dalek-ed25519-verified/verification/check.sh

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# check.sh — THE button. Compiles EVERY shipped .lean file and axiom-audits
# EVERY layer certificate. If a file is in this repo, this script checks it;
# if this script doesn't check it, it must not be in the repo.
#
# Phases:
# 0. resource + source-integrity guards
# 1. stub audit: no `by trivial` specs, no True-target theorems, and — the
# anti-axiom-smuggling gate — ZERO `axiom` declarations under Proofs/
# (external models in gen/ are the only sanctioned axiom site)
# 2. compile gen/ + Proofs/ in dependency order (explicit -o, capped cores,
# per-file timeout). Any "declaration uses 'sorry'" warning is a FAILURE
# (this catches sorry robustly — text greps can't, comments mention it).
verification: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate (Phase 2b) + self-test Phase 1's anti-smuggling check reads source text. Measured today on Lean v4.30.0-rc2, four distinct declarations compile cleanly and slip past its anchored pattern: ` axiom cheat : ...` one leading space `@[simp] axiom cheat : ...` line starts with the attribute `unsafe axiom cheat : ...` `unsafe` absent from the modifier list `axiom` <newline> ` cheat` no space follows the keyword Any of them yields a repository that proves False while the button prints ALL GREEN. Only the tab variant is blocked, and by Lean, not by us. Hardening the pattern would fix the exhibited syntax rather than the class, which is the mistake this estate has made before. Phase 2b stops parsing text and asks the kernel instead: it reads every compiled Proofs/*.olean with readModuleData and rejects any declaration that is an axiom. Design notes: - reads compiled artifacts rather than importing the modules, because Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs deliberately reuse `zero_spec` and a whole-corpus import is impossible by construction; - membership is self-deriving from the filesystem, so Scalar* and AxiomCheck are covered too — both are skipped by the CERTS audit and by the dead-file gate; - fails closed on absence: a missing .olean would make the scan vacuous, so the count of compiled modules must equal the count of shipped sources; - removes its temp source AND artifact on both paths, since a bare `rm` after the call never runs under `set -e` when the gate goes red — exactly how this repo accumulated 101 orphan .olean files; - ~3 s for the whole corpus, against ~53 s for one module-importing run. Phase 1's grep stays as a fast first line of defence. Phase 2b is the gate that is load-bearing. selftest-axgate.sh attacks the shipping gate, lifted out of check.sh at run time rather than copied. It asserts the specific diagnostic, so a rejection for an unrelated reason fails too, and it was itself negative-tested: with the gate's throwError removed, the self-test goes red on exactly that case. No proof, statement, specification or certificate is touched. No attested commit is altered — the log binds specific commit hashes, all of which remain ancestors of HEAD. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 16:24:18 +00:00
# 2b. kernel-side axiom-declaration gate: read every compiled Proofs/*.olean
# and reject ANY axiom declared there. Phase 1's grep reads source text
# and is evadable four ways (see the phase header); this one asks the
# kernel, derives its scope from the filesystem, and fails closed if the
# set of compiled modules does not match the set of shipped sources.
# 3. axiom audit: #print axioms for every certificate in CERTS; each must
# report exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
set -euo pipefail
source ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
AENEAS_LEAN="$AENEAS_HOME/backends/lean"
TIMEOUT="${LEAN_TIMEOUT:-300}"
export LEAN_MEM_MB="${LEAN_MEM_MB:-8192}" # 8192: ReduceSpec exceeds 6144 (coherence pass 2)
CORES="${LEAN_MAX_CORES:-0-3}"
