Lean Transparency Log — published mirror

This repository is the git-published face of a transparency log of formal-verification attestations: signed statements that the Lean 4 proofs of specific software, at specific git commits, re-check with exactly their documented assumptions. Its first twelve leaves attest four cryptographic Rust libraries (Ed25519 implementations); as of its thirteenth entry (leaf index 12, 2026-07-16) the log also attests its own accumulator machinery — a kernel-checked mechanization of the log's security analysis, so the log carries kernel-checked proofs about the accumulator model underlying its own inclusion and consistency reasoning, as one of its own entries (subject ltl-accumulator-verified; scoped to the mechanized model — it does not prove operator honesty, signing, or execution provenance). As of 2026-08 the log also attests the SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify-path proofs (leaf 18) (fips205-slhdsa-verified) and its heads carry a second, post-quantum SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature beside the required Ed25519 one. The current head is latest-sth.json — this README deliberately names no tree size, so it cannot go stale.

Layout:

Path	Content
entries/NNNNNN.json	one log leaf per file, append-only (git history mirrors log history)
entries/<component>.attestation.json	the newest attestation per library, for convenience
receipts/<component>.receipt.json	inclusion proof binding that attestation to the latest signed head
sth-history.jsonl	every Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads
latest-sth.json	the current head
provider.ed25519.pub	the provider's Ed25519 public key — the REQUIRED identity anchor; each statement's truth additionally rests on the assumptions stated in its leaf
provider.slhdsa.pub	the provider's SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key (FIPS 205) — checks the ADDITIVE post-quantum head signature; needs OpenSSL >= 3.5, and verify.py degrades honestly below that
verify.py	standalone verifier (Python stdlib + the openssl binary; fails closed without them; --all covers every published receipt)
verify_selftest.py	adversarial self-test: proves the verifier's fail-closed paths reject mutated receipts

Verify everything locally, no installation:

python3 verify.py --all
python3 verify.py --receipt receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json

The online service (same data, live endpoints + customer documentation): https://ltl.zkdefi.org

The design and its security analysis: https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22057482)

The provider tooling, agent tooling, and course materials: https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent

Honesty notes, always in force: attestations cover Rust source at a pinned commit (clone it — the commit identifies the committed git tree, not dependencies or toolchains — and build it yourself; compilers are declared trusted base). The log deliberately retains early leaves recording a failed audit run: an append-only trust ledger keeps its history. Tree heads are signed by the merkleized, proof-attested Ed25519 library itself, and each signature embeds the provider's own Merkle self-check of that library's leaf. Heads additionally carry a deterministic SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature over the same payload: strictly additional, so Ed25519 remains the signature a consumer must check, and honest about scope — the estate's certificates cover the verification path of both algorithms; no signing operation is proven for either, and leaves themselves are Ed25519-signed at issuance only. Heads published before 2026-08 have no SLH-DSA signature and verify.py reports them as slh_dsa:ABSENT, which is allowed — an append-only log keeps its history.