diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 85c9bfb..34e514c 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ path**, extracted from a pure-Rust implementation into Lean 4 via
 Charon/Aeneas — the same pipeline, discipline, and honesty rules as the
 four ed25519 campaigns (`dalek/anza/risc0/betrusted-ed25519-verified`).
 
-## STATUS: TWO CERTIFICATES PROVEN — chain (Alg 5) + WOTS+ chain loop (Alg 8)
+## STATUS: THREE CERTIFICATES PROVEN — chain (5) + WOTS+ loop (8) + XMSS path (10)
 
 `verification/check.sh` is **green** (exit 0): the model compiles, the
-proofs compile, and the axiom audit passes. **Two certificates proven so
+proofs compile, and the axiom audit passes. **Three certificates proven so
 far, bottom-up:**
 
 - **`fips205.chain_free_loop_eq`** (Algorithm 5, WOTS+ chaining): the
@@ -31,15 +31,27 @@ far, bottom-up:**
   and pins that the LEN chains run with the right start indices, step
   counts, and slots. Cone: kernel three + `verify_mono.oracle.f`.
 
+- **`fips205.xmss_loop_eq`** (Algorithm 10, XMSS pk-from-sig — the
+  authentication-path Merkle loop): the extracted
+  `xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop` equals the fold that, at step k, sets the
+  tree height to k+1, tests bit k of the leaf index, and on an even bit
+  halves the tree index and hashes H(node ∥ auth[k]), on an odd bit sets
+  the tree index to (i−1)/2 and hashes H(auth[k] ∥ node). This pins the
+  Merkle sibling ORDER (the even/odd rule), the tree-height/tree-index
+  address schedule, and the auth-path indexing — the heart of Merkle-path
+  verification. Cone: kernel three + `verify_mono.oracle.h` (the first
+  certificate where H enters; F does not — the loop runs above the WOTS+
+  computation).
+
 Foundations behind this (2026-07-22/23): the Aeneas-compat patch (additive
 monomorphic verify module through a named oracle boundary; charon + aeneas
 exit 0); the u32 range-loop de-plumbing (faithful `Step` defs vs pinned
 rustc, axiom-clean); fidelity pinned by a differential test in the snapshot
 (valid / corrupted / wrong-message).
 
-The remaining layers (WOTS+ pk, XMSS path, hypertree, FORS, apex) are not
-yet proven — the pyramid rises one certificate at a time, each audited to
-the same boundary.
+The remaining layers (hypertree, FORS, the WOTS+/XMSS input-prep plumbing,
+apex) are not yet proven — the pyramid rises one certificate at a time,
+each audited to the same boundary.
 
