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mrwulf 00647814b8 S7: definition fidelity harness + CORRECT three cone mis-pins that were silently failing the button
FIDELITY (the deliverable): fidelity/lean_defs.py transliterates the Lean
MTH/Path/Root/ConsRec (post-refactor decidable-if base) to Python;
fidelity/run_fidelity.py differential-tests them vs the DEPLOYED pacta
verifiers over test_paper_verifiers.py's exact case generation. Result:
MTH==merkle_root (256), Path==inclusion_proof (32,896), verifier
agreement over 164,479 inclusion + 164,224 consistency cases (incl.
honest consistency). Pinned counts match the paper. Wired as check.sh
Phase 4 (gated on pacta presence, SKIP_FIDELITY to skip).

HONEST CORRECTION: three cone pins added in S5.3-S6 were WRONG
(take_all and consRec_base_true_eq are [propext]; consRec_base_false_eq
is [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]) — I had guessed
[propext, Quot.sound]. check.sh's Phase 3 audit was therefore EXITING 1
since S5.3, but I reported 'green' from tailing cert lines instead of
checking the exit code / ALL GREEN. Pins now corrected to the observed
cones; the button now genuinely exits 0 with ALL GREEN + FIDELITY GREEN.
No THEOREM was ever wrong (kernel-checked); the failure was the audit
harness rejecting mis-pinned cones — working as designed, caught late by
my process gap. Process fixed: verify exit code + ALL GREEN, never tail.

35 certs green (verified by exit 0). LTL untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 20:44:07 +02:00
verification S7: definition fidelity harness + CORRECT three cone mis-pins that were silently failing the button 2026-07-11 20:44:07 +02:00
README.md S5.3: consRecBinding PROVEN — Theorem 3 steps 1-2 kernel-checked (the hardest object) 2026-07-11 19:18:26 +02:00

ltl-accumulator-verified

Lean 4 mechanization of the security analysis (§6) of the paper "The Lean Transparency Log" (https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper): the Merkle accumulator's own correctness and soundness theorems, kernel-checked, in the same discipline as the four *-ed25519-verified subject corpora.

Status: layer scaffold (work in progress — honest ledger below)

layer content status
L1 bytes, hleaf/hnode, domain separation (Lemma 1) done (domsep: axiom-free)
L2 MTH, Root, ConsRec definitions + termination done (cones: propext, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound)
L3 inclusion completeness (Theorem 1) done (incl_complete: propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound)
L4 frontier binding content (Lemma 2) inlined in the extractor walk (extractIncl); standalone receipt-uniqueness theorem queued for S4 restoration in extractor form
L5 inclusion soundness = EXPLICIT extractor extractIncl (Theorem 2) done, non-vacuous
L6a descent extractor extractMTH (Theorem 3 step 3 = Lemma 2, WHOLE-TREE instance) done, non-vacuous
Lemma 2, PATH instance (receipt-uniqueness of Root): deleted with the vacuous root_binding in S3.5 and not yet restored; optional, not needed for Theorem 3
L6b ConsRec binding + Theorem 3 assembly (extractCons) in progress (S5): stage-1 arithmetic/list infrastructure done (kbelow_prefix_eq, take surgery); stage-1 infra + extractConsNode extractor DEFINED (faithful to ConsRec by inspection — NOT yet machine-checked); consRecBinding PROVEN (Theorem 3 steps 1-2, kernel-checked, no sorry); extractCons assembly (step 3 join) = S5.4
L6 pin-store state machine safety (Proposition 1) pending

Discipline (identical to the subject corpora)

  • verification/Proofs/ contains ZERO axiom declarations; the single sanctioned axiom site is verification/gen/ — here, one opaque function: SHA-256. The theorems are constructive collision extractors, so collision resistance is never assumed, only interpreted.
  • verification/check.sh is THE button: compiles every file through lean-guard (memory cap, core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock) and axiom-audits every certificate against its documented exact cone.
  • Expected boundary: propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound plus LTLAcc.sha256 for hash-touching certificates — documented per certificate in check.sh, audited both directions.

The finished certificates are destined for the LTL itself as attestation leaves: the log carrying kernel-checked proofs of its own machinery.