// -*- mode: rust; -*- // // This file is part of x25519-dalek. // Copyright (c) 2017-2021 isis lovecruft // Copyright (c) 2019-2021 DebugSteven // See LICENSE for licensing information. // // Authors: // - isis agora lovecruft // - DebugSteven //! x25519 Diffie-Hellman key exchange //! //! This implements x25519 key exchange as specified by Mike Hamburg //! and Adam Langley in [RFC7748](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748). use curve25519_dalek::{ edwards::EdwardsPoint, montgomery::MontgomeryPoint, scalar::Scalar, traits::IsIdentity, }; use rand_core::CryptoRng; use rand_core::RngCore; #[cfg(feature = "zeroize")] use zeroize::Zeroize; /// A Diffie-Hellman public key, corresponding to an [`EphemeralSecret`] or /// [`StaticSecret`] key. /// /// We implement `Zeroize` so that downstream consumers may derive it for `Drop` /// should they wish to erase public keys from memory. Note that this erasure /// (in this crate) does *not* automatically happen, but either must be derived /// for Drop or explicitly called. #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", derive(Zeroize))] #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Copy, Clone, Debug)] pub struct PublicKey(pub(crate) MontgomeryPoint); impl From<[u8; 32]> for PublicKey { /// Given a byte array, construct a x25519 `PublicKey`. fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> PublicKey { PublicKey(MontgomeryPoint(bytes)) } } impl PublicKey { /// Convert this public key to a byte array. #[inline] pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.0.to_bytes() } /// View this public key as a byte array. #[inline] pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { self.0.as_bytes() } } /// A short-lived Diffie-Hellman secret key that can only be used to compute a single /// [`SharedSecret`]. /// /// This type is identical to the [`StaticSecret`] type, except that the /// [`EphemeralSecret::diffie_hellman`] method consumes and then wipes the secret key, and there /// are no serialization methods defined. This means that [`EphemeralSecret`]s can only be /// generated from fresh randomness by [`EphemeralSecret::new`] and the compiler statically checks /// that the resulting secret is used at most once. #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", derive(Zeroize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", zeroize(drop))] pub struct EphemeralSecret(pub(crate) Scalar); impl EphemeralSecret { /// Perform a Diffie-Hellman key agreement between `self` and /// `their_public` key to produce a [`SharedSecret`]. pub fn diffie_hellman(self, their_public: &PublicKey) -> SharedSecret { SharedSecret(self.0 * their_public.0) } /// Generate an x25519 [`EphemeralSecret`] key. pub fn new(mut csprng: T) -> Self { let mut bytes = [0u8; 32]; csprng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes); EphemeralSecret(Scalar::from_bits_clamped(bytes)) } } impl<'a> From<&'a EphemeralSecret> for PublicKey { /// Given an x25519 [`EphemeralSecret`] key, compute its corresponding [`PublicKey`]. fn from(secret: &'a EphemeralSecret) -> PublicKey { PublicKey(EdwardsPoint::mul_base(&secret.0).to_montgomery()) } } /// A Diffie-Hellman secret key which may be used more than once, but is /// purposefully not serialiseable in order to discourage key-reuse. This is /// implemented to facilitate protocols such as Noise (e.g. Noise IK key usage, /// etc.) and X3DH which require an "ephemeral" key to conduct the /// Diffie-Hellman operation multiple times throughout the protocol, while the /// protocol run at a higher level is only conducted once per key. /// /// Similarly to [`EphemeralSecret`], this type does _not_ have serialisation /// methods, in order to discourage long-term usage of secret key material. (For /// long-term secret keys, see [`StaticSecret`].) /// /// # Warning /// /// If you're uncertain about whether you should use this, then you likely /// should not be using this. Our strongly recommended advice is to use /// [`EphemeralSecret`] at all times, as that type enforces at compile-time that /// secret keys are never reused, which can have very serious security /// implications for many protocols. #[cfg(feature = "reusable_secrets")] #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", derive(Zeroize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", zeroize(drop))] #[derive(Clone)] pub struct ReusableSecret(pub(crate) Scalar); #[cfg(feature = "reusable_secrets")] impl ReusableSecret { /// Perform a Diffie-Hellman key agreement between `self` and /// `their_public` key to produce a [`SharedSecret`]. pub fn diffie_hellman(&self, their_public: &PublicKey) -> SharedSecret { SharedSecret(self.0 * their_public.0) } /// Generate a non-serializeable x25519 [`ReusableSecret`] key. pub fn new(mut csprng: T) -> Self { let mut bytes = [0u8; 32]; csprng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes); ReusableSecret(Scalar::from_bits_clamped(bytes)) } } #[cfg(feature = "reusable_secrets")] impl<'a> From<&'a ReusableSecret> for PublicKey { /// Given an x25519 [`ReusableSecret`] key, compute its corresponding [`PublicKey`]. fn from(secret: &'a ReusableSecret) -> PublicKey { PublicKey(EdwardsPoint::mul_base(&secret.0).to_montgomery()) } } /// A Diffie-Hellman secret key that can be used to compute multiple [`SharedSecret`]s. /// /// This type is identical to the [`EphemeralSecret`] type, except that the /// [`StaticSecret::diffie_hellman`] method does not consume the secret key, and the type provides /// serialization methods to save and load key material. This means that the secret may be used /// multiple times (but does not *have to be*). /// /// # Warning /// /// If you're uncertain about whether you should use this, then you likely /// should not be using this. Our strongly recommended advice is to use /// [`EphemeralSecret`] at all times, as that type enforces at compile-time that /// secret keys are never reused, which can have very serious security /// implications for many