Merge branch 'release/1.0.1'

This commit is contained in:
Isis Lovecruft 2020-09-22 02:00:50 +00:00
commit 925eb9ea56
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: AB41313533E8E812
8 changed files with 216 additions and 172 deletions

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "ed25519-dalek"
version = "1.0.0"
version = "1.0.1"
edition = "2018"
authors = ["isis lovecruft <isis@patternsinthevoid.net>"]
readme = "README.md"
@ -28,12 +28,14 @@ merlin = { version = "2", default-features = false, optional = true }
rand = { version = "0.7", default-features = false, optional = true }
rand_core = { version = "0.5", default-features = false, optional = true }
serde_crate = { package = "serde", version = "1.0", default-features = false, optional = true }
serde_bytes = { version = "0.11", optional = true }
sha2 = { version = "0.9", default-features = false }
zeroize = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["zeroize_derive"] }
[dev-dependencies]
hex = "^0.4"
bincode = "^0.9"
bincode = "1.0"
serde_json = "1.0"
criterion = "0.3"
rand = "0.7"
serde_crate = { package = "serde", version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
@ -47,11 +49,11 @@ harness = false
# required-features = ["batch"]
[features]
default = ["std", "u64_backend"]
default = ["std", "rand", "u64_backend"]
std = ["curve25519-dalek/std", "ed25519/std", "serde_crate/std", "sha2/std", "rand/std"]
alloc = ["curve25519-dalek/alloc", "rand/alloc", "zeroize/alloc"]
nightly = ["curve25519-dalek/nightly", "rand/nightly"]
serde = ["serde_crate", "ed25519/serde"]
nightly = ["curve25519-dalek/nightly"]
serde = ["serde_crate", "serde_bytes", "ed25519/serde"]
batch = ["merlin", "rand"]
# This feature enables deterministic batch verification.
batch_deterministic = ["merlin", "rand", "rand_core"]

