From 31a9dee10a593464575857f80c58345b53a962ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mrwulf Date: Sat, 22 Aug 2026 18:41:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] coherence sweep wave 2 (mirror template): 'additive' aligned to site vocabulary in reader-facing lines; paper+DOI line added (findings 20,21) --- provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py b/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py index 018210b..63aa6e2 100644 --- a/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py +++ b/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py @@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ scoped to the mechanized model — it does not prove operator honesty, signing, or execution provenance). As of **2026-08** the log also attests the **SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify-path proofs** (leaf 18) ([`fips205-slhdsa-verified`](https://github.com/saymrwulf/fips205-slhdsa-verified)) -and its heads carry an **additive post-quantum SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature** +and its heads carry a **second, post-quantum SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature** beside the required Ed25519 one. The current head is `latest-sth.json` — this README deliberately names no tree size, so it cannot go stale. @@ -536,6 +536,9 @@ python3 verify.py --receipt receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json The online service (same data, live endpoints + customer documentation): **https://ltl.zkdefi.org** +The design and its security analysis: +**https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper** (DOI [10.5281/zenodo.22057482](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22057482)) + The provider tooling, agent tooling, and course materials: **https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent** @@ -548,7 +551,7 @@ trust ledger keeps its history. Tree heads are signed by the merkleized, proof-attested Ed25519 library itself, and each signature embeds the provider's own Merkle self-check of that library's leaf. Heads additionally carry a **deterministic SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature** over the same payload: -additive, so Ed25519 remains the signature a consumer must check, and honest +strictly additional, so Ed25519 remains the signature a consumer must check, and honest about scope — the estate's certificates cover the *verification* path of both algorithms; no signing operation is proven for either, and leaves themselves are Ed25519-signed at issuance only. Heads published before 2026-08 have no