Verify by digest update + StreamVerifier (#735)

* Replace recompute_R with a separate RCompute

This struct can be use to implement verifiers with incremental updates

* Add raw_sign_byupdate and raw_verify_byupdate

These allow signing/verifying a non-prehashed message
but don't require the whole message to be provided at once.

* Tests for raw_sign_byupdate, raw_verify_byupdate

* Add StreamVerifier

* Make StreamVerifier use RCompute

This allows it to use the same implementation as non-stream signature
verification.

* Guard StreamVerifier behind hazmat feature

* docs: disambiguate unsafety

Co-authored-by: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>

* chore: relax F bounds on raw_verify_byupdate

* chore: remove raw_sign_byupdate and raw_verify_byupdate

* chore: address clippy lints within new code

* docs: fixup changelog

* test: invert new chunked test

* chore: revert raw_sign

---------

Co-authored-by: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
Co-authored-by: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>

ed25519-dalek/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ Entries are listed in reverse chronological order per undeprecated major series.
 
 # Unreleased
 
+* Add `SigningKey::verify_stream()`, and `VerifyingKey::verify_stream()`
+  
 # 2.x series
 
 ## 2.1.1

ed25519-dalek/src/signing.rs

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ use signature::DigestSigner;
 #[cfg(feature = "zeroize")]
 use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
 
+#[cfg(feature = "hazmat")]
+use crate::verifying::StreamVerifier;
 use crate::{
     constants::{KEYPAIR_LENGTH, SECRET_KEY_LENGTH},
     errors::{InternalError, SignatureError},
@@ -483,6 +485,17 @@ impl SigningKey {
         self.verifying_key.verify_strict(message, signature)
     }
 
+    /// Constructs stream verifier with candidate `signature`.
+    ///
+    /// See [`VerifyingKey::verify_stream()`] for more details.
+    #[cfg(feature = "hazmat")]
+    pub fn verify_stream(
+        &self,
+        signature: &ed25519::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<StreamVerifier, SignatureError> {
+        self.verifying_key.verify_stream(signature)
+    }
+
     /// Convert this signing key into a byte representation of an unreduced, unclamped Curve25519
     /// scalar. This is NOT the same thing as `self.to_scalar().to_bytes()`, since `to_scalar()`
     /// performs a clamping step, which changes the value of the resulting scalar.

ed25519-dalek/src/verifying.rs

@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ use crate::{
     signing::SigningKey,
 };
 
+#[cfg(feature = "hazmat")]
+mod stream;
+#[cfg(feature = "hazmat")]
+pub use self::stream::StreamVerifier;
+
 /// An ed25519 public key.
 ///
 /// # Note
@@ -186,58 +191,8 @@ impl VerifyingKey {
         self.point.is_small_order()
     }
 
-    // A helper function that computes `H(R || A || M)` where `H` is the 512-bit hash function
-    // given by `CtxDigest` (this is SHA-512 in spec-compliant Ed25519). If `context.is_some()`,
-    // this does the prehashed variant of the computation using its contents.
-    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
-    fn compute_challenge<CtxDigest>(
-        context: Option<&[u8]>,
-        R: &CompressedEdwardsY,
-        A: &CompressedEdwardsY,
-        M: &[u8],
-    ) -> Scalar
-    where
-        CtxDigest: Digest<OutputSize = U64>,
-    {
-        let mut h = CtxDigest::new();
-        if let Some(c) = context {
-            h.update(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions");
-            h.update([1]); // Ed25519ph
-            h.update([c.len() as u8]);
-            h.update(c);
-        }
-        h.update(R.as_bytes());
-        h.update(A.as_bytes());
-        h.update(M);
-
-        Scalar::from_hash(h)
-    }
-
-    // Helper function for verification. Computes the _expected_ R component of the signature. The
-    // caller compares this to the real R component.  If `context.is_some()`, this does the
-    // prehashed variant of the computation using its contents.
-    // Note that this returns the compressed form of R and the caller does a byte comparison. This
-    // means that all our verification functions do not accept non-canonically encoded R values.
-    // See the validation criteria blog post for more details:
-    //     https://hdevalence.ca/blog/2020-10-04-its-25519am
-    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
-    fn recompute_R<CtxDigest>(
-        &self,
-        context: Option<&[u8]>,
-        signature: &InternalSignature,
-        M: &[u8],
-    ) -> CompressedEdwardsY
-    where
-        CtxDigest: Digest<OutputSize = U64>,
-    {
-        let k = Self::compute_challenge::<CtxDigest>(context, &signature.R, &self.compressed, M);
-        let minus_A: EdwardsPoint = -self.point;
-        // Recall the (non-batched) verification equation: -[k]A + [s]B = R
-        EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &(minus_A), &signature.s).compress()
-    }
-
     /// The ordinary non-batched Ed25519 verification check, rejecting non-canonical R values. (see
-    /// [`Self::recompute_R`]). `CtxDigest` is the digest used to calculate the pseudorandomness
+    /// [`Self::RCompute`]). `CtxDigest` is the digest used to calculate the pseudorandomness
     /// needed for signing. According to the spec, `CtxDigest = Sha512`.
     ///
     /// This definition is loose in its parameters so that end-users of the `hazmat` module can
@@ -253,7 +208,7 @@ impl VerifyingKey {
     {
         let signature = InternalSignature::try_from(signature)?;
 
