fips205-slhdsa-verified/verification/PROVENANCE.json
mrwulf dce0473013 review round 5: bind the policy, the specification bodies, and the harness
The third reviewer demonstrated that the round-4 gate was closed at the
EXPLOITS, not the MECHANISMS: it bound the manifest rows while the things he
moved sat outside the binding. Three fail-opens, each executed end-to-end with
the button printing ALL GREEN. No theorem, proof, fold, or model body changed.

NEW-1 — the policy constant was unbound. `manifestFingerprint` covered
`manifest` but never `allowedBoundary`, the sole predicate the enumeration
tests against; adding one name re-opened the False-proof with the committed
fingerprint BYTE-IDENTICAL.

NEW-2 — the specification bodies were unbound. The statement fingerprint pinned
each certificate's TYPE, which names its reference fold; redefining that fold to
*be* the extracted loop left cone and type-hash identical while the certificate
degenerated to `loop = loop`. 100% of the fidelity content lives in those defs.

NEW-3 — the harness was unbound. Stubbing verification/lean-guard alone, without
touching check.sh or the proofs, gave ALL GREEN in 3.6s over destroyed proofs.

FIX — one mechanism rather than three patches. Audit.lean now emits a canonical
AUDIT-MANIFEST block and check.sh binds to its SHA-256. The block covers the
POLICY constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement, and every
specification constant transitively reachable from those statements with its
fully-elaborated BODY (41 constants; the closure is computed, so a new fold
cannot appear without moving the digest; Prop-valued constants contribute their
statement, by proof irrelevance). This also retires the 32-bit Expr.hash as the
binding (NEW-5) — it survives only as a per-certificate diagnostic.

Enumeration now covers EVERY declaration kind (a `def : False` passed before)
in the eight certificate modules AND in Audit.lean itself — the auditor is no
longer exempt (round-5 R1). A bare `axiom` in audited scope is now an error.

Phase 0 purges stale .olean (the verdict must depend on committed bytes, not
.gitignored build state — NEW-4), forbids any .lean outside gen/ and Proofs/,
and sha256-pins the four model files AND lean-guard. lean-guard is KEPT rather
than removed (the reviewer's portability advice is declined by operator
decision): it is the memory cap and machine-wide lock that protect the build
machine after a 12.2GB OOM took the host down. That trade-off is documented.

check.sh's "Certificates proven:" line now comes from the audited manifest; the
hand-kept CERTS array — the one authoritative claim string nothing bound — is
deleted.

check-selftest.sh: 14 attacks, all rejected, plus a check that the hashed block
literally carries the twelve fold bodies. Attacks 9-14 are the reviewers' and an
independent drill's own exploits, turned into regression tests.

DOCS. TRUSTED-BASE gains item 11 (the REAL trusted computing base — lean-guard
pinned; check.sh, the toolchain env, $AENEAS_HOME, python3 and Lean still
trusted) and item 12 (the apex does not compose the ten). README: the audit
description rewritten; the XMSS sibling-order claim downgraded from "pins" to
"makes visible", with a new blanket non-claim covering all ten loop
certificates; the de-plumbing file claim corrected (round 1 touched only
verify_mono.rs, round 2 only helpers.rs — which is ON the deployed verify AND
sign paths, now disclosed; wots.rs was never patched).

RECORDED-RUN: three lines that stood inside a fence were a hand-written summary,
not console output — fabricated evidence in the file whose purpose is machine
evidence. They are removed and the fabrication is named in place, together with
the correction that the "INDEPENDENT RUN" block predates this gate. New rule:
nothing goes in a fence unless captured with tee/cat, and every block states its
date, pin, and who ran it. The transcripts added here follow it.

Also disclosed rather than buried: three bugs in my own test harness this round
(an olean-purge build-order break, an attack rejected by the wrong rule, and a
coverage assertion looking on the wrong line) — each would have let an attack
pass or fail for an unrelated reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 22:57:46 +02:00

