diff --git a/paper/ltl.pdf b/paper/ltl.pdf
index bf2b6c8..07a5787 100644
Binary files a/paper/ltl.pdf and b/paper/ltl.pdf differ
diff --git a/paper/ltl.tex b/paper/ltl.tex
index 3037592..f59800b 100755
--- a/paper/ltl.tex
+++ b/paper/ltl.tex
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 % LTL paper, revised version (v2) addressing ePrint acceptance criteria:
 % self-containedness, formal model, proofs for the system's own claims,
-% honest title, no marketing. Author TODOs are marked \authortodo{...}
-% and MUST be resolved before resubmission.
+% honest title, no marketing. All \authortodo markers have been resolved;
+% the macro remains defined in case future edits need it.
 \documentclass[11pt]{article}
 \usepackage[a4paper,margin=1.1in]{geometry}
 \usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsthm}
@@ -497,11 +497,13 @@ $(n', r')$:
 \item $n' < n_{\mathrm{pin}}$: reject (rollback).
 \end{itemize}
 A freshness policy bounds head age. The full log is also published as a git
-repository (one file per leaf, plus every head ever signed), so any cloner
-can recompute every prefix root from the public leaves and audit the
-complete head history without consistency proofs---a low-infrastructure
-witness mechanism~\cite{ct2}; a standalone ${\approx}150$-line
-standard-library verifier ships in the mirror.
+repository: one file per leaf, plus the signed head history since
+publication began (heads signed before the mirror existed were not
+retained). Any cloner can therefore recompute every prefix root from the
+public leaves and check every published head against its prefix root and
+signature without consistency proofs---a low-infrastructure witness
+mechanism~\cite{ct2}; a standalone ${\approx}150$-line standard-library
+verifier ships in the mirror.
 
 \section{Security analysis}\label{sec:security}
 
@@ -708,8 +710,12 @@ asserts.
 \end{proposition}
 \begin{proof}
 By construction of the consumer tooling: the verdict function takes
-$(\obs_a, \allowed)$ and ignores the label fields; an attestation lacking
-observed cones is mapped to \textsf{unverifiable}, not to a verdict.
+$(\obs_a, \allowed)$ and ignores the label fields in every branch; a
+certificate lacking an observed cone is mapped to \textsf{unverifiable},
+not to a verdict. The operator's proven/failed \texttt{status} label is
+consulted separately by the acceptance policy, but only
+\emph{negatively}---a certificate the operator does not itself mark proven
+can never count---so no operator assertion can upgrade any verdict.
 \end{proof}
 
 \paragraph{What is \emph{not} proven.} Propositions~\ref{prop:pin} and
@@ -740,6 +746,10 @@ signing\_library\_leaf\_index: 8\\
 signing\_library\_certificates\_proven: 16/16\\
 self\_inclusion: verified
 \end{quote}
+(These provenance fields ride alongside the signature as operator-provided
+context; they are not part of the signed payload, and a consumer relies on
+none of them---the acyclic chain below rests only on the signature and the
+leaf's inclusion.)
 The signature vouches for the tree; the tree vouches for the code that
 produced the signature; and the two vouchings are different proof modalities
 (cryptographic and deductive), so the loop is self-referential without being
@@ -798,8 +808,12 @@ append-only ledger is the point of the system:
   changed their commit hashes. Because a leaf pins an exact commit
   (\S\ref{sec:leaves}), the operator re-ran the full corpus and appended
   fresh attestations at the new commits rather than editing leaves 4--7.
-  The proof \emph{files} are unchanged across the rewrite---independently
-  checkable by diffing the two commit trees---and the replay confirms it.
+  That the proof \emph{files} survived the rewrite unchanged is
+  corroborated from the log itself: leaves 4--7 and 8--11 carry identical
+  certificate lists and identical observed axiom cones, re-checked by the
+  kernel at both commit generations. (The pre-rewrite trees themselves are
+  no longer distributed, so a direct tree diff is not among the public
+  artifacts.)
 \end{itemize}
 