View file

@ -43,22 +43,32 @@ use crate::public::PublicKey;
use crate::signature::InternalSignature;
trait BatchTranscript {
fn append_hrams(&mut self, hrams: &Vec<Scalar>);
fn append_scalars(&mut self, scalars: &Vec<Scalar>);
fn append_message_lengths(&mut self, message_lengths: &Vec<usize>);
}
impl BatchTranscript for Transcript {
/// Add all the computed `H(R||A||M)`s to the protocol transcript.
/// Append some `scalars` to this batch verification sigma protocol transcript.
///
/// For ed25519 batch verification, we include the following as scalars:
///
/// * All of the computed `H(R||A||M)`s to the protocol transcript, and
/// * All of the `s` components of each signature.
///
/// Each is also prefixed with their index in the vector.
fn append_hrams(&mut self, hrams: &Vec<Scalar>) {
for (i, hram) in hrams.iter().enumerate() {
// XXX add message length into transcript
fn append_scalars(&mut self, scalars: &Vec<Scalar>) {
for (i, scalar) in scalars.iter().enumerate() {
self.append_u64(b"", i as u64);
self.append_message(b"hram", hram.as_bytes());
self.append_message(b"hram", scalar.as_bytes());
}
}
/// Append the lengths of the messages into the transcript.
///
/// This is done out of an (potential over-)abundance of caution, to guard
/// against the unlikely event of collisions. However, a nicer way to do
/// this would be to append the message length before the message, but this
/// is messy w.r.t. the calculations of the `H(R||A||M)`s above.
fn append_message_lengths(&mut self, message_lengths: &Vec<usize>) {
for (i, len) in message_lengths.iter().enumerate() {
self.append_u64(b"", i as u64);
@ -121,6 +131,65 @@ fn zero_rng() -> ZeroRng {
/// `SignatureError` containing a description of the internal error which
/// occured.
///
/// # Notes on Nonce Generation & Malleability
///
/// ## On Synthetic Nonces
///
/// This library defaults to using what is called "synthetic" nonces, which
/// means that a mixture of deterministic (per any unique set of inputs to this
/// function) data and system randomness is used to seed the CSPRNG for nonce
/// generation. For more of the background theory on why many cryptographers
/// currently believe this to be superior to either purely deterministic
/// generation or purely relying on the system's randomness, see [this section
/// of the Merlin design](https://merlin.cool/transcript/rng.html) by Henry de
/// Valence, isis lovecruft, and Oleg Andreev, as well as Trevor Perrin's
/// [designs for generalised
/// EdDSA](https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000925.html).
///
/// ## On Deterministic Nonces
///
/// In order to be ammenable to protocols which require stricter third-party
/// auditability trails, such as in some financial cryptographic settings, this
/// library also supports a `--features=batch_deterministic` setting, where the
/// nonces for batch signature verification are derived purely from the inputs
/// to this function themselves.
///
/// **This is not recommended for use unless you have several cryptographers on
/// staff who can advise you in its usage and all the horrible, terrible,
/// awful ways it can go horribly, terribly, awfully wrong.**
///
/// In any sigma protocol it is wise to include as much context pertaining
/// to the public state in the protocol as possible, to avoid malleability
/// attacks where an adversary alters publics in an algebraic manner that
/// manages to satisfy the equations for the protocol in question.
///
/// For ed25519 batch verification (both with synthetic and deterministic nonce
/// generation), we include the following as scalars in the protocol transcript:
///
/// * All of the computed `H(R||A||M)`s to the protocol transcript, and
/// * All of the `s` components of each signature.
///
/// Each is also prefixed with their index in the vector.
///
/// The former, while not quite as elegant as adding the `R`s, `A`s, and
/// `M`s separately, saves us a bit of context hashing since the
/// `H(R||A||M)`s need to be computed for the verification equation anyway.
///
/// The latter prevents a malleability attack only found in deterministic batch
/// signature verification (i.e. only when compiling `ed25519-dalek` with
/// `--features batch_deterministic`) wherein an adversary, without access
/// to the signing key(s), can take any valid signature, `(s,R)`, and swap
/// `s` with `s' = -z1`. This doesn't contitute a signature forgery, merely
/// a vulnerability, as the resulting signature will not pass single
/// signature verification. (Thanks to Github users @real_or_random and
/// @jonasnick for pointing out this malleability issue.)
///
/// For an additional way in which signatures can be made to probablistically
/// falsely "pass" the synthethic batch verification equation *for the same
/// inputs*, but *only some crafted inputs* will pass the deterministic batch
/// single, and neither of these will ever pass single signature verification,
/// see the documentation for [`PublicKey.validate()`].
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
@ -181,8 +250,10 @@ pub fn verify_batch(
Scalar::from_hash(h)
}).collect();
// Collect the message lengths to add into the transcript.
// Collect the message lengths and the scalar portions of the signatures,
// and add them into the transcript.
let message_lengths: Vec<usize> = messages.iter().map(|i| i.len()).collect();
let scalars: Vec<Scalar> = signatures.iter().map(|i| i.s).collect();
// Build a PRNG based on a transcript of the H(R || A || M)s seen thus far.
// This provides synthethic randomness in the default configuration, and
@ -190,8 +261,9 @@ pub fn verify_batch(
// "batch_deterministic" feature.
let mut transcript: Transcript = Transcript::new(b"ed25519 batch verification");
transcript.append_hrams(&hrams);
transcript.append_scalars(&hrams);
transcript.append_message_lengths(&message_lengths);
transcript.append_scalars(&scalars);
#[cfg(all(feature = "batch", not(feature = "batch_deterministic")))]
let mut prng = transcript.build_rng().finalize(&mut thread_rng());