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{
"_comment": "Single machine-readable pin set to reproduce the extracted Lean model in gen/SlhVerify from source. External review rounds 2-5 (2026-07-24 .. 2026-07-27). Running verification/extract.sh against the pinned source tree with the pinned Charon/Aeneas toolchain reproduces the two aeneas-generated files byte-identically (generated_artifacts_sha256 below). The *External*.lean files are hand-maintained (not regenerated) and are NOT part of that reproducibility claim — but they ARE byte-pinned for integrity in model_integrity_sha256, since they carry the five oracle axioms and the discharged Step definitions. NOTE: SlhVerify.llbc is an intermediate artifact and is .gitignored, so its hash here can only be checked by a party who re-runs extract.sh.",
"parameter_set": "SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s",
"source": {
"repo": "github.com/saymrwulf/fips205-source",
"head": "797b4ef26338e27363683656f93cb065a77daa0e",
"upstream_base": "integritychain/fips205 @ 30bac08580aa61f653e5436d1bbacb5ffac446c4",
"upstream_deviation": "verbatim import minus CI workflows; then the additive monomorphic verify_mono compat module + de-plumbing rounds 1-2, each an individually-justified commit",
"cargo_lock": "committed",
"rust_toolchain_toml": "nightly-2026-06-01"
},
"transpiler": {
"charon": {
"commit": "9dd7f23c",
"toolchain_channel": "nightly-2026-06-01"
},
"aeneas": {
"commit": "bf13c42e"
}
},
"proof_env": {
"lean": "v4.30.0-rc2 (3dc1a088b6d2d8eafe25a7cd7ec7b58d731bd7cc)",
"ocaml": "5.3.0"
},
"extraction": {
"driver": "verification/extract.sh (refuses a wrong-commit or dirty source tree)",
"charon": "charon cargo --preset=aeneas --start-from crate::verify_mono::slh_verify_128s --opaque crate::verify_mono::oracle --opaque sha2 --opaque sha3 --opaque zeroize --opaque rand_core --hide-marker-traits --dest-file SlhVerify.llbc -- --no-default-features --features slh_dsa_sha2_128s",
"aeneas": "aeneas -backend lean -split-files -subdir SlhVerify -dest gen SlhVerify.llbc"
},
"generated_artifacts_sha256": {
"SlhVerify.llbc": "d8ec0b00593eee1778bc4cc0cc1801fb6415bb294425f01384434849c6443f58",
"gen/SlhVerify/Types.lean": "db720b4a30f512e6048212a472e6853b24931a8121cb94c4cf7e6489754d6384",
"gen/SlhVerify/Funs.lean": "7b7de55fd0206142f2678a079a6ed4462292356bc7de08ecd55cac0c76a1da9f"
},
"hand_maintained_not_regenerated": [
"gen/SlhVerify/TypesExternal.lean",
"gen/SlhVerify/FunsExternal.lean"
],
"byte_identical_regeneration_verified": "2026-07-24",
"model_integrity_sha256": {
"_comment": "All four Lean model files check.sh Phase 0 pins before compiling anything \u2014 the two aeneas-generated files AND the two hand-maintained *External files (which carry the five oracle axioms and the Step defs). A hand-edit of the model fails the build here (round-4 reviewer F3).",
"gen/SlhVerify/TypesExternal.lean": "37958beb7c90b649497a20b0802f98f0fb2d975c245eca956d7396af74d7759f",
"gen/SlhVerify/FunsExternal.lean": "5efe551c35969c9da28b2f3eaed4a6a67c410c62a1926aab390e3abf010390f8",
"gen/SlhVerify/Types.lean": "db720b4a30f512e6048212a472e6853b24931a8121cb94c4cf7e6489754d6384",
"gen/SlhVerify/Funs.lean": "7b7de55fd0206142f2678a079a6ed4462292356bc7de08ecd55cac0c76a1da9f"
},
"harness_integrity_sha256": {
"_comment": "The compiler harness is part of the trusted computing base: check.sh shells out to lean-guard for every compile, and round-5 review demonstrated that stubbing it alone yields ALL GREEN in 3.6s over destroyed proofs. lean-guard is KEPT (it is the memory cap and machine-wide lock that protect this machine after the 12.2GB OOM incident) and sha256-pinned by Phase 0. NOT covered, and disclosed as trusted in TRUSTED-BASE.md item 11: check.sh itself, ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh, $AENEAS_HOME, python3, and the Lean toolchain.",
"lean-guard": "690d861cfd81b327604ffd5ef85599ee01b2bcd943907f5b71b8b6f99bad418f"
},
"audit_gate": "verification/Proofs/Audit.lean \u2014 in-Lean audit (round 5). Per certificate: exact cone equality (collectAxioms) + elaborated-statement check. Enumeration: EVERY declaration kind (def/theorem/opaque/axiom \u2014 round 4 matched theorems only, so a `def : False` passed) in the eight certificate modules AND in Audit.lean itself (the auditor is not exempt). Binding digest: check.sh binds to the SHA-256 of a canonical AUDIT-MANIFEST block covering the POLICY constants (allowedBoundary + certModules \u2014 round-5 NEW-1: widening allowedBoundary previously re-opened the False-proof with the fingerprint byte-identical), every certificate's fully-elaborated statement, and every reachable specification definition's fully-elaborated BODY (round-5 NEW-2: redefining a reference fold to *be* the extracted loop previously left cone and fingerprint intact while the certificate degenerated to `loop = loop`). The 32-bit Expr.hash is retained only as a per-certificate diagnostic, not as the binding. Fail-closed; adversarially exercised by check-selftest.sh. check.sh Phase 0 additionally purges stale .olean files, forbids stray .lean outside gen/ and Proofs/, and pins model + harness bytes."
}