 \noindent This last event is a live exercise of the append-only
@@ -906,9 +920,10 @@ byte-identical across all four; extraction-facing proof scripts diverge
 sharply where the forks' code or the extractor's naming differs (e.g., 215
 changed lines for the byte-parser proofs on the two forks whose extraction
 produces a closure-based loader; 121 lines for the signature-glue proofs on
-the same-crate fork; 27 lines---all annotation---between the two
-structurally closest forks, documenting one fork's \texttt{black\_box}
-optimization barrier). Per-target verification, in other words, is doing
+the same-crate fork; 27 lines between the two structurally closest forks,
+tracking one fork's \texttt{black\_box} optimization barrier---its
+axiom-list entries and the operation reordering it induces). Per-target
+verification, in other words, is doing
 measurable work exactly where the targets actually differ.
 
 \section{Limitations}\label{sec:limitations}
@@ -959,7 +974,7 @@ check scripts.
 % Review every proof in Section 6 line by line and re-run every number in
 % Section 8 yourself.}
 
-\begin{thebibliography}{19}
+\begin{thebibliography}{20}
 \itemsep2pt
 
 \bibitem{ct1} B. Laurie, A. Langley, E. K\"asper. Certificate Transparency.
@@ -969,7 +984,7 @@ RFC 6962, 2013.
 Version 2.0. RFC 9162, 2021.
 
 \bibitem{crosby} S. A. Crosby, D. S. Wallach. Efficient Data Structures for
-Tamper-Evident Logging. USENIX Security, 2009.
+Tamper-Evident Logging. USENIX Security, pp. 317--334, 2009.
 
 \bibitem{dghs} B. Dowling, F. G\"unther, U. Herath, D. Stebila. Secure
 Logging Schemes and Certificate Transparency. ESORICS, LNCS 9879, pp.
@@ -980,17 +995,18 @@ Software Signing for Everybody. ACM CCS, pp. 2353--2367, 2022.
 
 \bibitem{intoto} S. Torres-Arias, H. Afzali, T. K. Kuppusamy, R. Curtmola,
 J. Cappos. in-toto: Providing farm-to-table guarantees for bits and bytes.
-USENIX Security, 2019.
+USENIX Security, pp. 1393--1410, 2019.
 
 \bibitem{coniks} M. S. Melara, A. Blankstein, J. Bonneau, E. W. Felten,
 M. J. Freedman. CONIKS: Bringing Key Transparency to End Users. USENIX
-Security, 2015.
+Security, pp. 383--398, 2015.
 
 \bibitem{pcc} G. C. Necula. Proof-Carrying Code. ACM POPL, pp. 106--119,
 1997.
 
 \bibitem{cheval} V. Cheval, J. Moreira, M. Ryan. Automatic verification of
-transparency protocols. IEEE EuroS\&P, 2023. arXiv:2303.04500.
+transparency protocols. IEEE EuroS\&P, pp. 107--121, 2023.
+arXiv:2303.04500.
 
 \bibitem{easycrypt} G. Barthe, B. Gr\'egoire, S. Heraud, S. Zanella
 B\'eguelin. Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer.
@@ -1004,10 +1020,10 @@ Programming Language. CADE-28, LNCS 12699, pp. 625--635, 2021.
 
 \bibitem{hacl} J.-K. Zinzindohou\'e, K. Bhargavan, J. Protzenko,
 B. Beurdouche. HACL*: A Verified Modern Cryptographic Library. ACM CCS,
-2017.
+pp. 1789--1806, 2017.
 
 \bibitem{evercrypt} J. Protzenko et al. EverCrypt: A Fast, Verified,
-Cross-Platform Cryptographic Provider. IEEE S\&P, 2020.
+Cross-Platform Cryptographic Provider. IEEE S\&P, pp. 983--1002, 2020.
 
