betrusted + + all proven to decide the + same accept() predicate + unanimity required + + + + RELEASE + signature + quorum trail → ledger + + + QUARANTINE + LATCH + never returned · custody frozen + + + + + + + +

intent → sign → firewall → release  ·  a signature the wallet's own signer produced, rejected by the wallet's own quorum, never reaches the chain

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The lineup

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One core. Four deployment profiles.

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Same tested core — quorum boundary, signing firewall, hash-chained ledger, MCP surface — wired into four situations. The trust posture above holds for all four without exception. What changes is where the boundary sits and what it's plugged into.

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+ 01 · warden-solo +

The custody sidecar

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For a single autonomous agent that owns a wallet and must not sign anything it would regret. Local signer, quorum firewall on every outbound, MCP next to the agent.

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The agent gets a conscience it cannot bribe. Refusal receipts make it portable — when warden says no, the agent can prove to its principal exactly what was refused, and why.
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  • local dogfood signer
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  • intent-bound outbound + firewall
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  • signed, machine-actionable refusals
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LIVE — the tested default path

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+ 02 · warden-airgap +

The signing firewall for hardware

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For custody where the key never touches the networked host — a Precursor/Betrusted device, an HSM, a phone in a drawer. Seed stays across the gap; the returned signature still faces the quorum.

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Verify-after-sign, but the verifier is proven. A glitched or substituted device signature is quarantined and latches custody — it never reaches the chain.
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  • outbox/inbox gap protocol
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  • fault-injection countermeasure, machine-checked
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  • leans on the proven betrusted fork
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LIVE — two-file exchange, park-then-complete tested

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+ 03 · warden-treasury +

Trust-minimized chain watching

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For an agent that must believe on-chain state without trusting an RPC provider's word. Re-verify the signatures on treasury transactions with Solana's own proven verify path.

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The treasury trusts mathematics, not middlemen. A lying RPC can withhold data but cannot manufacture a signature the quorum will accept.
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  • anza member re-verifies locally
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  • RPC demoted from oracle to bandwidth
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  • observation-not-verdict, applied to chain data
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PRODUCT-READY — one integration point: a tx adapter

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+ 04 · warden-choir +

Cross-witnessed custody

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For operators who want no single warden able to rewrite its own history unobserved. N wardens gossip and countersign each other's ledger heads — the transparency-log witness pattern, turned inward.

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A wallet that keeps the others honest. Equivocation would have to survive every peer's memory of a countersigned head.
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  • hash-chained ledgers already exportable
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  • heads carried in the posture attestation
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  • custody becomes its own little transparency log
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PRODUCT-READY — one net-new component: gossip transport

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The part most products hide

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What a warden signature does not prove.

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+ ◆ evidence: ltl.zkdefi.org + the four forks' proofs are replay-attested in a public RFC 9162 log + · the paper + · built on Fable 5 +
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