# Layer manifests (extended as the pyramid grows; ORDER = import order).
GEN_MODULES=(
CurveField/TypesExternal
CurveField/Types
CurveField/FunsExternal
CurveField/Funs
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
CurveSig/TypesExternal
CurveSig/Types
CurveSig/FunsExternal
CurveSig/Funs
)
PROOFS=(
Basic
Denote
P25519
ReduceSpec
SubNegSpec
ConstSpecs
AddSpec
MulSpec
SquareSpec
Square2Spec
Field
InvertSpec
FieldMain
FeQ
EdCurve
EdDenote
EdDouble
EdAddProjNiels
EdAddAffNiels
EdConvert
EdMain
DsmTableSpec
DsmStepSpec
DsmLoopSpec
DsmNafLoadSpec
DsmNafMath
NAF encoder proven end-to-end + the phase-1 double-scalar-mul apex The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages): - `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load. - `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem. - `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split), digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry', oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps. - `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack) for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253. And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`: - `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation, kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness. - `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A, the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256 with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and documented; nothing assumes it. Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub (backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal — a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the #print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene. CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec, non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec — each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 14:52:06 +00:00
DsmNafLoopSpec
DsmNafSpec
DsmMulSpec
Phase 2, brick 1a: to_bytes canonicity proven (to_bytes_spec, kernel-audited) The load-bearing brick of the point-level apex equation: FieldElement51::to_bytes always succeeds and its 32 output bytes denote EXACTLY the represented residue - bytesVal s = feVal a mod p. Since the canonical residue determines the bytes, this is simultaneously canonicity ("output is the canonical encoding") and the injectivity compress needs ("equal residues iff equal bytes"). - Proofs/ToBytesMath.lean: the context-free ℕ mathematics (METHOD 4) - the 5-rung carry telescope (div_rung/q_telescope), the q-trick facts (q = (h+19)/2^255 is a bit, fires iff h >= p), q_mod_p (adding 19q and discarding bit 255 subtracts pq exactly), carry_pack (the masked-limb assembly mod 2^255), five per-limb byte-chunk splits, and bytes_pack (the 32-byte little-endian reassembly, closed by one zify + linear_combination over the five splits). - Proofs/ToBytesSpec.lean: the symbolic execution - at ~150 machine ops the longest walk in the repo, loop-free: weak reduce (reduce_spec), the q pass, the fold + carry pass, 32 byte extractions (the four limb-boundary bytes turn disjoint ORs into additions via Nat.two_pow_add_eq_or_of_lt), and the trailing top-bit debug-assert DISCHARGED (b31 = f4/2^44 < 2^7), not assumed. - check.sh: ToBytesMath/ToBytesSpec in PROOFS, to_bytes_spec in CERTS (exact standard-three audit) - full button green fresh. Walk lessons (for the control repo, next push): rw index-equations into their consumers instead of subst (subst eliminates the wrong side or dies on dependent do-motives); never rw [Nat.mod_eq_of_lt (by omega)] (metavariable goal reaches omega) - state the bound with show. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 11:10:43 +00:00
ToBytesMath
ToBytesSpec
CompressSpec
ScalarPackSpec
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
SigApexSpec
PointLiftSpec
PointEqSpec
DecompressSpec
FromBytesSpec
DecompressMain
)