 \bibitem{fiatcrypto} A. Erbsen, J. Philipoom, J. Gross, R. Sloan,
 A. Chlipala. Simple High-Level Code for Cryptographic Arithmetic---With
@@ -1040,10 +1056,10 @@ Each leaf is the canonical JSON serialization (sorted keys, no
 insignificant whitespace, UTF-8) of an attestation. Below is leaf~8 of
 the deployed log---the re-attestation of the upstream fork. The
 16-certificate array is elided to its first (foundational) and last
-(apex) entries, and long values (hashes, timestamps, version strings,
-paths) are shortened with ellipses; field names, structure, and the
-axiom lists are verbatim, and the unelided leaf is one \texttt{jq}
-invocation away in the public mirror.
+(apex) entries; long values (hashes, timestamps, version strings,
+paths) are shortened, and omitted fields are marked, with ellipses. The
+field names and values shown, and the axiom lists, are verbatim, and the
+unelided leaf is one \texttt{jq} invocation away in the public mirror.
 \begin{quote}\ttfamily\scriptsize
 \{ "type": "pacta.attestation", "schema\_version": 1,\\
 \hspace*{0.6em}"attestation": \{\\
@@ -1051,14 +1067,18 @@ invocation away in the public mirror.
 \hspace*{1.2em}"issued\_at": "2026-07-07T...Z",\\
 \hspace*{1.2em}"subject": \{ "component": "dalek-ed25519-verified",\\
 \hspace*{2.4em}"repo\_commit": "33fb8bb2311c70ead2e83c0...",\\
-\hspace*{2.4em}"repo\_url": ..., "verified\_backend": "serial" \},\\
-\hspace*{1.2em}"environment": \{ "lean\_version": "4.x.y",\\
+\hspace*{2.4em}"repo\_url": ..., "verified\_backend": "serial/u64",\\
+\hspace*{2.4em}... \},\\
+\hspace*{1.2em}"environment": \{\\
+\hspace*{2.4em}"lean\_version": "Lean (version 4.30.0-rc2, ...)",\\
 \hspace*{2.4em}"lake\_version": ..., "env\_script": ...,\\
 \hspace*{2.4em}"lean\_project\_dir": ... \},\\
 \hspace*{1.2em}"machine\_protection": \{ "lean\_guard": ...,\\
-\hspace*{2.4em}"note": "memory cap, core pinning, single-flight" \},\\
+\hspace*{2.4em}"note": "All Lean compiles route through the\\
+\hspace*{2.4em}repo's lean-guard (memory cap, core pinning,\\
+\hspace*{2.4em}timeout, single-flight lock) ..." \},\\
 \hspace*{1.2em}"replay": \{ "checked\_files": 64, "failed\_files": [],\\
-\hspace*{2.4em}"check\_ok": true, "axiom\_ok": true \},\\
+\hspace*{2.4em}"check\_ok": true, "axiom\_ok": true, ... \},\\
 \hspace*{1.2em}"certificates": [\\
 \hspace*{2.4em}\{ "name": "CurveFieldProofs.fieldImplementation",\\
 \hspace*{3.0em}"status": "proven", "axiom\_status": "clean",\\
@@ -1071,19 +1091,23 @@ invocation away in the public mirror.
 \hspace*{3.0em}"status": "proven", "axiom\_status": "clean",\\
 \hspace*{3.0em}"observed\_axioms": ["propext","Classical.choice",\\
 \hspace*{3.6em}"Quot.sound","ed25519.Signature","sha2.Sha512",\\
-\hspace*{3.6em}"verifying.sha512\_new","verifying.sha512\_update",\\
 \hspace*{3.6em}"verifying.sha512\_finalize\_bytes",\\
+\hspace*{3.6em}"verifying.sha512\_new","verifying.sha512\_update",\\
 \hspace*{3.6em}"ed25519.Signature.to\_bytes",\\
 \hspace*{3.6em}"signature.error.Error",\\
 \hspace*{3.6em}"signature.error.Error.new"] \} ],\\
-\hspace*{1.2em}"signature": \{ "scheme": "ed25519", ... \} \} \}
+\hspace*{1.2em}"signature": \{ "scheme": "openssl-ed25519", ... \} \} \}
 \end{quote}
 The \texttt{observed\_axioms} field is the exact output of
 \texttt{\#print axioms} for that theorem. Operator labels
 (\texttt{replay.check\_ok}, per-certificate \texttt{status} and
-\texttt{axiom\_status}) are recorded for the audit trail but are not
-inputs to any consumer verdict (Proposition~\ref{prop:verdict}); the
-consumer's verdict is $\obs = \allowed$ computed against its own table.
+\texttt{axiom\_status}) are recorded for the audit trail, but the
+cleanliness verdict is $\obs = \allowed$ computed against the consumer's
+own table in every case, with a missing cone mapped to
+\textsf{unverifiable} (Proposition~\ref{prop:verdict}). The
+\texttt{status} label is consulted only \emph{negatively}: a certificate
+the operator itself does not mark proven can never count toward
+acceptance, so labels can deny but never grant.
 