View file

@ -15,11 +15,9 @@ use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::de::Error as SerdeError;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::de::Visitor;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::de::SeqAccess;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde_bytes::{Bytes as SerdeBytes, ByteBuf as SerdeByteBuf};
pub use sha2::Sha512;
@ -125,6 +123,7 @@ impl Keypair {
/// The standard hash function used for most ed25519 libraries is SHA-512,
/// which is available with `use sha2::Sha512` as in the example above.
/// Other suitable hash functions include Keccak-512 and Blake2b-512.
#[cfg(feature = "rand")]
pub fn generate<R>(csprng: &mut R) -> Keypair
where
R: CryptoRng + RngCore,
@ -427,7 +426,8 @@ impl Serialize for Keypair {
where
S: Serializer,
{
serializer.serialize_bytes(&self.to_bytes()[..])
let bytes = &self.to_bytes()[..];
SerdeBytes::new(bytes).serialize(serializer)
}
}
@ -437,63 +437,7 @@ impl<'d> Deserialize<'d> for Keypair {
where
D: Deserializer<'d>,
{
struct KeypairVisitor;
impl<'d> Visitor<'d> for KeypairVisitor {
type Value = Keypair;
fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut ::core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::core::fmt::Result {
formatter.write_str("An ed25519 keypair, 64 bytes in total where the secret key is \
the first 32 bytes and is in unexpanded form, and the second \
32 bytes is a compressed point for a public key.")
}
fn visit_bytes<E>(self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Keypair, E>
where
E: SerdeError,
{
if bytes.len() != KEYPAIR_LENGTH {
return Err(SerdeError::invalid_length(bytes.len(), &self));
}
let secret_key = SecretKey::from_bytes(&bytes[..SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
let public_key = PublicKey::from_bytes(&bytes[SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..]);
if let (Ok(secret), Ok(public)) = (secret_key, public_key) {
Ok(Keypair{ secret, public })
} else {
Err(SerdeError::invalid_length(bytes.len(), &self))
}
}
fn visit_seq<A>(self, mut seq: A) -> Result<Keypair, A::Error>
where
A: SeqAccess<'d>
{
if let Some(len) = seq.size_hint() {
if len != KEYPAIR_LENGTH {
return Err(SerdeError::invalid_length(len, &self));
}
}
// TODO: We could do this with `MaybeUninit` to avoid unnecessary initialization costs
let mut bytes: [u8; KEYPAIR_LENGTH] = [0u8; KEYPAIR_LENGTH];
for i in 0..KEYPAIR_LENGTH {
bytes[i] = seq.next_element()?.ok_or_else(|| SerdeError::invalid_length(i, &self))?;
}
let secret_key = SecretKey::from_bytes(&bytes[..SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
let public_key = PublicKey::from_bytes(&bytes[SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..]);
if let (Ok(secret), Ok(public)) = (secret_key, public_key) {
Ok(Keypair{ secret, public })
} else {
Err(SerdeError::invalid_length(bytes.len(), &self))
}
}
}
deserializer.deserialize_bytes(KeypairVisitor)
let bytes = <SerdeByteBuf>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
Keypair::from_bytes(bytes.as_ref()).map_err(SerdeError::custom)
}
}

View file

@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
//! # fn main() {
//! # use rand::rngs::OsRng;
//! # use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, Signature, Signer, Verifier, PublicKey};
//! use bincode::{serialize, Infinite};
//! use bincode::serialize;
//! # let mut csprng = OsRng{};
//! # let keypair: Keypair = Keypair::generate(&mut csprng);
//! # let message: &[u8] = b"This is a test of the tsunami alert system.";
@ -184,8 +184,8 @@
//! # let public_key: PublicKey = keypair.public;
//! # let verified: bool = public_key.verify(message, &signature).is_ok();
//!
//! let encoded_public_key: Vec<u8> = serialize(&public_key, Infinite).unwrap();
//! let encoded_signature: Vec<u8> = serialize(&signature, Infinite).unwrap();
//! let encoded_public_key: Vec<u8> = serialize(&public_key).unwrap();
//! let encoded_signature: Vec<u8> = serialize(&signature).unwrap();
//! # }
//! # #[cfg(not(feature = "serde"))]
//! # fn main() {}
@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
//! # fn main() {
//! # use rand::rngs::OsRng;
//! # use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, Signature, Signer, Verifier, PublicKey};
//! # use bincode::{serialize, Infinite};
//! # use bincode::serialize;
//! use bincode::deserialize;
//!
//! # let mut csprng = OsRng{};
@ -215,8 +215,8 @@
//! # let signature: Signature = keypair.sign(message);
//! # let public_key: PublicKey = keypair.public;
//! # let verified: bool = public_key.verify(message, &signature).is_ok();
//! # let encoded_public_key: Vec<u8> = serialize(&public_key, Infinite).unwrap();
//! # let encoded_signature: Vec<u8> = serialize(&signature, Infinite).unwrap();
//! # let encoded_public_key: Vec<u8> = serialize(&public_key).unwrap();
//! # let encoded_signature: Vec<u8> = serialize(&signature).unwrap();
//! let decoded_public_key: PublicKey = deserialize(&encoded_public_key).unwrap();
//! let decoded_signature: Signature = deserialize(&encoded_signature).unwrap();
//!
@ -235,6 +235,9 @@
#![warn(future_incompatible)]
#![deny(missing_docs)] // refuse to compile if documentation is missing
#![cfg(not(test))]
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]
#[cfg(any(feature = "std", test))]
#[macro_use]
extern crate std;