# Fully-qualified certificate names; each must be axiom-clean.
CERTS=(
CurveFieldProofs.fieldImplementation
CurveFieldProofs.edwardsImplementation
CurveFieldProofs.naf_table_spec
CurveFieldProofs.naf_select_spec
CurveFieldProofs.proj_double_law
CurveFieldProofs.compl_as_projective_law
CurveFieldProofs.dsm_step_p_law
CurveFieldProofs.dsm_step_b_law
CurveFieldProofs.dsm_loop_spec
CurveFieldProofs.naf_load_spec
CurveFieldProofs.naf_exit
NAF encoder proven end-to-end + the phase-1 double-scalar-mul apex The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages): - `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load. - `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem. - `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split), digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry', oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps. - `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack) for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253. And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`: - `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation, kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness. - `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A, the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256 with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and documented; nothing assumes it. Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub (backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal — a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the #print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene. CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec, non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec — each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 14:52:06 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.naf_digit_loop_spec
CurveFieldProofs.non_adjacent_form_spec
CurveFieldProofs.run_basepoint
CurveFieldProofs.vartime_double_base_mul_spec
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.verify_loop_full
Phase 2, brick 1a: to_bytes canonicity proven (to_bytes_spec, kernel-audited) The load-bearing brick of the point-level apex equation: FieldElement51::to_bytes always succeeds and its 32 output bytes denote EXACTLY the represented residue - bytesVal s = feVal a mod p. Since the canonical residue determines the bytes, this is simultaneously canonicity ("output is the canonical encoding") and the injectivity compress needs ("equal residues iff equal bytes"). - Proofs/ToBytesMath.lean: the context-free ℕ mathematics (METHOD 4) - the 5-rung carry telescope (div_rung/q_telescope), the q-trick facts (q = (h+19)/2^255 is a bit, fires iff h >= p), q_mod_p (adding 19q and discarding bit 255 subtracts pq exactly), carry_pack (the masked-limb assembly mod 2^255), five per-limb byte-chunk splits, and bytes_pack (the 32-byte little-endian reassembly, closed by one zify + linear_combination over the five splits). - Proofs/ToBytesSpec.lean: the symbolic execution - at ~150 machine ops the longest walk in the repo, loop-free: weak reduce (reduce_spec), the q pass, the fold + carry pass, 32 byte extractions (the four limb-boundary bytes turn disjoint ORs into additions via Nat.two_pow_add_eq_or_of_lt), and the trailing top-bit debug-assert DISCHARGED (b31 = f4/2^44 < 2^7), not assumed. - check.sh: ToBytesMath/ToBytesSpec in PROOFS, to_bytes_spec in CERTS (exact standard-three audit) - full button green fresh. Walk lessons (for the control repo, next push): rw index-equations into their consumers instead of subst (subst eliminates the wrong side or dies on dependent do-motives); never rw [Nat.mod_eq_of_lt (by omega)] (metavariable goal reaches omega) - state the bound with show. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 11:10:43 +00:00
CurveFieldProofs.to_bytes_spec
CurveFieldProofs.ed_compress_spec
ScalarProofs.from_bytes_mod_order_wide_spec
CurveFieldProofs.vartime_dsm_basepoint_spec
CurveFieldProofs.enc_point_inj
CurveFieldProofs.pow_p58_spec
CurveFieldProofs.fe_ct_eq_spec
CurveFieldProofs.sqrt_core
CurveFieldProofs.sqrt_ratio_i_sq_spec
CurveFieldProofs.from_bytes_spec
CurveFieldProofs.decompress_of_canonical
)
# Imports needed so every certificate in CERTS is in scope for the audit.
AUDIT_IMPORTS=(
Proofs.FieldMain
Proofs.EdMain
Proofs.DsmTableSpec
Proofs.DsmStepSpec
Proofs.DsmLoopSpec
Proofs.DsmNafLoadSpec
Proofs.DsmNafMath