protocols. #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", derive(Zeroize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", zeroize(drop))] #[derive(Clone)] pub struct StaticSecret( #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(with = "AllowUnreducedScalarBytes"))] pub(crate) Scalar, ); impl StaticSecret { /// Perform a Diffie-Hellman key agreement between `self` and /// `their_public` key to produce a `SharedSecret`. pub fn diffie_hellman(&self, their_public: &PublicKey) -> SharedSecret { SharedSecret(self.0 * their_public.0) } /// Generate an x25519 key. pub fn new(mut csprng: T) -> Self { let mut bytes = [0u8; 32]; csprng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes); StaticSecret(Scalar::from_bits_clamped(bytes)) } /// Extract this key's bytes for serialization. pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.0.to_bytes() } } impl From<[u8; 32]> for StaticSecret { /// Load a secret key from a byte array. fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> StaticSecret { StaticSecret(Scalar::from_bits_clamped(bytes)) } } impl<'a> From<&'a StaticSecret> for PublicKey { /// Given an x25519 [`StaticSecret`] key, compute its corresponding [`PublicKey`]. fn from(secret: &'a StaticSecret) -> PublicKey { PublicKey(EdwardsPoint::mul_base(&secret.0).to_montgomery()) } } /// The result of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. /// /// Each party computes this using their [`EphemeralSecret`] or [`StaticSecret`] and their /// counterparty's [`PublicKey`]. #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", derive(Zeroize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", zeroize(drop))] pub struct SharedSecret(pub(crate) MontgomeryPoint); impl SharedSecret { /// Convert this shared secret to a byte array. #[inline] pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.0.to_bytes() } /// View this shared secret key as a byte array. #[inline] pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] { self.0.as_bytes() } /// Ensure in constant-time that this shared secret did not result from a /// key exchange with non-contributory behaviour. /// /// In some more exotic protocols which need to guarantee "contributory" /// behaviour for both parties, that is, that each party contibuted a public /// value which increased the security of the resulting shared secret. /// To take an example protocol attack where this could lead to undesireable /// results [from Thái "thaidn" Dương](https://vnhacker.blogspot.com/2015/09/why-not-validating-curve25519-public.html): /// /// > If Mallory replaces Alice's and Bob's public keys with zero, which is /// > a valid Curve25519 public key, he would be able to force the ECDH /// > shared value to be zero, which is the encoding of the point at infinity, /// > and thus get to dictate some publicly known values as the shared /// > keys. It still requires an active man-in-the-middle attack to pull the /// > trick, after which, however, not only Mallory can decode Alice's data, /// > but everyone too! It is also impossible for Alice and Bob to detect the /// > intrusion, as they still share the same keys, and can communicate with /// > each other as normal. /// /// The original Curve25519 specification argues that checks for /// non-contributory behaviour are "unnecessary for Diffie-Hellman". /// Whether this check is necessary for any particular given protocol is /// often a matter of debate, which we will not re-hash here, but simply /// cite some of the [relevant] [public] [discussions]. /// /// # Returns /// /// Returns `true` if the key exchange was contributory (good), and `false` /// otherwise (can be bad for some protocols). /// /// [relevant]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748#page-15 /// [public]: https://vnhacker.blogspot.com/2015/09/why-not-validating-curve25519-public.html /// [discussions]: https://vnhacker.blogspot.com/2016/08/the-internet-of-broken-protocols.html #[must_use] pub fn was_contributory(&self) -> bool { !self.0.is_identity() } } /// The bare, byte-oriented x25519 function, exactly as specified in RFC7748. /// /// This can be used with [`X25519_BASEPOINT_BYTES`] for people who /// cannot use the better, safer, and faster ephemeral DH API. /// /// # Example /// ``` /// use rand_core::OsRng; /// use rand_core::RngCore; /// /// use x25519_dalek::x25519; /// use x25519_dalek::StaticSecret; /// use x25519_dalek::PublicKey; /// /// // Generate Alice's key pair. /// let alice_secret = StaticSecret::new(&mut OsRng); /// let alice_public = PublicKey::from(&alice_secret); /// /// // Generate Bob's key pair. /// let bob_secret = StaticSecret::new(&mut OsRng); /// let bob_public = PublicKey::from(&bob_secret); /// /// // Alice and Bob should now exchange their public keys. /// /// // Once they've done so, they may generate a shared secret. /// let alice_shared = x25519(alice_secret.to_bytes(), bob_public.to_bytes()); /// let bob_shared = x25519(bob_secret.to_bytes(), alice_public.to_bytes()); /// /// assert_eq!(alice_shared, bob_shared); /// ``` pub fn x25519(k: [u8; 32], u: [u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] { (Scalar::from_bits_clamped(k) * MontgomeryPoint(u)).to_bytes() } /// The X25519 basepoint, for use with the bare, byte-oriented x25519 /// function. This is provided for people who cannot use the typed /// DH API for some reason. pub const X25519_BASEPOINT_BYTES: [u8; 32] = [ 9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ]; /// Derived serialization methods will not work on a StaticSecret because x25519 requires /// non-canonical scalars which are rejected by curve25519-dalek. Thus we provide a way to convert /// the bytes directly to a scalar using Serde's remote derive functionality. #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))] #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(remote = "Scalar"))] struct AllowUnreducedScalarBytes( #[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(getter = "Scalar::to_bytes"))] [u8; 32], ); impl From for Scalar { fn from(bytes: AllowUnreducedScalarBytes) -> Scalar { Scalar::from_bits_clamped(bytes.0) } }