View file

@ -26,11 +26,9 @@ pub use sha2::Sha512;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::de::Error as SerdeError;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::de::Visitor;
use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::{Deserializer, Serializer};
use serde_bytes::{Bytes as SerdeBytes, ByteBuf as SerdeByteBuf};
use crate::constants::*;
use crate::errors::*;
@ -362,7 +360,7 @@ impl Serialize for PublicKey {
where
S: Serializer,
{
serializer.serialize_bytes(self.as_bytes())
SerdeBytes::new(self.as_bytes()).serialize(serializer)
}
}
@ -372,24 +370,7 @@ impl<'d> Deserialize<'d> for PublicKey {
where
D: Deserializer<'d>,
{
struct PublicKeyVisitor;
impl<'d> Visitor<'d> for PublicKeyVisitor {
type Value = PublicKey;
fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut ::core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::core::fmt::Result {
formatter.write_str(
"An ed25519 public key as a 32-byte compressed point, as specified in RFC8032",
)
}
fn visit_bytes<E>(self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<PublicKey, E>
where
E: SerdeError,
{
PublicKey::from_bytes(bytes).or(Err(SerdeError::invalid_length(bytes.len(), &self)))
}
}
deserializer.deserialize_bytes(PublicKeyVisitor)
let bytes = <SerdeByteBuf>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
PublicKey::from_bytes(bytes.as_ref()).map_err(SerdeError::custom)
}
}

View file

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ use curve25519_dalek::digest::Digest;
use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
#[cfg(feature = "rand")]
use rand::{CryptoRng, RngCore};
use sha2::Sha512;
@ -24,11 +25,9 @@ use sha2::Sha512;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::de::Error as SerdeError;
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::de::Visitor;
use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
use serde::{Deserializer, Serializer};
use serde_bytes::{Bytes as SerdeBytes, ByteBuf as SerdeByteBuf};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
@ -164,6 +163,7 @@ impl SecretKey {
/// # Input
///
/// A CSPRNG with a `fill_bytes()` method, e.g. `rand::OsRng`
#[cfg(feature = "rand")]
pub fn generate<T>(csprng: &mut T) -> SecretKey
where
T: CryptoRng + RngCore,
@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ impl Serialize for SecretKey {
where
S: Serializer,
{
serializer.serialize_bytes(self.as_bytes())
SerdeBytes::new(self.as_bytes()).serialize(serializer)
}
}
@ -192,23 +192,8 @@ impl<'d> Deserialize<'d> for SecretKey {
where
D: Deserializer<'d>,
{
struct SecretKeyVisitor;
impl<'d> Visitor<'d> for SecretKeyVisitor {
type Value = SecretKey;
fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut ::core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::core::fmt::Result {
formatter.write_str("An ed25519 secret key as 32 bytes, as specified in RFC8032.")
}
fn visit_bytes<E>(self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<SecretKey, E>
where
E: SerdeError,
{
SecretKey::from_bytes(bytes).or(Err(SerdeError::invalid_length(bytes.len(), &self)))
}
}
deserializer.deserialize_bytes(SecretKeyVisitor)
let bytes = <SerdeByteBuf>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
SecretKey::from_bytes(bytes.as_ref()).map_err(SerdeError::custom)
}
}
@ -519,7 +504,8 @@ impl Serialize for ExpandedSecretKey {
where
S: Serializer,
{
serializer.serialize_bytes(&self.to_bytes()[..])
let bytes = &self.to_bytes()[..];
SerdeBytes::new(bytes).serialize(serializer)
}
}
@ -529,26 +515,8 @@ impl<'d> Deserialize<'d> for ExpandedSecretKey {
where
D: Deserializer<'d>,
{
struct ExpandedSecretKeyVisitor;
impl<'d> Visitor<'d> for ExpandedSecretKeyVisitor {
type Value = ExpandedSecretKey;
fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut ::core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::core::fmt::Result {
formatter.write_str(
"An ed25519 expanded secret key as 64 bytes, as specified in RFC8032.",
)
}
fn visit_bytes<E>(self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<ExpandedSecretKey, E>
where
E: SerdeError,
{
ExpandedSecretKey::from_bytes(bytes)
.or(Err(SerdeError::invalid_length(bytes.len(), &self)))
}
}
deserializer.deserialize_bytes(ExpandedSecretKeyVisitor)
let bytes = <SerdeByteBuf>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
ExpandedSecretKey::from_bytes(bytes.as_ref()).map_err(SerdeError::custom)
}
}

