`pacta` is a local CLI prototype for interpreting formal-verification evidence in cryptographic tooling. It is not a trading bot, does not move funds, and does not make financial decisions.
The immediate corpus is the `saymrwulf/*-verified` family of repositories. The shipped Lean files are treated as the verification artifact. This project intentionally does not run Charon, Aeneas, extraction, or Rust-to-Lean regeneration.
## Purpose
An autonomous economic agent needs to answer a narrow question before trusting infrastructure:
> Does this theorem cover the exact code path that will protect my funds?
`pacta` helps answer that by replaying pure Lean checks where possible, auditing axioms and proof hygiene, generating machine-readable claim cards, and assigning residual-risk classifications with explicit exclusions.
## macOS / Apple Silicon
The prototype is written for Python 3.11+ and macOS on Apple Silicon. It does not assume GNU coreutils, Linux `free`, Linux `taskset`, GNU `timeout`, Docker, Nix, or x86_64.
Lean tooling is detected with `shutil.which("lean")` and `shutil.which("lake")`. If neither is available, `pacta` reports clear diagnostics and still supports offline claim-card generation and static hygiene scans.
## Install
```bash
python3 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"
```
PyYAML is optional. Without it, `pacta` can still read the included simple YAML examples and JSON-compatible `.yaml` files.
-`07_agent_consequences.ipynb`: receipt-gated artifact builds and wallet-denial policy.
-`08_capstone_research_program.ipynb`: research roadmap from R3 toward R4/R5.
The notebooks are committed without execution output. They can be opened in Jupyter, VS Code, or any notebook reader. They import `pacta` directly from this repository and avoid external notebook-only dependencies.
`pacta agent` turns evaluation into an operational consequence.
-`build-library` requires `R3` by default. It builds a small Rust proof-gated component capsule under `artifacts/`. The capsule embeds the claim card and exposes whether downstream automation may use the component for lower-layer cryptographic code only.
-`build-wallet-demo` requires `R4`. An `R3` Ed25519 arithmetic claim will refuse this action and write a machine-readable denial artifact instead of building a wallet.
This is intentional. Arithmetic proof evidence can authorize a constrained lower-layer library decision, but it must not contaminate wallet, transaction, custody, or trading-agent risk scoring.
In live mode, `--clone --run-axioms` downloads the configured repository, replays the local Lean checks, runs the axiom audit, writes `claims.yaml` and `report.md`, and only builds the capsule if the resulting score satisfies the policy threshold. Failed replay is a hard consequence: no artifact is built.
Some verified repositories rely on a pinned Aeneas Lean project, usually exposed by an environment script such as `~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh`. `pacta` can use that environment without running extraction:
```bash
pacta doctor --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified
If those are missing, the result is `R0` for local replay because this machine lacks verifier capability. That is different from saying the theorem is false. It means the agent cannot trust the repository from local machine-checked evidence yet.
## Third-Party Attestation
For agents that should not build the full Lean/Aeneas environment locally, `pacta` also supports an attestation lane. A specialized proof-checking service can replay the proofs in its own controlled environment and publish a certificate describing:
- repository URL and commit,
- theorem/certificate names,
- observed axioms,
- Lean/toolchain environment,
- service identity and signature metadata.
The agent can consume that certificate only when the provider is explicitly trusted:
This changes the trusted base. The agent is no longer trusting local Lean replay; it is trusting the proof-checking service, its environment, signing key custody, and log retention. Without an explicitly trusted provider, attestation evidence scores `R0`.
The included `examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml` is an unsigned schema/demo fixture and requires `--allow-unsigned-attestation`. Real provider certificates should be signed and consumed with `--attestation-public-key`.
Standalone signatures prove who signed an attestation, but they do not make the provider accountable for equivocation or silent replacement. The nested provider can also append attestations to a local RFC 9162-style Merkle transparency log and issue inclusion receipts.
The log uses:
-`RFC9162_SHA256` Merkle leaf/node hashing with `0x00` leaf and `0x01` node domain separation.
- Signed Tree Heads over canonical JSON tree-head payloads.
- OpenSSL Ed25519 signatures today.
- An explicit `ML-DSA-65` / FIPS 204 signature slot that is `unavailable` unless the host has a real backend. If an agent policy requires both signatures, verification fails closed.
On a host without ML-DSA support, that command should fail. That is intentional. The system records the missing capability as a deployment blocker instead of treating the Ed25519 signature as quantum-robust.
This repository includes a nested provider prototype under `provider/`. It searches read-only under your home/GitClone tree for reusable Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs the proof replay, signs the result with OpenSSL Ed25519, and emits an attestation.
This is the intended trust transformation: local agents can avoid constructing the full verifier environment, but they must explicitly trust the provider identity and verification key.
The Ed25519 repositories should not be marketed as fully verified wallets or fully verified Ed25519 end-to-end. The strongest current claim is lower-layer and theorem-bound:
For selected curve25519-dalek / Solana-Ed25519-family Rust code paths already transpiled into Lean, the repositories contain Lean-checked certificates for field arithmetic over `F_p`, `p = 2^255 - 19`, and complete twisted Edwards point-operation laws, under explicit invariants and backend constraints.
`pacta` treats these as out of scope unless separately proven:
- Full EdDSA signature verification.
- Complete Scalar52 arithmetic.
- SHA-512.
- Encoding, decoding, and canonicality.
- Rust compiler correctness.
- Charon/Aeneas translation faithfulness.
- Side-channel resistance.
- SIMD, AVX, hardware, zkVM, accelerator, or syscall paths.
-`R2`: Formal model exists, but it is incomplete, weakly tied to production code, or major proof gaps remain.
-`R3`: A specific lower-layer implementation artifact is Lean-checked for a specific backend and theorem boundary.
-`R4`: End-to-end primitive proof covers public API, parsing/encoding, scalar arithmetic, hashing interface, signature equation, rejection rules, and implementation boundary.
-`R5`: `R4` plus reproducible production builds, compiler/build assurance, side-channel analysis, hardware/KMS/MPC integration, and operational controls.
Expected first-pass classification: Ed25519 field plus Edwards point arithmetic can reach `R3` if configured certificates compile and the axiom audit is clean. Full Ed25519 signature verification remains `R2` or lower unless complete scalar, encoding, hashing, and signature certificates exist.