 \section{The consumer verifier}\label{app:verifier}
 
@@ -1139,8 +1163,8 @@ above, plus):
 this fork exposes SHA-512 as three streaming operations):
 \begin{quote}\ttfamily\scriptsize
 ed25519.Signature \quad sha2.Sha512\\
-verifying.sha512\_new \quad verifying.sha512\_update\\
 verifying.sha512\_finalize\_bytes\\
+verifying.sha512\_new \quad verifying.sha512\_update\\
 ed25519.Signature.to\_bytes\\
 signature.error.Error \quad signature.error.Error.new
 \end{quote}
diff --git a/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py b/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py
index 79a13d7..029cabc 100644
--- a/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py
+++ b/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ the proof-attested Ed25519 code path itself (<code>--require-verified-verifier</
 
 <h2>API</h2>
 <pre>GET {base}/v1/sth                      latest Signed Tree Head
-GET {base}/v1/sth-history              every head ever signed (witness material)
+GET {base}/v1/sth-history              the published head history (witness material)
 GET {base}/v1/sth-consistency?first=N  consistency proof from your pinned size
 GET {base}/v1/proof?component=NAME     inclusion proof (artifact 3, freshly issued)
 GET {base}/v1/attestation?component=NAME   the claim (artifact 2)
diff --git a/src/pacta/attestation.py b/src/pacta/attestation.py
index ccf1e7f..33e8dc4 100644
--- a/src/pacta/attestation.py
+++ b/src/pacta/attestation.py
@@ -129,19 +129,29 @@ def validate_attestation(
                 if not fresh:
                     diagnostics.append(error or "Signed tree head fails the freshness policy.")
             if sth_store_path:
-                proof_hex = None
-                if consistency_proof_path:
-                    raw_proof = load_data(consistency_proof_path)
-                    proof_hex = [str(item) for item in (raw_proof.get("proof") if isinstance(raw_proof, dict) else raw_proof) or []]
-                sth_check = check_sth_against_store(
-                    sth,
-                    sth_store_path,
-                    consistency_proof_hex=proof_hex,
-                    consistency_from=receipt.get("consistency"),
-                )
-                transparency_evidence.update(sth_check.evidence())
-                if not sth_check.ok:
-                    diagnostics.extend("STH store: " + note for note in sth_check.diagnostics)
+                # The pin-store state machine (including permanent poisoning
+                # on equivocation) only ever runs on a VALIDLY SIGNED head;
+                # an unauthenticated head must not be able to mutate - let
+                # alone poison - the consumer's pin.
+                if receipt_result.signatures.get("ed25519") != "verified":
+                    transparency_evidence["sth_store"] = "skipped_unverified_head"
+                    diagnostics.append(
+                        "STH store: head signature did not verify; pin store not consulted or updated."
+                    )
+                else:
+                    proof_hex = None
+                    if consistency_proof_path:
+                        raw_proof = load_data(consistency_proof_path)
+                        proof_hex = [str(item) for item in (raw_proof.get("proof") if isinstance(raw_proof, dict) else raw_proof) or []]
+                    sth_check = check_sth_against_store(
+                        sth,
+                        sth_store_path,
+                        consistency_proof_hex=proof_hex,
+                        consistency_from=receipt.get("consistency"),
+                    )
+                    transparency_evidence.update(sth_check.evidence())
+                    if not sth_check.ok:
+                        diagnostics.extend("STH store: " + note for note in sth_check.diagnostics)
 