-        let expected_R = self.recompute_R::<CtxDigest>(None, &signature, message);
+        let expected_R = RCompute::<CtxDigest>::compute(self, signature, None, message);
         if expected_R == signature.R {
             Ok(())
         } else {
@@ -289,7 +244,8 @@ impl VerifyingKey {
         );
 
         let message = prehashed_message.finalize();
-        let expected_R = self.recompute_R::<CtxDigest>(Some(ctx), &signature, &message);
+
+        let expected_R = RCompute::<CtxDigest>::compute(self, signature, Some(ctx), &message);
 
         if expected_R == signature.R {
             Ok(())
@@ -415,7 +371,7 @@ impl VerifyingKey {
             return Err(InternalError::Verify.into());
         }
 
-        let expected_R = self.recompute_R::<Sha512>(None, &signature, message);
+        let expected_R = RCompute::<Sha512>::compute(self, signature, None, message);
         if expected_R == signature.R {
             Ok(())
         } else {
@@ -423,8 +379,22 @@ impl VerifyingKey {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Constructs stream verifier with candidate `signature`.
+    ///
+    /// Useful for cases where the whole message is not available all at once, allowing the
+    /// internal signature state to be updated incrementally and verified at the end. In some cases,
+    /// this will reduce the need for additional allocations.
+    #[cfg(feature = "hazmat")]
+    pub fn verify_stream(
+        &self,
+        signature: &ed25519::Signature,
+    ) -> Result<StreamVerifier, SignatureError> {
+        let signature = InternalSignature::try_from(signature)?;
+        Ok(StreamVerifier::new(*self, signature))
+    }
+
     /// Verify a `signature` on a `prehashed_message` using the Ed25519ph algorithm,
-    /// using strict signture checking as defined by [`Self::verify_strict`].
+    /// using strict signature checking as defined by [`Self::verify_strict`].
     ///
     /// # Inputs
     ///
@@ -477,7 +447,7 @@ impl VerifyingKey {
         }
 
         let message = prehashed_message.finalize();
-        let expected_R = self.recompute_R::<Sha512>(Some(ctx), &signature, &message);
+        let expected_R = RCompute::<Sha512>::compute(self, signature, Some(ctx), &message);
 
         if expected_R == signature.R {
             Ok(())
@@ -511,6 +481,79 @@ impl VerifyingKey {
     }
 }
 
