mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/ltl-accumulator-verified.git
synced 2026-09-04 20:03:44 +00:00
The crux layer — the statement whose HAND proof once carried the frontier
coverage bug is now kernel-checked.
- gen: hash outputs refactored to Hash = {l : List UInt8 // l.length = 32}.
MECHANIZATION FINDING: the paper's pair-coincidence step ('equal hnode
values of distinct argument pairs are a collision') is load-bearing on
FIXED-WIDTH outputs — with unconstrained byte strings x++s = X++Y does
not split. hnode_preimage_inj (cone: propext) makes this explicit via
List.append_inj on equal-length components. Queued as a half-sentence
for the paper's next cycle.
- HasCollision := ∃ x y, x ≠ y ∧ sha256 x = sha256 y — appears ONLY as a
conclusion, never a hypothesis (no collision-resistance assumed).
- hnode_inj_or_collision / hleaf_inj_or_collision: the per-node dichotomy.
- root_binding: any accepting reconstruction from (v,P) to the honest root
either IS the honest receipt (leaf hash AND full path P = Path m D — case
(ii) pinning every consumed sibling) or exhibits a collision. Motive
quantifies (v,P); induction on Path; k-fold discipline.
- incl_sound (Theorem 2, position binding): accepting a wrong leaf at m
yields a collision. Cone [propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256,
Quot.sound] — the single hash axiom, pinned in check.sh. ALL GREEN.
Also: Root n=1 branch changed from list-match to decidable 'if P = []'
(well-founded unfolding generated a spurious exhaustiveness obligation);
Root_one_cons added. Fable-5 statement-audit passed. LTL untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
175 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
175 lines
6.1 KiB
Text
/- L1 + L2 of the accumulator pyramid: byte-level hashing shapes, domain
|
||
separation (paper Lemma 1), the split point, and the three §5.3
|
||
definitions (MTH, Path-dual Root, ConsRec) with their termination.
|
||
|
||
Everything here is stated over the opaque `sha256` of gen/ — no
|
||
property of the hash is used anywhere in this file. -/
|
||
import LTLAcc.HashExternal
|
||
|
||
namespace LTLAcc
|
||
|
||
abbrev Bytes := List UInt8
|
||
|
||
/-- Leaf hash: `H(0x00 ‖ d)` (paper §5.3). -/
|
||
noncomputable def hleaf (d : Bytes) : Hash := sha256 (0x00 :: d)
|
||
|
||
/-- Node hash: `H(0x01 ‖ x ‖ y)` (paper §5.3). Arguments are 32-byte
|
||
hash values, so the preimage determines the argument pair — the
|
||
load-bearing width fact of the paper's Lemma 2. -/
|
||
noncomputable def hnode (x y : Hash) : Hash := sha256 (0x01 :: (x.val ++ y.val))
|
||
|
||
/-- Preimage-level pair injectivity: equal `hnode` PREIMAGES force equal
|
||
argument pairs, because both components are exactly 32 bytes. -/
|
||
theorem hnode_preimage_inj {x y X Y : Hash}
|
||
(h : (0x01 : UInt8) :: (x.val ++ y.val) = 0x01 :: (X.val ++ Y.val)) :
|
||
x = X ∧ y = Y := by
|
||
injection h with _ happ
|
||
have hlen : x.val.length = X.val.length := by rw [x.property, X.property]
|
||
have := List.append_inj happ hlen
|
||
exact ⟨Subtype.ext this.1, Subtype.ext this.2⟩
|
||
|
||
/-- **Lemma 1 (Domain separation), preimage form**: no leaf preimage
|
||
equals a node preimage as a byte string — the first byte differs. -/
|
||
theorem domsep (d x y : Bytes) :
|
||
(0x00 : UInt8) :: d ≠ (0x01 : UInt8) :: (x ++ y) := by
|
||
intro h
|
||
injection h with h0 _
|
||
exact absurd h0 (by decide)
|
||
|
||
/-- Largest power of two STRICTLY below `n`, for `n ≥ 2` (RFC 9162's
|
||
split point `k`; values at `n ≤ 1` are irrelevant and default to 1). -/
|
||
def kbelow (n : Nat) : Nat :=
|
||
if n ≤ 2 then 1
|
||
else 2 * kbelow ((n + 1) / 2)
|
||
termination_by n
|
||
decreasing_by omega
|
||
|
||
theorem kbelow_pos (n : Nat) : 0 < kbelow n := by
|
||
induction n using kbelow.induct with
|
||
| case1 n h => rw [kbelow]; simp [h]
|
||
| case2 n h ih => rw [kbelow]; simp [h]; omega
|
||
|
||
theorem kbelow_lt (n : Nat) (h : 2 ≤ n) : kbelow n < n := by
|
||
induction n using kbelow.induct with
|
||
| case1 n hle => rw [kbelow]; simp only [if_pos hle]; omega
|
||
| case2 n hgt ih =>
|
||
rw [kbelow]
|
||
simp only [if_neg hgt]
|
||
have h2 : 2 ≤ (n + 1) / 2 := by omega
|
||
have := ih h2
|
||
omega
|
||
|
||
theorem le_two_kbelow (n : Nat) (h : 2 ≤ n) : n ≤ 2 * kbelow n := by
|
||
induction n using kbelow.induct with
|
||
| case1 n hle => rw [kbelow]; simp only [if_pos hle]; omega
|
||
| case2 n hgt ih =>
|
||
rw [kbelow]
|
||
simp only [if_neg hgt]
|
||
have h2 : 2 ≤ (n + 1) / 2 := by omega
|
||
have := ih h2
|
||
omega
|
||
|
||
/-- `kbelow` is a genuine power of two. Together with `kbelow_lt` and
|
||
`le_two_kbelow` (`2^j = k < n ≤ 2k = 2^(j+1)`) this pins `kbelow n`
|
||
as THE largest power of two strictly below `n` — the RFC 9162 split
|
||
point, uniquely determined. -/
|
||
theorem kbelow_pow2 (n : Nat) : ∃ j, kbelow n = 2 ^ j := by
|
||
induction n using kbelow.induct with
|
||
| case1 n hle => exact ⟨0, by rw [kbelow]; simp only [if_pos hle]⟩
|
||
| case2 n hgt ih =>
|
||
obtain ⟨j, hj⟩ := ih
|
||
refine ⟨j + 1, ?_⟩
|
||
rw [kbelow]
|
||
simp only [if_neg hgt]
|
||
rw [hj, Nat.pow_succ, Nat.mul_comm]
|
||
|
||
/-- `MTH` (paper §5.3): the RFC 9162 tree head over a leaf-data list.
