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mrwulf be4f742b29 verification: guard the accumulator's two lifts (port lift-guard, assert on the payload)
The four forks ship lift-guard.sh and call it from eight files each. This
repository had no lift-guard.sh at all and called it zero times, while lifting
Phase 0c (selftest-harness.sh) and Phase 3d (selftest_statements.sh). Its lifts
got a line-count sanity check and nothing else — no analysis of which variables
the payload READS against which the driver DEFINES, and after yesterday's fix
no errexit check either. It was the one place that class could still recur.

A SECOND defect surfaced while porting, and it is the more interesting one.
Both lifts assembled the driver inline, with no payload file anywhere:

    { echo 'set -euo pipefail'; echo "HERE=..."; sed -n '...' check.sh } > DRIVER
    if [ "$(wc -l < "$DRIVER")" -lt 40 ]; then ... refuse ...

so the size check measured the CONCATENATED DRIVER — bindings included. A lift
that recovered almost nothing still cleared the threshold on the strength of
the lines the test itself prepended. That is exactly the defect round-7
lift-guard-payload-assert reported and that the forks closed with the words
"all six lift sites now assert on payload.sh". Six counted the forks. These two
were never in the count, so a finding recorded as closed was measuring the
wrong population — the same error this estate keeps finding in new costumes.
Both sites now write payload.sh / payload3d.sh and assert on those.

lift-guard.sh is byte-identical to the forks' (4f61c113). It is executable, so
this repository's own self-deriving Phase 0c rule required a pin before it
would run at all: required set == pinned set, verified.

WIRING PROVEN RATHER THAN ASSUMED. With lift-guard.sh stubbed to exit 1, each
self-test halts AT the guard, naming its phase, before a single attack case
runs. Guard restored, pins re-verified.

Certified: button + all three self-tests GREEN (check.sh 86s, selftest_audit
258s, selftest-harness 1s, selftest_statements 34s). The other five
repositories are unchanged from the tree round-15 certified 50/50 and were not
re-run; this commit does not claim they were.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 13:39:19 +02:00
docs essay: bound the rollup analogy to the paper's precise framing 2026-07-19 17:49:56 +02:00
verification verification: guard the accumulator's two lifts (port lift-guard, assert on the payload) 2026-08-04 13:39:19 +02:00
.gitignore Review round 4: F1* absorbed (lied-size boundary), acceptCons_sound, kit reproducibility 2026-07-12 15:07:57 +02:00
ATTESTATION-RUNBOOK.md runbook: refer to the private infrastructure repo without naming it 2026-07-19 16:56:48 +02:00
KNOWN-GAPS.md verification: bind statements and specification bodies (P1-a); un-stale the fidelity pin 2026-07-29 09:07:13 +02:00
README.md docs: paper-numbering disambiguation + runbook facts updated (doc audit 2026-07-19) 2026-07-19 13:11:50 +02:00
RESPONSE-TO-REVIEWERS.md Round 5 (housekeeping): doc-consistency welded into the button; both round-4 approvals recorded 2026-07-15 09:40:20 +02:00
STATEMENT-MAP.md P2-b: close classes 9 and 15 — the instruments, and the places nothing looked 2026-07-31 14:18:40 +02:00

ltl-accumulator-verified

Lean 4 mechanization of the security analysis (§6) of the system report "The Lean Transparency Log" (archived at https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper/v0.2 — the version this corpus was built against; the current paper, "Accountable Distribution of Machine-Checked Correctness Evidence" at https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper, presents these results in its §5 and carries this corpus as entry 13): the Merkle accumulator's own correctness and soundness theorems, kernel-checked, in the same discipline as the four *-ed25519-verified subject corpora.

