ltl-accumulator-verified/README.md

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# ltl-accumulator-verified
Lean 4 mechanization of the security analysis (§6) of the paper
"The Lean Transparency Log" (https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper): the Merkle
accumulator's own correctness and soundness theorems, kernel-checked, in
the same discipline as the four `*-ed25519-verified` subject corpora.
## Status: layer scaffold (work in progress — honest ledger below)
| layer | content | status |
|---|---|---|
| L1 | bytes, hleaf/hnode, domain separation (Lemma 1) | **done** (domsep: axiom-free) |
| L2 | MTH, Root, ConsRec definitions + termination | **done** (cones: propext, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound) |
| L3 | inclusion completeness (Theorem 1) | **done** (incl_complete: propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound) |
| L4 | frontier binding content (Lemma 2) | **inlined in the extractor walk** (extractIncl); standalone receipt-uniqueness theorem queued for S4 restoration in extractor form |
S3.5: explicit collision extractor — Theorem 2 made non-vacuous, vacuous forms removed The S3 Socratic re-audit found incl_sound was kernel-perfect but VACUOUS: its '... ∨ HasCollision' disjunct (∃ x y, x≠y ∧ sha256 x = sha256 y) is provable by pigeonhole ALONE (sha256: infinite List UInt8 → finite 32-byte Hash), so the theorem said nothing about forgeries. Even a data-carrying {p // IsCollision p} disjunct fails (Classical.choice inhabits it). The only faithful rendering of the paper's 'explicit algorithm 𝓔' is a NAMED FUNCTION whose correctness is a claim about ITS OUTPUT. - extractIncl (m D d P): total function that walks the honest tree and returns the concrete colliding preimage pair at the first divergence (a node preimage pair, or the leaf preimage pair at the bottom). - extractIncl_correct: d ≠ D[m] ∧ accepting-receipt → IsCollision (extractIncl …).1 (extractIncl …).2. A statement ABOUT the fixed function's output; pigeonhole cannot discharge it. ADVERSARIAL CHECK (probe, since removed): proved ¬ IsCollision (extractIncl 0 [[7]] [7] []) — i.e. on a NON-forgery input the output is provably NOT a collision, so the conclusion is genuinely false for some inputs ⇒ non-vacuous, choice-proof. - Removed the vacuous theorems entirely (incl_sound, root_binding, hnode/hleaf_inj_or_collision, HasCollision def) so no hollow statement survives in a corpus destined for the log. Kept the real building blocks (hnode_preimage_inj [propext]; eq_dropLast helper moved to Completeness; Binding.lean deleted). extractIncl_correct cone [propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound]. THE button green (14 certs). Fable statement-audit passed. LTL untouched (12 leaves, bcd15f9d). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 13:31:21 +00:00
| L5 | inclusion soundness = EXPLICIT collision extractor extractIncl+correctness (Theorem 2) **done, non-vacuous**; consistency (Theorem 3) pending |
| L6 | pin-store state machine safety (Proposition 1) | pending |
## Discipline (identical to the subject corpora)
- `verification/Proofs/` contains ZERO `axiom` declarations; the single
sanctioned axiom site is `verification/gen/` — here, one opaque
function: SHA-256. The theorems are constructive collision extractors,
so collision resistance is never assumed, only interpreted.
- `verification/check.sh` is THE button: compiles every file through
`lean-guard` (memory cap, core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock)
and axiom-audits every certificate against its documented exact cone.
- Expected boundary: `propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound` plus
`LTLAcc.sha256` for hash-touching certificates — documented per
certificate in `check.sh`, audited both directions.
The finished certificates are destined for the LTL itself as attestation
leaves: the log carrying kernel-checked proofs of its own machinery.