NAF encoder proven end-to-end + the phase-1 double-scalar-mul apex The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages): - `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load. - `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem. - `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split), digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry', oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps. - `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack) for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253. And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`: - `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation, kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness. - `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A, the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256 with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and documented; nothing assumes it. Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub (backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal — a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the #print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene. CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec, non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec — each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 14:52:06 +00:00
Proofs.DsmNafSpec
Proofs.DsmMulSpec
Phase 2, brick 1a: to_bytes canonicity proven (to_bytes_spec, kernel-audited) The load-bearing brick of the point-level apex equation: FieldElement51::to_bytes always succeeds and its 32 output bytes denote EXACTLY the represented residue - bytesVal s = feVal a mod p. Since the canonical residue determines the bytes, this is simultaneously canonicity ("output is the canonical encoding") and the injectivity compress needs ("equal residues iff equal bytes"). - Proofs/ToBytesMath.lean: the context-free ℕ mathematics (METHOD 4) - the 5-rung carry telescope (div_rung/q_telescope), the q-trick facts (q = (h+19)/2^255 is a bit, fires iff h >= p), q_mod_p (adding 19q and discarding bit 255 subtracts pq exactly), carry_pack (the masked-limb assembly mod 2^255), five per-limb byte-chunk splits, and bytes_pack (the 32-byte little-endian reassembly, closed by one zify + linear_combination over the five splits). - Proofs/ToBytesSpec.lean: the symbolic execution - at ~150 machine ops the longest walk in the repo, loop-free: weak reduce (reduce_spec), the q pass, the fold + carry pass, 32 byte extractions (the four limb-boundary bytes turn disjoint ORs into additions via Nat.two_pow_add_eq_or_of_lt), and the trailing top-bit debug-assert DISCHARGED (b31 = f4/2^44 < 2^7), not assumed. - check.sh: ToBytesMath/ToBytesSpec in PROOFS, to_bytes_spec in CERTS (exact standard-three audit) - full button green fresh. Walk lessons (for the control repo, next push): rw index-equations into their consumers instead of subst (subst eliminates the wrong side or dies on dependent do-motives); never rw [Nat.mod_eq_of_lt (by omega)] (metavariable goal reaches omega) - state the bound with show. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 11:10:43 +00:00
Proofs.ToBytesSpec
Proofs.CompressSpec
Proofs.ScalarPackSpec
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
Proofs.SigApexSpec
Proofs.PointLiftSpec
Proofs.PointEqSpec
Proofs.DecompressSpec
Proofs.FromBytesSpec
Proofs.DecompressMain
)
# ── Phase 0: resource + integrity guards ────────────────────────────────────
free -m | awk '/Mem:/{if($7<2048){print "FATAL: <2GB RAM available — refusing to compile"; exit 1}}'
echo "=== Phase 0: source integrity ==="
for f in "$HERE"/gen/CurveField/*.lean "$HERE"/Proofs/*.lean; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
if ! grep -qE '^(/-|import |namespace |theorem |def |open |set_option |--)' "$f"; then
echo "CORRUPTED: $f is not Lean source (olean clobber?). Restore: git checkout HEAD -- $f"
exit 1
fi
done
echo " all sources valid"
# ── Phase 1: stub + axiom-smuggling audit ───────────────────────────────────
echo "=== Phase 1: stub audit ==="
if grep -rn 'by trivial' "$HERE"/Proofs/*Spec*.lean 2>/dev/null; then
echo "STUB DETECTED: 'by trivial' in spec files"; exit 1; fi
if grep -rn ' : True :=' "$HERE"/Proofs/*.lean 2>/dev/null; then
echo "STUB DETECTED: True-target theorem"; exit 1; fi
if grep -rnE '^(private |protected |noncomputable )*axiom ' "$HERE"/Proofs/*.lean 2>/dev/null; then
echo "AXIOM SMUGGLING DETECTED: axiom declaration under Proofs/ — forbidden."
echo "External models belong in gen/*/FunsExternal.lean and must stay outside"
echo "every certificate's dependency cone (Phase 3 verifies that)."
