mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/dalek-ed25519-verified.git
synced 2026-09-04 20:24:12 +00:00
mrwulf
b4e8a4e733
Closes four round-7/8 findings. Certified by the round-12 sweep: five repositories, both buttons and every self-test, 48/48 GREEN. ── `scalar-statements-unbound` (gpt, round 7, CRITICAL) ──────────────────── The main button bound its 31 certificates' elaborated statements and reachable specification bodies. This button bound NONE of its thirteen, while TRUSTED-BASE item 8 said the audit covers "every certificate" — false across the 44-certificate surface. The finding was raised in round 7, lost from the round-8 work list by an F-number collision between two reviewers, and re-raised in round 8. Proofs/ScalarAudit.lean is generated from each fork's OWN Audit.lean, so the canonicalisation is provably the same code: pp.all rendering, whitespace normalisation, transitive specification closure. check-scalar.sh Phase 3c pins the block's digest, requires the committed copy to match byte-for-byte so a mismatch can be DIFFED, and cross-checks the auditor's certificate set against the button's CERTS array. dalek ecf3a3f8 · anza 0d942e47 · risc0 4b550a61 · betrusted 4b550a61 risc0 and betrusted share a digest and that is correct, not a collision: their ScalarSubSpec.lean differs only in doc prose and in `black_box` entries inside `simp only [...]` lists AFTER `:= by`. Proof scripts. They bind the same statements over the same specifications, which is the documented scope. selftest-scalar-statements.sh ships the two attacks the reviewer asked for: ok gutted statement caught (cone unchanged) ok rewritten specification body caught (name and cone unchanged) The second rewrites a reachable reference body to `id (…)` — DEFINITIONALLY EQUAL, so the corpus compiles and every proof typechecks and the cone is byte-identical. Every earlier phase is blind to it. ── `drv-surface-no-cones` + `accounting-certifies-enumeration` (claude) ──── The round-7 accounting identity proved every kernel constant was ENUMERATED. The reviewer showed enumeration is not audit: their planted claim WAS enumerated, as DRV|LTLAccAudit.bait.smuggled|theorem with a real cone, and nothing examined it — rows had no cone, no allowlist covered them, the statement digest does not reach instruments, and Phase 2b gates DECLARED AXIOMS, a different question. "Progress of one step, not two." DRV rows now carry their axiom cone and are pinned in driver-allowlist.txt by inventory_gate.sh with a DRV tag — the same implementation that pins the corpus, in both directions, because a second copy of a coverage gate is a second thing to drift. The axiom policy is per-surface and enforced per surface: the corpus admits exactly the sanctioned boundary, the instruments admit none, and an instrument axiom fails EVEN WHEN ALLOWLISTED. Verified with the reviewer's own payload, both placements: before the walk -> UNCLASSIFIED: DRV|…|bait.smuggled|theorem|Classical.choice,Quot.sound,propext after the walk -> ACCOUNTING FAILED names it (kernel-side) ── `drv-naming-heuristic` (claude, round 7) ──────────────────────────────── Retired as load-bearing rather than patched. The rule admits a theorem whose name extends a constant declared alongside it, and "breaks in one line" — declare `def bait`, then `theorem bait.smuggled` walks through. It stays as a fast readable first check; membership in a committed allowlist is what now carries the weight, and a new row fails closed whatever it is called. ── what round 11 caught, which was mine ─────────────────────────────────── DRV rows first shipped WITHOUT their originating driver. dalek and anza run two drivers, each declaring its own `corpus`; keyed on name alone those two distinct declarations produced one byte-identical row, `sort -u` collapsed them, and the trailers summed to 37 against 36. The estate had already learned this on the corpus walk — INV rows carry their module because two modules both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec — and I rebuilt the record without it. Rows now carry their driver, and the gate FAILS CLOSED ON DUPLICATE RECORDS naming the collision: two declarations sharing one entry means one is covered by the other's, which is exactly how a real declaration hides. The trailer now checks what the drivers EMITTED, not what survives de-duplication — conflating "the run was truncated" with "two rows were identical" is what let a record-format defect present itself as an arithmetic complaint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| AddSpec.lean | ||
| Audit.lean | ||
| Basic.lean | ||
| CompressSpec.lean | ||
| ConstSpecs.lean | ||
| DecompressMain.lean | ||
| DecompressSpec.lean | ||
| Denote.lean | ||
| DsmLoopSpec.lean | ||
| DsmMulSpec.lean | ||
| DsmNafLoadSpec.lean | ||
| DsmNafLoopSpec.lean | ||
| DsmNafMath.lean | ||
| DsmNafSpec.lean | ||
| DsmStepSpec.lean | ||
| DsmTableSpec.lean | ||
| EdAddAffNiels.lean | ||
| EdAddProjNiels.lean | ||
| EdConvert.lean | ||
| EdCurve.lean | ||
| EdDenote.lean | ||
| EdDouble.lean | ||
| EdMain.lean | ||
| FeQ.lean | ||
| Field.lean | ||
| FieldMain.lean | ||
| FromBytesSpec.lean | ||
| Inventory.lean | ||
| InventoryBasic.lean | ||
| InventoryCore.lean | ||
| InventoryScalar.lean | ||
| InvertSpec.lean | ||
| MulSpec.lean | ||
| P25519.lean | ||
| PointEqSpec.lean | ||
| PointLiftSpec.lean | ||
| ReduceSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarAddSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarAudit.lean | ||
| ScalarBytesSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarDenote.lean | ||
| ScalarFromBytesSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarFullMulSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarLoop.lean | ||
| ScalarMain.lean | ||
| ScalarMontSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarMulSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarPackSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarReduceSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarSubSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarUnpackSpec.lean | ||
| ScalarWideSpec.lean | ||
| SigApexSpec.lean | ||
| Square2Spec.lean | ||
| SquareSpec.lean | ||
| SubNegSpec.lean | ||
| ToBytesMath.lean | ||
| ToBytesSpec.lean | ||