proof-aware-crypto-tooling-.../provider/src/pacta_provider/cli.py

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2026-07-03 11:03:58 +00:00
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
from pathlib import Path
from pacta.config import load_config
from pacta.signing import generate_ed25519_keypair
from pacta.yamlio import dump_data
from .discovery import discover_toolchains
from .service import build_attestation
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from .transparency_log import TransparencyLog
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def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
parser = build_parser()
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
try:
return args.func(args)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"error: {exc}")
return 2
def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="pacta-provider", description="PACTA proof-checking attestation provider.")
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
discover = sub.add_parser("discover", help="Find reusable local Lean/Aeneas toolchains.")
discover.add_argument("--root", action="append")
discover.add_argument("--max-depth", type=int, default=6)
discover.set_defaults(func=cmd_discover)
init_key = sub.add_parser("init-key", help="Create an Ed25519 provider signing keypair.")
init_key.add_argument("--key-dir", default="provider/state/local-provider")
init_key.set_defaults(func=cmd_init_key)
check = sub.add_parser("check", help="Run proof checks and emit a signed attestation.")
check.add_argument("--config", required=True)
check.add_argument("--repo-name", required=True)
check.add_argument("--repo", required=True)
check.add_argument("--provider", required=True)
check.add_argument("--private-key", required=True)
check.add_argument("--public-key", required=True)
check.add_argument("--env-script")
check.add_argument("--lean-project-dir")
check.add_argument("--timeout", type=int, default=120)
check.add_argument("--log-dir", default="provider/out/logs")
check.add_argument("--out", required=True)
check.set_defaults(func=cmd_check)
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log_init = sub.add_parser("log-init", help="Initialize a local RFC9162-style transparency log.")
log_init.add_argument("--log-dir", default="provider/state/transparency-log")
log_init.add_argument("--provider", required=True)
log_init.add_argument("--public-key", required=True)
log_init.set_defaults(func=cmd_log_init)
log_append = sub.add_parser("log-append", help="Append a signed proof-check attestation and emit an inclusion receipt.")
log_append.add_argument("--log-dir", default="provider/state/transparency-log")
log_append.add_argument("--attestation", required=True)
log_append.add_argument("--private-key", required=True)
log_append.add_argument("--public-key", required=True)
log_append.add_argument("--out", required=True)
log_append.set_defaults(func=cmd_log_append)
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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log_publish = sub.add_parser("log-publish", help="Export the log's public face into a git-publishable directory (entries, STH history, receipts).")
log_publish.add_argument("--log-dir", required=True)
log_publish.add_argument("--git-dir", required=True)
log_publish.add_argument("--public-key", help="Provider public key to include in the published repo.")
log_publish.set_defaults(func=cmd_log_publish)
serve = sub.add_parser("serve", help="Serve the log read-only over HTTP (CT-style endpoints + customer docs). Never touches private keys.")
serve.add_argument("--log-dir", required=True)
serve.add_argument("--base-path", default="")
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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serve.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
serve.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8461)
serve.set_defaults(func=cmd_serve)
Log accountability: STH pinning, consistency enforcement, freshness, monitor A transparency log without split-view defense is just a signature with extra steps: the provider could serve one tree to the agent and another to the world, or roll the log back, and standalone receipt verification would never notice. The primitives (RFC 9162 consistency proofs) were already implemented and correct; this closes the loop on the AGENT side. - src/pacta/sthstore.py: a local STH pin store. Unknown log -> pin (trust-on-first-use, recorded as such). Same tree size -> the root must match the pin byte-for-byte; a mismatch is named EQUIVOCATION and is a hard rejection. Larger tree -> a consistency proof FROM THE PINNED SIZE is required and verified before the pin advances (receipts already embed a from-previous anchor; the anchor's root is itself checked against the pin so a lying anchor cannot bridge a split view). Smaller tree -> LOG ROLLBACK, hard rejection. - Freshness policy: --max-sth-age-seconds rejects stale (or future-dated) tree heads - an old-but-valid STH can hide later entries. - Wired into receipt-verify, claims, and agent (--sth-store, --consistency-proof, --max-sth-age-seconds); evidence records the pin action; any accountability failure fails the receipt closed. - Provider: log-consistency --from-size N (serve proofs for pinning agents whose pin is older than the receipt's embedded anchor) and log-audit (monitor self-check: recompute the tree, verify the stored STH and per-entry leaf hashes). Live drill in this commit's validation: pin-on-first-use -> matched -> grown-with-proof advance -> a real forged same-size split view REJECTED with the equivocation diagnostic -> freshness rejection -> clean self-audit. tests/test_sthstore.py covers pin/match/equivocation, growth-without-proof, lying consistency anchors, rollback, freshness. 45/45 tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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log_consistency = sub.add_parser("log-consistency", help="Emit a consistency proof from an earlier tree size (for pinning agents).")
log_consistency.add_argument("--log-dir", required=True)
log_consistency.add_argument("--from-size", type=int, required=True)
log_consistency.add_argument("--out", help="Write the proof document here (default: stdout).")
log_consistency.set_defaults(func=cmd_log_consistency)
log_audit = sub.add_parser("log-audit", help="Monitor check: recompute the tree, verify the stored STH and append-only structure.")
log_audit.add_argument("--log-dir", required=True)
log_audit.set_defaults(func=cmd_log_audit)
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log_sth = sub.add_parser("log-sth", help="Sign and print the latest transparency-log tree head.")