Status: ATTESTED — LTL entry 13, live (2026-07-16)

This corpus is now itself a leaf of the log it describes. It was appended as entry 13 of the Lean Transparency Log (freeze 172a1d0), so the log carries kernel-checked proofs about the accumulator model underlying its own inclusion and consistency reasoning (a deployment we are unaware of a precedent for; scoped to the mechanized model, not the deployed verifier — see below). Live head after the append: tree size 13, root 3488a2d0ff9f00415bb561d61b01a420e3ca2e0f7b29351ec9ebb3f57319da0d; this corpus is leaf index 12, hash 8cb258d657f1fd00baaa9e0091e26c316cb69b591cb249a9543f51cade57c50a. The old 12-leaf head (bcd15f9d…) is a proven prefix; the 12→13 consistency transition is accepted by both the deployed verifier and the mechanized model. Fetch and verify it at ltl.zkdefi.org/v1/sth. The leaf carries its own scope block: what is kernel-checked is the mechanized model (§6), and correspondence to the deployed verifier is scoped by KNOWN-GAPS 14/15 — the leaf does not claim the deployed verifier is formally verified.

All paper-§6/§10 mechanization targets (v0.2 numbering) are kernel-checked; the audit surface is defined and green (verification/check.sh, exit 0). See STATEMENT-MAP.md for the paper↔Lean review surface and KNOWN-GAPS.md for the honest scope ledger. Reviewed across six external adversarial rounds (GPT-5.6 + a second Claude; zero broken theorems in any round; both approved). The audit surface is an environment-derived inventory (Proofs/Inventory.lean + pinned allowlist — 222 constants, 61 human-reviewed cones, self-tested by selftest_audit.sh); the review kit is push-button reproducible (run_bare.sh, self-contained fidelity target); acceptIncl/acceptCons_sound route the theorems through the named acceptance predicates; fidelity = agreement over pinned families (230,271 + 230,016 baseline; 73,573 lied-size boundary cases with 3,867 expected one-sided divergences — KNOWN-GAPS gaps 14/15, not extensional equality). Doc counts are asserted by check.sh Phase 3c. How the append was done — release tuple, preflight, candidate-inspection gate, and the 12→13 structural rehearsal — is recorded in ATTESTATION-RUNBOOK.md.

layer content status
L1 bytes, hleaf/hnode, domain separation (Lemma 1) done (domsep: axiom-free)
L2 MTH, Root, ConsRec definitions + termination done (cones: propext, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound)
L3 inclusion completeness (Theorem 1) + named acceptance acceptIncl done (incl_complete: propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound)
L4 frontier binding content (Lemma 2) done as specializations — inlined in the extractor walk (extractIncl), whole-tree (extractMTH), ConsRec (consRecBinding); the standalone Root receipt-uniqueness instance was deleted with the vacuous root_binding in S3.5 and deliberately NOT restored (optional, unused — KNOWN-GAPS gap 3)
L5 inclusion soundness = EXPLICIT extractor extractIncl (Theorem 2) done, non-vacuous
L6a descent extractor extractMTH (Theorem 3 step 3 = Lemma 2, whole-tree instance) done, non-vacuous
L6b Theorem 3 (consistency soundness): consRecBinding (steps 12) + extractCons/extractCons_correct (+ _paper at the paper's exact quantifiers; acceptCons_sound routes it through the named acceptCons predicate, size bound derived from acceptance via consRec_some_le) done, non-vacuous
L6c pin-store state machine safety (Proposition 1): pinAccept_monotone, pin_prefix_correct, fork_distinct done, non-vacuous (per-step; multi-step chain = gap 7)

Discipline (identical to the subject corpora)

  • verification/Proofs/ contains ZERO axiom declarations; the single sanctioned axiom site is verification/gen/ — here, one opaque function: SHA-256. The theorems are constructive collision extractors, so collision resistance is never assumed, only interpreted.
  • verification/check.sh is THE button: compiles every file through lean-guard (memory cap, core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock) and axiom-audits every certificate against its documented exact cone.
  • Reviewers without the operator toolchain: verification/run_bare.sh compiles, axiom-audits, and inventory-gates the corpus with a plain public lean (version pinned in verification/lean-toolchain); the operator path is overridable via AENEAS_ENV.
  • Expected boundary: propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound plus LTLAcc.sha256 for hash-touching certificates — documented per certificate in check.sh, audited both directions.

The finished certificates are destined for the LTL itself as attestation leaves: the log carrying kernel-checked proofs of its own machinery.