+/// Helper for verification. Computes the _expected_ R component of the signature. The
+/// caller compares this to the real R component.
+/// This computes `H(R || A || M)` where `H` is the 512-bit hash function
+/// given by `CtxDigest` (this is SHA-512 in spec-compliant Ed25519).
+///
+/// For pre-hashed variants a `h` with the context already included can be provided.
+/// Note that this returns the compressed form of R and the caller does a byte comparison. This
+/// means that all our verification functions do not accept non-canonically encoded R values.
+/// See the validation criteria blog post for more details:
+///     https://hdevalence.ca/blog/2020-10-04-its-25519am
+pub(crate) struct RCompute<CtxDigest> {
+    key: VerifyingKey,
+    signature: InternalSignature,
+    h: CtxDigest,
+}
+
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+impl<CtxDigest> RCompute<CtxDigest>
+where
+    CtxDigest: Digest<OutputSize = U64>,
+{
+    /// If `prehash_ctx.is_some()`, this does the prehashed variant of the computation using its
+    /// contents.
+    pub(crate) fn compute(
+        key: &VerifyingKey,
+        signature: InternalSignature,
+        prehash_ctx: Option<&[u8]>,
+        message: &[u8],
+    ) -> CompressedEdwardsY {
+        let mut c = Self::new(key, signature, prehash_ctx);
+        c.update(message);
+        c.finish()
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn new(
+        key: &VerifyingKey,
+        signature: InternalSignature,
+        prehash_ctx: Option<&[u8]>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        let R = &signature.R;
+        let A = &key.compressed;
+
+        let mut h = CtxDigest::new();
+        if let Some(c) = prehash_ctx {
+            h.update(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions");
+            h.update([1]); // Ed25519ph
+            h.update([c.len() as u8]);
+            h.update(c);
+        }
+
+        h.update(R.as_bytes());
+        h.update(A.as_bytes());
+        Self {
+            key: *key,
+            signature,
+            h,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn update(&mut self, m: &[u8]) {
+        self.h.update(m)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn finish(self) -> CompressedEdwardsY {
+        let k = Scalar::from_hash(self.h);
+
+        let minus_A: EdwardsPoint = -self.key.point;
+        // Recall the (non-batched) verification equation: -[k]A + [s]B = R
+        EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &(minus_A), &self.signature.s)
+            .compress()
+    }
+}
+
 impl Verifier<ed25519::Signature> for VerifyingKey {
     /// Verify a signature on a message with this keypair's public key.
     ///

ed25519-dalek/src/verifying/stream.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
+use sha2::Sha512;
+
+use crate::verifying::RCompute;
+use crate::{signature::InternalSignature, InternalError, SignatureError, VerifyingKey};
+
+/// An IUF verifier for ed25519.
+///
+/// Created with [`VerifyingKey::verify_stream()`] or [`SigningKey::verify_stream()`].
+///
+/// [`SigningKey::verify_stream()`]: super::SigningKey::verify_stream()
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+pub struct StreamVerifier {
+    cr: RCompute<Sha512>,
+    sig_R: CompressedEdwardsY,
+}
+
+impl StreamVerifier {
+    /// Constructs new stream verifier.
+    ///
+    /// Seeds hash state with public key and signature components.
+    pub(crate) fn new(public_key: VerifyingKey, signature: InternalSignature) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            cr: RCompute::new(&public_key, signature, None),
+            sig_R: signature.R,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Digest message chunk.
+    pub fn update(&mut self, chunk: impl AsRef<[u8]>) {
+        self.cr.update(chunk.as_ref());
+    }
+
+    /// Finalize verifier and check against candidate signature.
+    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
+    pub fn finalize_and_verify(self) -> Result<(), SignatureError> {
+        let expected_R = self.cr.finish();
+
+        if expected_R == self.sig_R {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(InternalError::Verify.into())
+        }
+    }
+}

ed25519-dalek/tests/ed25519.rs

@@ -334,6 +334,50 @@ mod integrations {
         );
     }
 
+    #[cfg(feature = "digest")]
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_verify_digest_equivalence() {
+        // TestSignVerify
+
+        let mut csprng = OsRng {};
+
+        let good: &[u8] = "test message".as_bytes();
+        let bad: &[u8] = "wrong message".as_bytes();
+
+        let keypair: SigningKey = SigningKey::generate(&mut csprng);
+        let good_sig: Signature = keypair.sign(good);
+        let bad_sig: Signature = keypair.sign(bad);
+
+        let mut verifier = keypair.verify_stream(&good_sig).unwrap();
+        verifier.update(good);
+        assert!(
+            verifier.finalize_and_verify().is_ok(),
+            "Verification of a valid signature failed!"
+        );
+
+        let mut verifier = keypair.verify_stream(&bad_sig).unwrap();
+        verifier.update(good);
+        assert!(
+            verifier.finalize_and_verify().is_err(),
+            "Verification of a signature on a different message passed!"
+        );
+
+        let mut verifier = keypair.verify_stream(&good_sig).unwrap();
+        verifier.update("test ");
+        verifier.update("message");
+        assert!(
+            verifier.finalize_and_verify().is_ok(),
+            "Verification of a valid signature failed!"
+        );
+
+        let mut verifier = keypair.verify_stream(&good_sig).unwrap();
+        verifier.update(bad);
+        assert!(
+            verifier.finalize_and_verify().is_err(),
+            "Verification of a signature on a different message passed!"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[cfg(feature = "digest")]
     #[test]
     fn ed25519ph_sign_verify() {