exit 1
fi
echo " clean: no trivial stubs, no True targets, no axioms outside gen/"
# ── Phase 2: compile everything shipped ─────────────────────────────────────
echo "=== Phase 2: compile ==="
LOG=$(mktemp /tmp/check-compile-XXXX.log)
cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
compile() {
echo \" · \$1\"
LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT LEAN_MAX_CORES=$CORES '$HERE/lean-guard' \"\${1}.lean\" 2>&1 | tee -a '$LOG' || { echo \"FAIL: \$1\"; exit 1; }
}
for m in ${GEN_MODULES[*]}; do compile \"\$m\"; done
cd '$HERE'
for m in ${PROOFS[*]}; do
[ -f \"Proofs/\$m.lean\" ] || { echo \"MISSING: Proofs/\$m.lean listed in manifest\"; exit 1; }
compile \"Proofs/\$m\"
done
# every shipped proof file must be in the manifest (no dead files)
for f in Proofs/*.lean; do
b=\$(basename \"\$f\" .lean)
[ \"\$b\" = AxiomCheck ] && continue
case \"\$b\" in Scalar*) continue;; esac # scalar layer: checked by check-scalar.sh (coherence pass 2)
case \" ${PROOFS[*]} \" in (*\" \$b \"*) ;; (*) echo \"DEAD FILE: \$f not in check manifest\"; exit 1;; esac
done
"
if grep -q "uses 'sorry'" "$LOG"; then
echo "STUB DETECTED: a compiled declaration uses 'sorry'"; exit 1; fi
rm -f "$LOG"
verification: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate (Phase 2b) + self-test Phase 1's anti-smuggling check reads source text. Measured today on Lean v4.30.0-rc2, four distinct declarations compile cleanly and slip past its anchored pattern: ` axiom cheat : ...` one leading space `@[simp] axiom cheat : ...` line starts with the attribute `unsafe axiom cheat : ...` `unsafe` absent from the modifier list `axiom` <newline> ` cheat` no space follows the keyword Any of them yields a repository that proves False while the button prints ALL GREEN. Only the tab variant is blocked, and by Lean, not by us. Hardening the pattern would fix the exhibited syntax rather than the class, which is the mistake this estate has made before. Phase 2b stops parsing text and asks the kernel instead: it reads every compiled Proofs/*.olean with readModuleData and rejects any declaration that is an axiom. Design notes: - reads compiled artifacts rather than importing the modules, because Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs deliberately reuse `zero_spec` and a whole-corpus import is impossible by construction; - membership is self-deriving from the filesystem, so Scalar* and AxiomCheck are covered too — both are skipped by the CERTS audit and by the dead-file gate; - fails closed on absence: a missing .olean would make the scan vacuous, so the count of compiled modules must equal the count of shipped sources; - removes its temp source AND artifact on both paths, since a bare `rm` after the call never runs under `set -e` when the gate goes red — exactly how this repo accumulated 101 orphan .olean files; - ~3 s for the whole corpus, against ~53 s for one module-importing run. Phase 1's grep stays as a fast first line of defence. Phase 2b is the gate that is load-bearing. selftest-axgate.sh attacks the shipping gate, lifted out of check.sh at run time rather than copied. It asserts the specific diagnostic, so a rejection for an unrelated reason fails too, and it was itself negative-tested: with the gate's throwError removed, the self-test goes red on exactly that case. No proof, statement, specification or certificate is touched. No attested commit is altered — the log binds specific commit hashes, all of which remain ancestors of HEAD. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 16:24:18 +00:00
# ── Phase 2b: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate ────────────────────────────
# WHY THIS EXISTS. Phase 1's anti-smuggling check reads SOURCE TEXT, and a
# source-text grep is the wrong instrument. Measured on Lean v4.30.0-rc2
# (2026-07-28), each of the following compiles cleanly and slips past it:
# ` axiom cheat : ...` (one leading space — the pattern is anchored)
# `@[simp] axiom cheat : ...` (line starts with the attribute)
# `unsafe axiom cheat : ...` (`unsafe` is not in the modifier alternation)
# `axiom` <newline> ` cheat` (no space follows the keyword)
# Only the tab variant is blocked, and by Lean itself, not by us. Hardening the
# pattern would fix the exhibited syntax rather than the class; the class fix is
# to stop parsing text and ask the kernel, which is what this phase does.
# Ported from fips205-slhdsa-verified/verification/Proofs/Audit.lean.
#
# Phase 1's grep is kept as a fast, readable first line of defence. THIS is the
# gate that is load-bearing.
echo "=== Phase 2b: kernel-side axiom-declaration gate ==="