|
||
`MTH [] = H(ε)`, `MTH [d] = hleaf d`, and for `n ≥ 2` the split at
|
||
`k = kbelow n`. -/
|
||
noncomputable def MTH (D : List Bytes) : Hash :=
|
||
if _h0 : D.length = 0 then sha256 []
|
||
else if _h1 : D.length = 1 then hleaf (D.headD [])
|
||
else
|
||
hnode (MTH (D.take (kbelow D.length))) (MTH (D.drop (kbelow D.length)))
|
||
termination_by D.length
|
||
decreasing_by
|
||
· -- take-branch: k < n
|
||
simp only [List.length_take]
|
||
have h2 : 2 ≤ D.length := by omega
|
||
have hk := kbelow_lt D.length h2
|
||
omega
|
||
· -- drop-branch: n - k < n
|
||
simp only [List.length_drop]
|
||
have h2 : 2 ≤ D.length := by omega
|
||
have hk := kbelow_lt D.length h2
|
||
have hp := kbelow_pos D.length
|
||
omega
|
||
|
||
/-- `Root` (paper §5.3 / Appendix B): the consumer's root reconstruction.
|
||
`none` = rejection on any length mismatch, exactly as deployed. -/
|
||
noncomputable def Root (v : Hash) (m n : Nat) (P : List Hash) : Option Hash :=
|
||
if n = 1 then
|
||
(if P = [] then some v else none)
|
||
else if n = 0 then none
|
||
else
|
||
match P.getLast? with
|
||
| none => none
|
||
| some s =>
|
||
let k := kbelow n
|
||
if m < k then
|
||
match Root v m k P.dropLast with
|
||
| none => none
|
||
| some x => some (hnode x s)
|
||
else
|
||
match Root v (m - k) (n - k) P.dropLast with
|
||
| none => none
|
||
| some x => some (hnode s x)
|
||
termination_by n
|
||
decreasing_by
|
||
· have h2 : 2 ≤ n := by omega
|
||
exact kbelow_lt n h2
|
||
· have := kbelow_pos n
|
||
omega
|
||
|
||
/-- `ConsRec` (paper §5.3): the recursive consistency verifier. Returns
|
||
the reconstructed pair (old root, new root); `none` = shape
|
||
mismatch. The flag `b` records whether the size-`n₀` subtree root is
|
||
carried implicitly (the pinned root `r`) or explicitly in `C`. -/
|
||
noncomputable def ConsRec (n₀ n : Nat) (C : List Hash) (b : Bool) (r : Hash) :
|
||
Option (Hash × Hash) :=
|
||
if n₀ = n then
|
||
if b then
|
||
match C with
|
||
| [] => some (r, r)
|
||
| _ => none
|
||
else
|
||
match C with
|
||
| [s] => some (s, s)
|
||
| _ => none
|
||
else if n₀ > n ∨ n₀ = 0 ∨ n ≤ 1 then none
|
||
else
|
||
match C.getLast? with
|
||
| none => none
|
||
| some s =>
|
||
let k := kbelow n
|
||
if n₀ ≤ k then
|
||
match ConsRec n₀ k C.dropLast b r with
|
||
| none => none
|
||
| some (x, y) => some (x, hnode y s)
|
||
else
|
||
match ConsRec (n₀ - k) (n - k) C.dropLast false r with
|
||
| none => none
|
||
| some (x, y) => some (hnode s x, hnode s y)
|
||
termination_by n
|
||
decreasing_by
|
||
· have h2 : 2 ≤ n := by omega
|
||
exact kbelow_lt n h2
|
||
· have := kbelow_pos n
|
||
omega
|
||
|
||
/-- The consumer's acceptance predicate for a consistency proof between
|
||
pinned head `(n₀, r₀)` and offered head `(n₁, r₁)` (paper §5.3). -/
|
||
def acceptCons (n₀ n₁ : Nat) (r₀ r₁ : Hash) (C : List Hash) : Prop :=
|
||
n₀ = 0 ∨ ConsRec n₀ n₁ C true r₀ = some (r₀, r₁)
|
||
|
||
end LTLAcc
|