     accepted = not diagnostics
     evidence = {
@@ -190,13 +200,16 @@ def _normalize_certificate(cert: dict[str, Any], profile: Any) -> dict[str, Any]
     status = str(cert.get("status") or "unknown")
     observed = [str(a) for a in (cert.get("observed_axioms") or [])]
     expected = profile.expected_axioms_for(name)
-    if status == "proven" and observed:
+    # The cleanliness verdict is a function of (observed cone, local allowed
+    # set) ONLY - in every branch. The provider's status label still gates
+    # acceptance elsewhere (only status=="proven" certificates can count),
+    # but it can only deny, never grant, and the provider's own axiom_status
+    # label is never copied into the verdict.
+    if observed:
         axiom_status = "clean" if sorted(observed) == sorted(expected) else "dirty"
-    elif status == "proven":
-        # proven with no observed axioms reported: cannot re-derive; distrust.
-        axiom_status = "unverifiable"
     else:
-        axiom_status = str(cert.get("axiom_status") or "not_checked")
+        # no observed cone: nothing to re-derive from; distrust.
+        axiom_status = "unverifiable"
     provider_verdict = str(cert.get("axiom_status") or "not_stated")
     return {
         "name": name,
diff --git a/src/pacta/cli.py b/src/pacta/cli.py
index 8297a8a..aae8fd9 100644
--- a/src/pacta/cli.py
+++ b/src/pacta/cli.py
@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ def cmd_receipt_verify(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
         sth_store=args.sth_store,
         consistency_proof_path=args.consistency_proof,
         max_sth_age_seconds=args.max_sth_age_seconds,
+        head_signature_verified=result.signatures.get("ed25519") == "verified",
     )
     if args.require_verified_verifier and result.signatures.get("ed25519_backend") != "verified-dalek-serial":
         accountability_diagnostics.append(
@@ -575,6 +576,7 @@ def _log_accountability_checks(
     sth_store: str | None,
     consistency_proof_path: str | None,
     max_sth_age_seconds: int | None,
+    head_signature_verified: bool = False,
 ) -> list[str]:
     diagnostics: list[str] = []
     sth = receipt.get("sth") or {}
@@ -582,7 +584,13 @@ def _log_accountability_checks(
         fresh, error = check_sth_freshness(sth, max_sth_age_seconds)
         if not fresh:
             diagnostics.append(error or "Signed tree head fails the freshness policy.")
-    if sth_store:
+    if sth_store and not head_signature_verified:
+        # Only a validly signed head may drive the pin-store state machine;
+        # an unauthenticated head must not be able to poison the pin.
+        diagnostics.append(
+            "STH store: head signature did not verify; pin store not consulted or updated."
+        )
+    elif sth_store:
         proof_hex = None
         if consistency_proof_path:
             from .yamlio import load_data
diff --git a/tests/test_attestation.py b/tests/test_attestation.py
index e4f548a..49eaee1 100644
--- a/tests/test_attestation.py
+++ b/tests/test_attestation.py
@@ -52,3 +52,58 @@ def test_signed_attestation_requires_public_key(tmp_path):
     assert not result.accepted
     assert card["risk"]["level"] == "R0"
     assert any("attestation-public-key" in item for item in result.diagnostics)
+
+
+def test_unverified_head_cannot_touch_pin_store(tmp_path):
+    """Regression for the paper's SS5.4 precondition: the pin-store state
+    machine (including permanent poisoning) runs only on a VALIDLY SIGNED
+    head. A forged head at the pinned size must not poison the pin."""
+    import json