# dot-prefixed and inside $HERE: `lean` refuses a file outside the root
# directory, and a leading dot keeps it out of every *.lean glob.
# The gate reads the COMPILED ARTIFACTS directly (readModuleData) rather than
# importing the modules. Two reasons, both load-bearing:
# · Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs deliberately reuse the name
# `zero_spec` (they are never imported together), so a whole-corpus import
# is impossible by construction — it fails with "environment already
# contains". Reading oleans merges nothing, so collisions cannot arise.
# · Membership is then SELF-DERIVING from the filesystem: every .olean under
# Proofs/ is scanned, including Scalar* and AxiomCheck, which the CERTS
# audit and the dead-file gate both skip. Nothing is on a hand-kept list.
# Cost is ~3 s for the whole corpus (no mathlib import), against ~53 s for a
# single module-importing invocation.
N_PROOF_SRC=$(ls -1 "$HERE"/Proofs/*.lean 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
GATE=$(mktemp "$HERE/.axgate-XXXX.lean")
{
echo "import Lean"
echo "open Lean"
echo "def expectedModules : Nat := $N_PROOF_SRC"
cat <<'LEANGATE'
run_cmd do
let dir : System.FilePath := "Proofs"
let mut errs : Array String := #[]
let mut nMod := 0
let mut nConst := 0
for entry in (← dir.readDir) do
if entry.path.extension == some "olean" then
nMod := nMod + 1
let (mod, _) ← readModuleData entry.path
for ci in mod.constants do
nConst := nConst + 1
if ci matches .axiomInfo _ then
errs := errs.push s!" {entry.fileName}: {ci.name}"
unless errs.isEmpty do
throwError "AXIOM DECLARED under Proofs/ (kernel-side gate):\n{String.intercalate "\n" errs.toList}"
-- FAIL CLOSED ON ABSENCE: an empty result and a clean result must not share
-- a code path. A deleted .olean would make the scan above vacuous; an extra
-- one is orphan litter with no shipped source.
if nMod != expectedModules then
throwError "COVERAGE MISMATCH under Proofs/: scanned {nMod} compiled modules, but the directory ships {expectedModules} sources. A missing .olean makes this gate vacuous; an extra .olean is an orphan with no source."
logInfo s!" kernel confirms: {nConst} declarations across {nMod} compiled Proofs modules, none is an axiom"
LEANGATE
} > "$GATE"
cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"
# The temp source AND its compiled artifact are removed on BOTH paths. Under
# `set -e` a bare `rm` after the call never runs when the gate goes red, which
# is exactly how this repo accumulated 101 orphan .olean files (fixed today).
GATE_RC=0
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
cd '$HERE'
LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT LEAN_MAX_CORES=$CORES '$HERE/lean-guard' '$GATE'
" || GATE_RC=$?
rm -f "$GATE" "${GATE%.lean}.olean"
if [ "$GATE_RC" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "AXIOM SMUGGLING GATE FAILED (kernel-side) — see the error above."
exit 1
fi
# ── Phase 3: axiom audit of every certificate ───────────────────────────────
echo "=== Phase 3: axiom audit ==="
EXPECTED="[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]"
cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
cd '$HERE'
AUD=\$(mktemp '$HERE/.audit-XXXX.lean')
{
for i in ${AUDIT_IMPORTS[*]}; do echo \"import \$i\"; done
for c in ${CERTS[*]}; do echo \"#print axioms \$c\"; done
} > \"\$AUD\"
OUT=\$(LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT LEAN_MEM_MB=4096 '$HERE/lean-guard' \"\$AUD\" 2>&1)
echo \"\$OUT\"
rm -f \"\$AUD\" \"\${AUD%.lean}.olean\"
N_CLEAN=\$(echo \"\$OUT\" | grep -cF \"depends on axioms: $EXPECTED\" || true)
if [ \"\$N_CLEAN\" -ne ${#CERTS[@]} ]; then
echo \"AXIOM AUDIT FAILED: \$N_CLEAN/${#CERTS[@]} certificates clean\"
exit 1
fi
"
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
echo ""
echo "=== Phase 3b: signature-apex audit (SHA-512 + wire-format boundary) ==="