View file

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ fn check_scalar(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Scalar, SignatureError> {
// This is compatible with ed25519-donna and libsodium when
// -DED25519_COMPAT is NOT specified.
if bytes[31] & 224 != 0 {
return Err(SignatureError(InternalError::ScalarFormatError));
return Err(InternalError::ScalarFormatError.into());
}
Ok(Scalar::from_bits(bytes))

View file

@ -230,11 +230,11 @@ struct Demo {
mod serialisation {
use super::*;
use self::bincode::{serialize, serialized_size, deserialize, Infinite};
use self::toml;
use ed25519::signature::Signature as _;
// The size for bincode to serialize the length of a byte array.
static BINCODE_INT_LENGTH: usize = 8;
static PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH] = [
130, 039, 155, 015, 062, 076, 188, 063,
124, 122, 026, 251, 233, 253, 225, 220,
@ -269,42 +269,104 @@ mod serialisation {
035, 056, 000, 074, 130, 168, 225, 071, ];
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_signature() {
fn serialize_deserialize_signature_bincode() {
let signature: Signature = Signature::from_bytes(&SIGNATURE_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_signature: Vec<u8> = serialize(&signature, Infinite).unwrap();
let decoded_signature: Signature = deserialize(&encoded_signature).unwrap();
let encoded_signature: Vec<u8> = bincode::serialize(&signature).unwrap();
let decoded_signature: Signature = bincode::deserialize(&encoded_signature).unwrap();
assert_eq!(signature, decoded_signature);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_public_key() {
let public_key: PublicKey = PublicKey::from_bytes(&PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_public_key: Vec<u8> = serialize(&public_key, Infinite).unwrap();
let decoded_public_key: PublicKey = deserialize(&encoded_public_key).unwrap();
fn serialize_deserialize_signature_json() {
let signature: Signature = Signature::from_bytes(&SIGNATURE_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_signature = serde_json::to_string(&signature).unwrap();
let decoded_signature: Signature = serde_json::from_str(&encoded_signature).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES[..], &encoded_public_key[encoded_public_key.len() - 32..]);
assert_eq!(signature, decoded_signature);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_public_key_bincode() {
let public_key: PublicKey = PublicKey::from_bytes(&PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_public_key: Vec<u8> = bincode::serialize(&public_key).unwrap();
let decoded_public_key: PublicKey = bincode::deserialize(&encoded_public_key).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES[..], &encoded_public_key[encoded_public_key.len() - PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH..]);
assert_eq!(public_key, decoded_public_key);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_secret_key() {
let secret_key: SecretKey = SecretKey::from_bytes(&SECRET_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_secret_key: Vec<u8> = serialize(&secret_key, Infinite).unwrap();
let decoded_secret_key: SecretKey = deserialize(&encoded_secret_key).unwrap();
fn serialize_deserialize_public_key_json() {
let public_key: PublicKey = PublicKey::from_bytes(&PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_public_key = serde_json::to_string(&public_key).unwrap();
let decoded_public_key: PublicKey = serde_json::from_str(&encoded_public_key).unwrap();
for i in 0..32 {
assert_eq!(public_key, decoded_public_key);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_secret_key_bincode() {
let secret_key: SecretKey = SecretKey::from_bytes(&SECRET_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_secret_key: Vec<u8> = bincode::serialize(&secret_key).unwrap();
let decoded_secret_key: SecretKey = bincode::deserialize(&encoded_secret_key).unwrap();
for i in 0..SECRET_KEY_LENGTH {
assert_eq!(SECRET_KEY_BYTES[i], decoded_secret_key.as_bytes()[i]);
}
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_secret_key_json() {