+
+    from pacta.signing import generate_ed25519_keypair
+    from pacta_provider.transparency_log import TransparencyLog
+
+    key, pub = tmp_path / "log.key", tmp_path / "log.pub"
+    generate_ed25519_keypair(key, pub)
+    log = TransparencyLog(tmp_path / "log")
+    log.init("example-proof-checker.invalid", pub)
+    att_path = "examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml"
+    receipt_path = tmp_path / "receipt.yaml"
+    log.append_attestation(att_path, key, pub, receipt_out=receipt_path)
+
+    raw = load_attestation(att_path)
+    store = tmp_path / "pins.json"
+    kwargs = dict(
+        path=att_path,
+        trusted_provider="example-proof-checker.invalid",
+        allow_unsigned=True,
+        transparency_receipt_path=receipt_path,
+        transparency_log_public_key_path=pub,
+        sth_store_path=store,
+    )
+
+    def _pin():
+        return next(iter(json.loads(store.read_text())["logs"].values()))
+
+    # Control: a validly signed head reaches the store and pins.
+    result = validate_attestation(raw, _repo(), **kwargs)
+    assert store.exists(), result.diagnostics
+    pinned = _pin()
+    assert "poisoned" not in pinned
+    honest_root = pinned["root_hash"]
+
+    # Attack: same size, different root => signature no longer verifies.
+    # Before the fix this PERMANENTLY POISONED the pin (unauthenticated DoS).
+    from pacta.yamlio import dump_data, load_data
+
+    forged = load_data(receipt_path)
+    forged["sth"]["root_hash"] = "ab" * 32
+    forged_path = tmp_path / "forged-receipt.yaml"
+    dump_data(forged, forged_path)
+    result = validate_attestation(raw, _repo(), **{**kwargs, "transparency_receipt_path": forged_path})
+    assert not result.accepted
+    assert any("pin store not consulted or updated" in d for d in result.diagnostics)
+    pinned = _pin()
+    assert "poisoned" not in pinned  # the pin survived the forgery
+    assert pinned["root_hash"] == honest_root
+    assert result.evidence.get("sth_store") == "skipped_unverified_head"
diff --git a/tests/test_boundaries.py b/tests/test_boundaries.py
index f1b3990..4d61b09 100644
--- a/tests/test_boundaries.py
+++ b/tests/test_boundaries.py
@@ -66,3 +66,27 @@ def test_full_fixture_scores_r4_and_partial_scores_r3(tmp_path):
     card = build_claim_card(partial, tmp_path, offline_fixture=True)
     assert card["risk"]["level"] == "R3"
     assert any("R4 requires the full apex tier set" in b for b in card["risk"]["blockers"])
+
+
+def test_verdict_never_copies_operator_labels():
+    """Prop 2 (verdict integrity), literally: the cleanliness verdict is a
+    function of (observed cone, local allowed set) in EVERY branch. The
+    operator's axiom_status label is never copied - not even for
+    non-proven certificates - and a missing cone is always unverifiable."""
+    profile = get_profile("ed25519", _repo())
+    failed_flattered = {
+        "name": "CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff",
+        "status": "failed",
+        "axiom_status": "clean",  # operator flattery, must not pass through
+    }
+    out = _normalize_certificate(failed_flattered, profile)
+    assert out["axiom_status"] == "unverifiable"
+    assert out["provider_axiom_verdict"] == "clean"  # recorded, not believed
+
+    failed_with_cone = {
+        "name": "CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff",
+        "status": "failed",
+        "axiom_status": "clean",
+        "observed_axioms": ["propext", "sorryAx"],
+    }
+    assert _normalize_certificate(failed_with_cone, profile)["axiom_status"] == "dirty"