# Statement map: paper §6 ↔ Lean corpus **Numbering note (2026-07-19):** every paper reference in this map uses the numbering of the archived system report — "The Lean Transparency Log", the v0.2 draft (archived in the pacta repository's git history) — whose §6 this corpus mechanized verbatim and whose §10 scopes the mechanization to items i–v. The current paper ("Accountable Distribution of Machine-Checked Correctness Evidence", https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper) presents the same results in its §5.1–5.2 under different theorem numbers and cites this corpus in its §7.2 coverage table; do not match the numbers below against it. The kernel guarantees every proof below; what a reviewer must vet is the **statements** — that each Lean theorem says what the paper's item says. This map is the review surface. | paper item | Lean name | file | cone | |---|---|---|---| | §5.3 split point k (RFC 9162) | `kbelow` + `kbelow_pos/lt`, `le_two_kbelow`, `kbelow_pow2` (2^j = k < n ≤ 2^{j+1} pins k uniquely) | Basic | no hash axiom | | §5.3 MTH | `MTH` | Basic | sha256 | | §5.3 Path | `Path` | Completeness | sha256 | | §5.3 Root (App. B) | `Root` (Option = rejection) | Basic | sha256 | | §5.3 inclusion accept | `acceptIncl` (= `m < n ∧ Root … = some r`); `acceptIncl_complete`, `acceptIncl_sound` route Thm 1/2 through it | Basic, Completeness, Extract | sha256 (+choice) | | Lemma 2 (general abstract form) | **not mechanized as one theorem** — proved as specializations (see KNOWN-GAPS gap 3); the row below and the Lemma-2 rows are those instances | — | — | | §5.3 ConsRec | `ConsRec` (+ machine-checked base-refactor equivalences `consRec_base_true_eq/false_eq`) | Basic, Refactor | sha256 | | Lemma 1 (domain separation) | `domsep` | Basic | **axiom-free** | | Theorem 1 (inclusion completeness) | `incl_complete` | Completeness | sha256 (+choice) | | Lemma 2, width fact ("65-byte preimages") | `Hash` = length-32 subtype; `hnode_preimage_inj` | gen, Basic | propext | | Lemma 2, whole-tree instance | `extractMTH` + `extractMTH_correct` | Descent | sha256 (+choice) | | Lemma 2, ConsRec instance (Thm 3 steps 1–2) | `consRecBinding` | Binding3 | sha256 (+choice) | | Theorem 2 (inclusion soundness, explicit 𝓔) | `extractIncl` + `extractIncl_correct` | Extract | sha256 (+choice) | | Theorem 3 (consistency soundness, explicit 𝓔′) | `extractCons` + `extractCons_correct`; `extractCons_correct_paper` at the paper's exact quantifiers (n₀=0 discharged); `acceptCons_sound` routes it through the named `acceptCons` predicate (size bound derived from acceptance via `consRec_some_le`). Covers the MECHANIZED accept set; transfer to the deployed verifier is conditional on the deployment refinement invariant of gap 15 (gap 14 closed 2026-07-23) | Theorem3 | sha256 (+choice) | | Prop 1(1) (pin monotonicity + prefix) | `pinAccept`, `pinAccept_monotone`, `pin_prefix_correct` | PinStore | sha256 (+choice) | | Prop 1(2), Merkle share | `fork_distinct` (different roots ⇒ different content); transferability = signature layer, out of scope | PinStore | sha256 | | non-vacuity guards (anti-pigeonhole) | `extractIncl_nonvacuous`, `extractMTH_nonvacuous`, `extractCons_nonvacuous`, `pin_prefix_nonvacuous` | Extract/Descent/Theorem3/PinStore | sha256 | | definition fidelity vs deployed verifier | `fidelity/` harness: MTH==merkle_root, Path==inclusion_proof, verifier agreement 230,271 inclusion + 230,016 consistency over the pinned case families — **not extensional equality**: the lied-size family (73,573 cases) pins **0 divergences** at the current subject (post-`ddbb5a4` pacta, see PACTA-PIN.sha256; gap 14 closed 2026-07-23 — the historical 3,867 one-sided family is recorded in its closure note) | fidelity | (testing) | Note on "assumption-free" (paper §10(i)): `incl_complete`'s cone lists `LTLAcc.sha256`, but the theorem assumes **no property** of it — it merely *mentions* the opaque constant. Constant-dependence is not property-assumption; the soundness theorems likewise carry `sha256` without assuming collision resistance. Design invariant of every soundness statement: the collision is the output of a **named extractor function** and correctness is a claim about that output. A bare `∃ x y, x ≠ y ∧ sha256 x = sha256 y` is provable by pigeonhole alone (sha256 maps an infinite domain into the finite 32-byte type), so it carries no cryptographic content. What the guards certify (precisely — round-2 M3): each named extractor does **not** return a collision on at least one canonical honest input, which rules out the degeneration where the conclusion is a globally inhabited bare collision existential. They do NOT establish logical dependence on every listed hypothesis, nor that no other classical argument could reach the conclusion on some restricted domain. Audit surface (enforced by `verification/check.sh`, exit 0 = green): the FULL compiled environment of the corpus modules — 222 constants, read from the Lean environment by `Proofs/Inventory.lean` (fully qualified names, kinds, axiom cones) and pinned in `verification/inventory-allowlist.txt`, diffed fail-closed both directions on every run (round-3 replacement for the round-2 source-regex gate, which GPT H1 showed was evadable). The 61 human-reviewed statement cones above are additionally checked via `#print axioms` and cross-checked against the inventory's independently computed cones. (These two counts, and the fidelity pins in the table above, are asserted against the allowlist/CONES/harness by check.sh Phase 3c on every run — stale-count drift is now a red button, not an erratum: review R4-1, after three consecutive rounds of hand-edit failures.) `verification/selftest_audit.sh` attacks the gate with fifteen injection cases (attributed/indented/private/instance declarations, a nested namespace reusing an audited basename, a smuggled axiom, a deleted declaration, and unmanifested Proofs/ and gen/ modules) — each must fail the exact production gate. Four were added on 2026-07-31 and close two classes the earlier suite did not reach: * **A Lean file where no phase was looking.** The dead-file scan read `Proofs/*.lean` and `gen/LTLAcc/*.lean` and nothing else, so a module at the verification root or under any other `gen/` subdirectory was neither compiled nor rejected — while remaining importable by name, since `LEAN_PATH` contains both roots. Cases 10 and 11 forbid both. * **The instruments' own declaration surface.** `Proofs/AxiomCheck.lean` and `Proofs/Inventory.lean` perform the audit and are therefore not corpus, so nothing inventoried what THEY declare. `Inventory.lean` now walks both — including itself, as the module still being elaborated — and fails closed on an axiom, or on a theorem that is not an artefact of a definition declared alongside it. Cases 12 and 13 attack each driver; case 12 uses an INDENTED axiom, because Phase 1's source grep catches an unindented one and the point is to reach the kernel-side walk behind it. Both new gates were negative-tested by removal. With the driver-surface check disabled, `check.sh` PASSES a tree whose inventory driver declares `axiom driver_cheat : False` — which is the whole reason the check exists.