let secret_key: SecretKey = SecretKey::from_bytes(&SECRET_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_secret_key = serde_json::to_string(&secret_key).unwrap();
let decoded_secret_key: SecretKey = serde_json::from_str(&encoded_secret_key).unwrap();
for i in 0..SECRET_KEY_LENGTH {
assert_eq!(SECRET_KEY_BYTES[i], decoded_secret_key.as_bytes()[i]);
}
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_expanded_secret_key_bincode() {
let expanded_secret_key = ExpandedSecretKey::from(&SecretKey::from_bytes(&SECRET_KEY_BYTES).unwrap());
let encoded_expanded_secret_key: Vec<u8> = bincode::serialize(&expanded_secret_key).unwrap();
let decoded_expanded_secret_key: ExpandedSecretKey = bincode::deserialize(&encoded_expanded_secret_key).unwrap();
for i in 0..EXPANDED_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH {
assert_eq!(expanded_secret_key.to_bytes()[i], decoded_expanded_secret_key.to_bytes()[i]);
}
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_expanded_secret_key_json() {
let expanded_secret_key = ExpandedSecretKey::from(&SecretKey::from_bytes(&SECRET_KEY_BYTES).unwrap());
let encoded_expanded_secret_key = serde_json::to_string(&expanded_secret_key).unwrap();
let decoded_expanded_secret_key: ExpandedSecretKey = serde_json::from_str(&encoded_expanded_secret_key).unwrap();
for i in 0..EXPANDED_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH {
assert_eq!(expanded_secret_key.to_bytes()[i], decoded_expanded_secret_key.to_bytes()[i]);
}
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_keypair_bincode() {
let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&KEYPAIR_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_keypair: Vec<u8> = serialize(&keypair, Infinite).unwrap();
let decoded_keypair: Keypair = deserialize(&encoded_keypair).unwrap();
let encoded_keypair: Vec<u8> = bincode::serialize(&keypair).unwrap();
let decoded_keypair: Keypair = bincode::deserialize(&encoded_keypair).unwrap();
for i in 0..64 {
for i in 0..KEYPAIR_LENGTH {
assert_eq!(KEYPAIR_BYTES[i], decoded_keypair.to_bytes()[i]);
}
}
#[test]
fn serialize_deserialize_keypair_json() {
let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&KEYPAIR_BYTES).unwrap();
let encoded_keypair = serde_json::to_string(&keypair).unwrap();
let decoded_keypair: Keypair = serde_json::from_str(&encoded_keypair).unwrap();
for i in 0..KEYPAIR_LENGTH {
assert_eq!(KEYPAIR_BYTES[i], decoded_keypair.to_bytes()[i]);
}
}
@ -323,18 +385,30 @@ mod serialisation {
#[test]
fn serialize_public_key_size() {
let public_key: PublicKey = PublicKey::from_bytes(&PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
assert_eq!(serialized_size(&public_key) as usize, 40); // These sizes are specific to bincode==1.0.1
assert_eq!(bincode::serialized_size(&public_key).unwrap() as usize, BINCODE_INT_LENGTH + PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_signature_size() {
let signature: Signature = Signature::from_bytes(&SIGNATURE_BYTES).unwrap();
assert_eq!(serialized_size(&signature) as usize, 64); // These sizes are specific to bincode==1.0.1
assert_eq!(bincode::serialized_size(&signature).unwrap() as usize, SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_secret_key_size() {
let secret_key: SecretKey = SecretKey::from_bytes(&SECRET_KEY_BYTES).unwrap();
assert_eq!(serialized_size(&secret_key) as usize, 40); // These sizes are specific to bincode==1.0.1
assert_eq!(bincode::serialized_size(&secret_key).unwrap() as usize, BINCODE_INT_LENGTH + SECRET_KEY_LENGTH);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_expanded_secret_key_size() {
let expanded_secret_key = ExpandedSecretKey::from(&SecretKey::from_bytes(&SECRET_KEY_BYTES).unwrap());
assert_eq!(bincode::serialized_size(&expanded_secret_key).unwrap() as usize, BINCODE_INT_LENGTH + EXPANDED_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH);
}
#[test]
fn serialize_keypair_size() {
let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&KEYPAIR_BYTES).unwrap();
assert_eq!(bincode::serialized_size(&keypair).unwrap() as usize, BINCODE_INT_LENGTH + KEYPAIR_LENGTH);
}
}