 ## Subject
 
diff --git a/verification/Proofs/XmssSpec.lean b/verification/Proofs/XmssSpec.lean
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..137d050
--- /dev/null
+++ b/verification/Proofs/XmssSpec.lean
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/- Proofs/XmssSpec.lean — XMSS public-key-from-signature (Algorithm 10), the
+   authentication-path Merkle loop.
+
+   THEOREM xmss_loop_eq: the extracted auth-path loop
+   (xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop) equals the explicit fold that, at step k,
+   sets the tree height to k+1, tests bit k of the leaf index, and on an even
+   bit halves the tree index and hashes H(node ∥ auth[k]), on an odd bit sets
+   the tree index to (i−1)/2 and hashes H(auth[k] ∥ node) — the FIPS 205
+   Merkle-path recomputation. This is the layer above WOTS+: it pins the
+   hash ORDER (the even/odd sibling rule), the tree-height/tree-index address
+   schedule, and the auth-path indexing. H stays opaque
+   (verify_mono.oracle.h), so the certificate cone is the three kernel axioms
+   + oracle.h, audited by check.sh Phase 3.
+
+   The proof is the chain/wots recipe on a u32 range (u32_succ / fwd_succ /
+   hnext and loop_unfold_bind reused VERBATIM from ChainSpec), with one new
+   feature: the loop body branches on the index bit, so the step lemma and
+   the induction split with by_cases + if_pos/if_neg and thread the IH under
+   the opaque binds of BOTH branches with bind_congr. The get_tree_index
+   pair-bind destructures with rintro; differing pair matchers are
+   definitionally bridged by structure eta.
+-/
+import Proofs.ChainSpec
+open Aeneas Aeneas.Std Result ControlFlow
+open fips205
+
+set_option maxHeartbeats 4000000
+
+namespace fips205
+
+/-- The loop body on a non-empty range, as a clean do-block: the iterator is
+    resolved (hnext) and both occurrences of start+1 — the iterator's forward
+    step and the body's tree-height argument — are the same successor w. -/
+theorem hbody_x {HP N : Std.Usize} (idx : Std.U32) (pk_seed : Slice Std.U8)
+    (auth : Array (Array Std.U8 N) HP) (start stop w : Std.U32)
+    (adrs : types.Adrs) (node : Array Std.U8 N)
+    (hd : decide (start.val < stop.val) = true) (hwok : start + 1#u32 = ok w) :
+    verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop.body idx pk_seed auth
+        { start := start, «end» := stop } adrs node
+      = (do
+          let adrs1 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_height adrs w
+          let i1 ← idx >>> start
+          let i2 ← lift (i1 &&& 1#u32)
+          if i2 = 0#u32
+          then
+            let (i3, adrs2) ← helpers.Adrs.get_tree_index adrs1
+            let tmp ← i3 / 2#u32
+            let adrs3 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_index adrs2 tmp
+            let s0 ← lift (Array.to_slice node)
+            let i4 ← lift (UScalar.cast .Usize start)
+            let a ← Array.index_usize auth i4
+            let s1 ← lift (Array.to_slice a)
+            let node1 ← verify_mono.oracle.h N pk_seed adrs3 s0 s1
+            ok (cont (({ start := w, «end» := stop } : core.ops.range.Range Std.U32), adrs3, node1))
+          else
+            let (i3, adrs2) ← helpers.Adrs.get_tree_index adrs1
+            let i4 ← i3 - 1#u32
+            let tmp ← i4 / 2#u32
+            let adrs3 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_index adrs2 tmp
+            let i5 ← lift (UScalar.cast .Usize start)
+            let a ← Array.index_usize auth i5
+            let s0 ← lift (Array.to_slice a)
+            let s1 ← lift (Array.to_slice node)
+            let node1 ← verify_mono.oracle.h N pk_seed adrs3 s0 s1
+            ok (cont (({ start := w, «end» := stop } : core.ops.range.Range Std.U32), adrs3, node1))) := by
+  unfold verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop.body
+  rw [hnext hd hwok]
+  simp [hwok]
+
+/-- The mathematical Merkle-path fold: at step k set the tree height to k+1,
+    test bit k of idx, and hash the current node with auth[k] in the order
+    the bit dictates, halving the tree index. Recursion on the step count;
+    the successor and the fallible scalar ops stay monadic, mirroring the
+    extracted code exactly. -/