# The verification-equation apex is grounded in the PROVEN curve model; its
# only axioms beyond the standard three are the deliberate, documented
# boundary: the SHA-512 hash oracle and the opaque wire-format types.
# NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend-dispatch axioms.
cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"
lake env bash -c "
set -euo pipefail
cd '$HERE/gen' && export LEAN_PATH=\"\$LEAN_PATH:\$PWD:$HERE\"
cd '$HERE'
ALLOWED='[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, verifying.sha512_finalize_bytes, verifying.sha512_new, verifying.sha512_update, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new]'
AUD=\$(mktemp '$HERE/.apex-XXXX.lean')
{ echo 'import Proofs.SigApexSpec'; echo 'import Proofs.PointLiftSpec'; echo 'import Proofs.PointEqSpec'; echo 'import Proofs.DecompressMain'; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff'; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point'; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point_eq'; echo '#print axioms CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_decompress'; } > \"\$AUD\"
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
OUT=\$(LEAN_TIMEOUT=$TIMEOUT LEAN_MEM_MB=4096 '$HERE/lean-guard' \"\$AUD\" 2>&1)
echo \"\$OUT\"
rm -f \"\$AUD\" \"\${AUD%.lean}.olean\"
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
FLAT=\$(echo \"\$OUT\" | tr '\\n' ' ' | tr -s ' ')
PHASE 2 HALF-LIFT PROVEN: verify_accepts_iff_point, button-enforced THE THEOREM (CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point): for a parsing signature, a valid on-curve public-key point, a canonical signature scalar, and a successful recompute, there is a point R' - the certified [k](-A) + [s]B, ExtValid and on-curve - with verifier accepts <=> bytesVal R_bytes = (edY R').val + ((edX R').val % 2) * 2^255 The apex's byte-for-byte comparison IS point-encoding equality: the signature's R bytes are accepted exactly when they are THE canonical encoding of the recomputed point. Axiom cone: EXACTLY the apex boundary (SHA-512 oracle + wire-format opaques; zero curve/scalar/backend axioms), now enforced for BOTH apex and half-lift by check.sh Phase 3b. New machinery in Proofs/PointLiftSpec.lean: - bind_ok_inv: generic ok-inversion of one monadic bind - the clean way to invert oracle-bearing chains (axioms cannot be walked). - recompute_inv: names the recompute chain's intermediates (hash, k, -A, R') with their defining equations, via eight flat bind_ok_inv steps after the pass-through reductions. - Bytes64.exists_bytes + List.exists_len32: the 64-byte destructure - Lean's match refuses list patterns beyond ~32 elements, so the device is a 32-cons prefix + a list-level 32-destructure on the tail. - The assembly: recompute_inv + from_bytes_mod_order_wide_spec (k canonical) + edwards_neg_law (-A) + vartime_dsm_basepoint_spec (R', valid, on-curve) + ed_compress_spec (er = canonical encoding) + rangeEq_iff_bytesVal (byte comparison = value equality), threaded through the ok-injectivity of the inverted equations. Full button green fresh, incl. the extended Phase 3b. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 14:06:23 +00:00
if echo \"\$FLAT\" | grep -qF \"'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff' depends on axioms: \$ALLOWED\" \
&& echo \"\$FLAT\" | grep -qF \"'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point' depends on axioms: \$ALLOWED\" \
&& echo \"\$FLAT\" | grep -qF \"'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point_eq' depends on axioms: \$ALLOWED\" \
&& echo \"\$FLAT\" | grep -qF \"'CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_decompress' depends on axioms: \$ALLOWED\"; then
echo ' apex + full-lift axiom cones = exactly the SHA-512 + wire-format boundary (no curve/scalar/backend axioms)'
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
else
