This fix eliminates a scenario where a user misuses the `ExpandedSecretKey` API
in a way that leaks the user's secret key. In short, if a user sends
`ExpandedSecretKey::sign(sk, msg, pk1)` followed by
`ExpandedSecretKey::sign(sk, msg, pk2)`, where `pk1 != pk2`, a passive
adversary [can easily][0] derive `sk`. To mitigate this, we remove the API
entirely.
[0]: https://github.com/MystenLabs/ed25519-unsafe-libs
The API for this isn't the greatest and I apologise for that. Suggestions for
improvement welcome. One thing which @hdevalence and I considered was to
change the function signature to:
pub fn verify_batch<D, C, M, S, K>(messages: M,
signatures: S,
public_keys: K,
csprng: &mut C) -> Result<(), SignatureError>
where D: Digest<OutputSize = U64> + Default,
C: Rng + CryptoRng,
M: IntoIterator<Item = &[u8]>,
S: IntoIterator,
S::Item: Borrow<Signature>,
K: IntoIterator,
K::Item: Borrow<Signature>,
The other improvement which could be made is to implement 128-bit scalars for
the randomnesses.
* CLOSES#27