+noncomputable def xmssFoldN {HP N : Std.Usize} (idx : Std.U32)
+    (pk_seed : Slice Std.U8) (auth : Array (Array Std.U8 N) HP) :
+    types.Adrs → Array Std.U8 N → Std.U32 → Nat → Result (Array Std.U8 N)
+  | _, node, _, 0 => ok node
+  | adrs, node, k, (s+1) => do
+      let w ← k + 1#u32
+      let adrs1 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_height adrs w
+      let i1 ← idx >>> k
+      let i2 ← lift (i1 &&& 1#u32)
+      if i2 = 0#u32
+      then
+        let (i3, adrs2) ← helpers.Adrs.get_tree_index adrs1
+        let tmp ← i3 / 2#u32
+        let adrs3 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_index adrs2 tmp
+        let s0 ← lift (Array.to_slice node)
+        let i4 ← lift (UScalar.cast .Usize k)
+        let a ← Array.index_usize auth i4
+        let s1 ← lift (Array.to_slice a)
+        let node1 ← verify_mono.oracle.h N pk_seed adrs3 s0 s1
+        xmssFoldN idx pk_seed auth adrs3 node1 w s
+      else
+        let (i3, adrs2) ← helpers.Adrs.get_tree_index adrs1
+        let i4 ← i3 - 1#u32
+        let tmp ← i4 / 2#u32
+        let adrs3 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_index adrs2 tmp
+        let i5 ← lift (UScalar.cast .Usize k)
+        let a ← Array.index_usize auth i5
+        let s0 ← lift (Array.to_slice a)
+        let s1 ← lift (Array.to_slice node)
+        let node1 ← verify_mono.oracle.h N pk_seed adrs3 s0 s1
+        xmssFoldN idx pk_seed auth adrs3 node1 w s
+
+/-- One full loop step on a non-empty range = one fold step, tail as the
+    continuation loop — in BOTH branches of the index-bit test. -/
+theorem xmss_loop_step {HP N : Std.Usize} (idx : Std.U32) (pk_seed : Slice Std.U8)
+    (auth : Array (Array Std.U8 N) HP) (start stop : Std.U32)
+    (adrs : types.Adrs) (node : Array Std.U8 N)
+    (hlt : start.val < stop.val) (hb : start.val + 1 < 2 ^ 32) :
+    verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop { start := start, «end» := stop }
+        idx pk_seed adrs auth node
+      = (do
+          let w ← start + 1#u32
+          let adrs1 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_height adrs w
+          let i1 ← idx >>> start
+          let i2 ← lift (i1 &&& 1#u32)
+          if i2 = 0#u32
+          then
+            let (i3, adrs2) ← helpers.Adrs.get_tree_index adrs1
+            let tmp ← i3 / 2#u32
+            let adrs3 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_index adrs2 tmp
+            let s0 ← lift (Array.to_slice node)
+            let i4 ← lift (UScalar.cast .Usize start)
+            let a ← Array.index_usize auth i4
+            let s1 ← lift (Array.to_slice a)
+            let node1 ← verify_mono.oracle.h N pk_seed adrs3 s0 s1
+            verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop { start := w, «end» := stop }
+              idx pk_seed adrs3 auth node1
+          else
+            let (i3, adrs2) ← helpers.Adrs.get_tree_index adrs1
+            let i4 ← i3 - 1#u32
+            let tmp ← i4 / 2#u32
+            let adrs3 ← helpers.Adrs.set_tree_index adrs2 tmp
+            let i5 ← lift (UScalar.cast .Usize start)
+            let a ← Array.index_usize auth i5
+            let s0 ← lift (Array.to_slice a)
+            let s1 ← lift (Array.to_slice node)
+            let node1 ← verify_mono.oracle.h N pk_seed adrs3 s0 s1
+            verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop { start := w, «end» := stop }
+              idx pk_seed adrs3 auth node1) := by
+  obtain ⟨w, hwok, _⟩ := u32_succ hb
+  have hd : decide (start.val < stop.val) = true := by simp [hlt]
+  conv_lhs => rw [verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop, loop_unfold_bind]
+  dsimp only
+  rw [hbody_x idx pk_seed auth start stop w adrs node hd hwok]
+  simp only [bind_assoc, bind_ok]
+  conv_rhs => rw [show (start + 1#u32) = ok w from hwok]
+  simp only [bind_tc_ok, bind_ok]
+  apply bind_congr; intro adrs1
+  apply bind_congr; intro i1
+  apply bind_congr; intro i2
+  by_cases hc : i2 = 0#u32
+  -- Per branch: expose the pair-bind (assoc), make the scrutinee concrete
+  -- (bind_congr + rintro), then FULL simp: only full simp iota-reduces the
+  -- pair matcher (the chain lesson); with assoc, ok-bind, and the loop def