log_sth.add_argument("--log-dir", default="provider/state/transparency-log")
log_sth.add_argument("--private-key", required=True)
log_sth.add_argument("--public-key", required=True)
log_sth.set_defaults(func=cmd_log_sth)
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return parser
def cmd_discover(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
candidates = discover_toolchains(args.root, max_depth=args.max_depth)
print(json.dumps([candidate.to_dict() for candidate in candidates], indent=2))
return 0 if candidates else 1
def cmd_init_key(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
key_dir = Path(args.key_dir)
private_key = key_dir / "provider.ed25519.key"
public_key = key_dir / "provider.ed25519.pub"
if private_key.exists() or public_key.exists():
raise ValueError(f"Refusing to overwrite existing key files in {key_dir}")
generate_ed25519_keypair(private_key, public_key)
print(f"private_key: {private_key}")
print(f"public_key: {public_key}")
return 0
def cmd_check(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
config = load_config(args.config)
repo = config.repo_named(args.repo_name)
attestation = build_attestation(
repo,
args.repo,
provider=args.provider,
private_key=args.private_key,
public_key=args.public_key,
env_script=args.env_script,
lean_project_dir=args.lean_project_dir,
timeout=args.timeout,
log_dir=args.log_dir,
)
dump_data(attestation, args.out)
print(f"attestation: {args.out}")
return 0
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def cmd_log_init(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
metadata = TransparencyLog(args.log_dir).init(args.provider, args.public_key)
print(json.dumps(metadata, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
return 0
def cmd_log_append(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
receipt = TransparencyLog(args.log_dir).append_attestation(
args.attestation,
private_key_path=args.private_key,
public_key_path=args.public_key,
receipt_out=args.out,
)
print(f"receipt: {args.out}")
print(f"log_id: {receipt['log_id']}")
print(f"tree_size: {receipt['tree_size']}")
print(f"leaf_hash: {receipt['leaf_hash']}")
print(f"ed25519_sth_signature: {receipt['sth']['signatures']['ed25519']['status']}")
print(f"ml_dsa_sth_signature: {receipt['sth']['signatures']['ml_dsa']['status']}")
return 0
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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def cmd_log_publish(args) -> int:
log = TransparencyLog(args.log_dir)
report = log.publish(args.git_dir, public_key_path=args.public_key)
print(f"published {report['entries']} entries, components: {', '.join(report['components'])}")
print(f"out: {report['out']}")
return 0
def cmd_serve(args) -> int:
from .web import serve as make_server
server = make_server(args.log_dir, base_path=args.base_path, host=args.host, port=args.port)
base = args.base_path.strip("/")
prefix = f"/{base}" if base else ""
print(f"serving read-only log on http://{args.host}:{args.port}{prefix}/docs")
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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try:
server.serve_forever()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
pass
return 0
Log accountability: STH pinning, consistency enforcement, freshness, monitor A transparency log without split-view defense is just a signature with extra steps: the provider could serve one tree to the agent and another to the world, or roll the log back, and standalone receipt verification would never notice. The primitives (RFC 9162 consistency proofs) were already implemented and correct; this closes the loop on the AGENT side. - src/pacta/sthstore.py: a local STH pin store. Unknown log -> pin (trust-on-first-use, recorded as such). Same tree size -> the root must match the pin byte-for-byte; a mismatch is named EQUIVOCATION and is a hard rejection. Larger tree -> a consistency proof FROM THE PINNED SIZE is required and verified before the pin advances (receipts already embed a from-previous anchor; the anchor's root is itself checked against the pin so a lying anchor cannot bridge a split view). Smaller tree -> LOG ROLLBACK, hard rejection. - Freshness policy: --max-sth-age-seconds rejects stale (or future-dated) tree heads - an old-but-valid STH can hide later entries. - Wired into receipt-verify, claims, and agent (--sth-store, --consistency-proof, --max-sth-age-seconds); evidence records the pin action; any accountability failure fails the receipt closed. - Provider: log-consistency --from-size N (serve proofs for pinning agents whose pin is older than the receipt's embedded anchor) and log-audit (monitor self-check: recompute the tree, verify the stored STH and per-entry leaf hashes). Live drill in this commit's validation: pin-on-first-use -> matched -> grown-with-proof advance -> a real forged same-size split view REJECTED with the equivocation diagnostic -> freshness rejection -> clean self-audit. tests/test_sthstore.py covers pin/match/equivocation, growth-without-proof, lying consistency anchors, rollback, freshness. 45/45 tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 08:08:34 +00:00
def cmd_log_consistency(args) -> int:
from pacta.yamlio import dump_data
log = TransparencyLog(args.log_dir)
document = log.consistency_from(args.from_size)
if args.out:
dump_data(document, args.out)
print(f"consistency proof: {args.out}")
else:
for key in ("log_id", "from_tree_size", "from_root_hash", "to_tree_size", "to_root_hash"):
print(f"{key}: {document[key]}")
for item in document["proof"]:
print(f" {item}")
return 0
def cmd_log_audit(args) -> int:
log = TransparencyLog(args.log_dir)
report = log.audit()
print(f"tree_size: {report['tree_size']}")
print(f"computed_root: {report['computed_root']}")
print(f"stored_sth_root: {report['stored_sth_root']}")
if report["problems"]:
print("problems:")
for problem in report["problems"]:
print(f" - {problem}")
print(f"ok: {str(report['ok']).lower()}")
return 0 if report["ok"] else 1
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def cmd_log_sth(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
sth = TransparencyLog(args.log_dir).latest_sth(args.private_key, args.public_key)
print(json.dumps(sth, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
return 0