PHASE 2 HALF-LIFT PROVEN: verify_accepts_iff_point, button-enforced THE THEOREM (CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff_point): for a parsing signature, a valid on-curve public-key point, a canonical signature scalar, and a successful recompute, there is a point R' - the certified [k](-A) + [s]B, ExtValid and on-curve - with verifier accepts <=> bytesVal R_bytes = (edY R').val + ((edX R').val % 2) * 2^255 The apex's byte-for-byte comparison IS point-encoding equality: the signature's R bytes are accepted exactly when they are THE canonical encoding of the recomputed point. Axiom cone: EXACTLY the apex boundary (SHA-512 oracle + wire-format opaques; zero curve/scalar/backend axioms), now enforced for BOTH apex and half-lift by check.sh Phase 3b. New machinery in Proofs/PointLiftSpec.lean: - bind_ok_inv: generic ok-inversion of one monadic bind - the clean way to invert oracle-bearing chains (axioms cannot be walked). - recompute_inv: names the recompute chain's intermediates (hash, k, -A, R') with their defining equations, via eight flat bind_ok_inv steps after the pass-through reductions. - Bytes64.exists_bytes + List.exists_len32: the 64-byte destructure - Lean's match refuses list patterns beyond ~32 elements, so the device is a 32-cons prefix + a list-level 32-destructure on the tail. - The assembly: recompute_inv + from_bytes_mod_order_wide_spec (k canonical) + edwards_neg_law (-A) + vartime_dsm_basepoint_spec (R', valid, on-curve) + ed_compress_spec (er = canonical encoding) + rangeEq_iff_bytesVal (byte comparison = value equality), threaded through the ok-injectivity of the inverted equations. Full button green fresh, incl. the extended Phase 3b. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-05 14:06:23 +00:00
echo 'APEX AUDIT FAILED: apex/half-lift cone is not the documented boundary'; exit 1
THE SIGNATURE APEX: the EdDSA verification equation, proven and audited `Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean`: - `verify_loop_full` — the extracted 32-byte comparison loop returns exactly the byte-equality of the two arrays (induction; axiom cone = exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]). - `verify_accepts_iff` — THE APEX: for a signature that parses, the extracted RustCrypto verifier accepts IFF the recomputed compressed point compress( [s]·B − [k]·A ) equals the signature's R byte-for-byte. The recomputation is grounded in the PROVEN curve model (every curve and scalar call is a certified definition); k is whatever scalar the SHA-512 oracle produces — the honest EdDSA acceptance criterion with the hash opaque. Boundary hygiene forced by the audit itself: - The public vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint dispatch pulled the AVX2 vector-backend axiom into the apex cone. Fixed at the build level: extract.sh pins RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial", so the SIMD arm compiles out; BackendKind has only Serial and get_selected_backend becomes a real definition (ok Serial). - subtle.Choice.unwrap_u8 upgraded from axiom to the documented model definition (Choice := U8; unwrap_u8 = self.0) — it sits on the verify path via compress → is_negative. - CurveSig modules added to GEN_MODULES (stale-olean incoherence otherwise). check.sh grows Phase 3b: the apex certificate's axiom cone must equal EXACTLY [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature, sha2.Sha512, sha512_new, sha512_update, sha512_finalize_bytes, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes, signature.error.Error, Error.new] — the SHA-512 hash oracle plus the opaque wire-format types. NO curve axioms, NO scalar axioms, NO backend axioms, enforced on every button press. Full check.sh green: 16 standard certificates + the apex audit. Phase 2 (the point-level equation [s]B − [k]A = decompress R, needing to_bytes canonicity and decompress) remains deferred and documented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 17:45:55 +00:00
fi
"
echo ""
echo "ALL PROOFS PASS. ALL CERTIFICATES AXIOM-CLEAN. NO DEAD FILES."