+  -- both sides normalize to the same right-nested chain.
+  · rw [if_pos hc, if_pos hc]
+    simp only [bind_assoc, bind_ok]
+    apply bind_congr; rintro ⟨i3, adrs2⟩
+    simp [bind_assoc, bind_ok, verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop]
+  · rw [if_neg hc, if_neg hc]
+    simp only [bind_assoc, bind_ok]
+    apply bind_congr; rintro ⟨i3, adrs2⟩
+    simp [bind_assoc, bind_ok, verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop]
+
+/-- **Algorithm 10 fidelity.** The extracted XMSS auth-path loop over
+    [start, start+s) equals the explicit Merkle-path fold. -/
+theorem xmss_loop_eq {HP N : Std.Usize} (idx : Std.U32) (pk_seed : Slice Std.U8)
+    (auth : Array (Array Std.U8 N) HP) (s : Nat) :
+    ∀ (start : Std.U32) (adrs : types.Adrs) (node : Array Std.U8 N),
+      start.val + s < 2 ^ 32 →
+      ∀ (stop : Std.U32), stop.val = start.val + s →
+      verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop { start := start, «end» := stop }
+          idx pk_seed adrs auth node
+        = xmssFoldN idx pk_seed auth adrs node start s := by
+  induction s with
+  | zero =>
+    intro start adrs node _ stop hstop
+    have hse : start = stop := by apply Std.UScalar.eq_of_val_eq; omega
+    subst hse
+    unfold verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop xmssFoldN
+    rw [loop.eq_1]
+    unfold verify_mono.xmss_pk_from_sig_free_loop.body core.iter.range.IteratorRange.next
+    simp [core.cmp.impls.PartialOrdU32.lt]
+  | succ k ih =>
+    intro start adrs node hb stop hstop
+    have hlt : start.val < stop.val := by omega
+    have hb1 : start.val + 1 < 2 ^ 32 := by omega
+    obtain ⟨w, hwok, hwv⟩ := u32_succ hb1
+    rw [xmss_loop_step idx pk_seed auth start stop adrs node hlt hb1]
+    unfold xmssFoldN
+    rw [hwok]
+    simp only [bind_tc_ok, bind_ok]
+    have hbound : w.val + k < 2 ^ 32 := by omega
+    have hstop' : stop.val = w.val + k := by omega
+    apply bind_congr; intro adrs1
+    apply bind_congr; intro i1
+    apply bind_congr; intro i2
+    by_cases hc : i2 = 0#u32
+    · rw [if_pos hc, if_pos hc]
+      apply bind_congr; rintro ⟨i3, adrs2⟩
+      apply bind_congr; intro tmp
+      apply bind_congr; intro adrs3
+      apply bind_congr; intro s0
+      apply bind_congr; intro i4
+      apply bind_congr; intro a
+      apply bind_congr; intro s1
+      apply bind_congr; intro node1
+      exact ih w adrs3 node1 hbound stop hstop'
+    · rw [if_neg hc, if_neg hc]
+      apply bind_congr; rintro ⟨i3, adrs2⟩
+      apply bind_congr; intro i4
+      apply bind_congr; intro tmp
+      apply bind_congr; intro adrs3
+      apply bind_congr; intro i5
+      apply bind_congr; intro a
+      apply bind_congr; intro s0
+      apply bind_congr; intro s1
+      apply bind_congr; intro node1
+      exact ih w adrs3 node1 hbound stop hstop'
+
+end fips205
diff --git a/verification/check.sh b/verification/check.sh
index 2386e85..6903a9f 100755
--- a/verification/check.sh
+++ b/verification/check.sh
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ GEN_MODULES=(
 PROOFS=(
   "ChainSpec"
   "WotsSpec"
+  "XmssSpec"
 )
 # Certificates whose axiom cones are audited, and the allowed extras beyond
 # the three kernel axioms: the five SHA-2 verify-path oracles. A certificate
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ PROOFS=(
 CERTS=(
   "fips205.chain_free_loop_eq"
   "fips205.wots_loop1_eq"
+  "fips205.xmss_loop_eq"
 )
 ORACLES="verify_mono.oracle.f, verify_mono.oracle.h, verify_mono.oracle.t_l, verify_mono.oracle.t_len, verify_mono.oracle.h_msg"
 ALLOWED="[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ${ORACLES}]"
@@ -69,6 +71,7 @@ echo "=== Phase 3: axiom audit (cone ⊆ kernel-3 + 5 oracles) ==="
 cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"
 AUD="$HERE/Proofs/.audit.lean"
 { echo "import Proofs.ChainSpec"; echo "import Proofs.WotsSpec"
+  echo "import Proofs.XmssSpec"
   for c in "${CERTS[@]}"; do echo "#print axioms $c"; done
 } > "$AUD"
 OUT=$(lake env bash -c "cd '$HERE' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD/gen:\$PWD\" && LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT LEAN_MEM_MB=$MEM '$HERE/lean-guard' 'Proofs/.audit.lean'" 2>&1)