diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 9cb233c..6941314 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -108,9 +108,45 @@ after the fact, breaking compatibility with every other implementation.
 In short, if malleable signatures are bad for your protocol, don't use them.
 Consider using a curve25519-based Verifiable Random Function (VRF), such as
 [Trevor Perrin's VXEdDSA](https://www.whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/xeddsa/),
-instead.  We
-[plan](https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/9) to
-eventually support VXEdDSA in curve25519-dalek.
+instead.
+
+#### The `legacy_compatibility` Feature
+
+By default, this library performs a stricter check for malleability in the
+scalar component of a signature, upon signature deserialisation.  This stricter
+check, that `s < \ell` where `\ell` is the order of the basepoint, is
+[mandated by RFC8032](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7).
+However, that RFC was standardised a decade after the original paper, which, as
+described above, (usually, falsely) stated that malleability was inconsequential.
+
+Because of this, most ed25519 implementations only perform a limited, hackier
+check that the most significant three bits of the scalar are unset.  If you need
+compatibility with legacy implementations, including:
+
+* ed25519-donna
+* Golang's /x/crypto ed25519
+* libsodium (only when built with `-DED25519_COMPAT`)
+* NaCl's "ref" implementation
+* probably a bunch of others
+
+then enable `ed25519-dalek`'s `legacy_compatibility` feature.  Please note and
+be forewarned that doing so allows for signature malleability, meaning that
+there may be two different and "valid" signatures with the same key for the same
+message, which is obviously incredibly dangerous in a number of contexts,
+including—but not limited to—identification protocols and cryptocurrency
+transactions.
+
+#### The `verify_strict()` Function
+
+The scalar component of a signature is not the only source of signature
+malleability, however.  Both the public key used for signature verification and
+the group element component of the signature are malleable, as they may contain
+a small torsion component as a consquence of the curve25519 group not being of
+prime order, but having a small cofactor of 8.
+
+If you wish to also eliminate this source of signature malleability, please
+review the
+[documentation for the `verify_strict()` function](https://doc.dalek.rs/ed25519_dalek/struct.PublicKey.html#method.verify_strict).
 
 # Installation
 
diff --git a/src/signature.rs b/src/signature.rs
index 653155d..8bcbbe3 100644
--- a/src/signature.rs
+++ b/src/signature.rs
@@ -108,6 +108,55 @@ impl Signature {
     }
 
     /// Construct a `Signature` from a slice of bytes.
+    ///
+    /// # Scalar Malleability Checking
+    ///
+    /// As originally specified in the ed25519 paper (cf. the "Malleability"
+    /// section of the README in this repo), no checks whatsoever were performed
+    /// for signature malleability.
+    ///
+    /// Later, a semi-functional, hacky check was added to most libraries to
+    /// "ensure" that the scalar portion, `s`, of the signature was reduced `mod
+    /// \ell`, the order of the basepoint:
+    ///
+    /// ```ignore
+    /// if signature.s[31] & 224 != 0 {
+    ///     return Err();
+    /// }
+    /// ```
+    ///
+    /// This bit-twiddling ensures that the most significant three bits of the
+    /// scalar are not set:
+    ///
+    /// ```python,ignore
+    /// >>> 0b00010000 & 224
+    /// 0
+    /// >>> 0b00100000 & 224
+    /// 32
+    /// >>> 0b01000000 & 224
+    /// 64
+    /// >>> 0b10000000 & 224
+    /// 128
+    /// ```
+    ///
+    /// However, this check is hacky and insufficient to check that the scalar is
+    /// fully reduced `mod \ell = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493` as
+    /// it leaves us with a guanteed bound of 253 bits.  This means that there are
+    /// `2^253 - 2^252 + 2774231777737235353585193779088364849311` remaining scalars
+    /// which could cause malleabilllity.
+    ///
+    /// RFC8032 [states](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7):
+    ///
+    /// > To verify a signature on a message M using public key A, [...]
+    /// > first split the signature into two 32-octet halves.  Decode the first
+    /// > half as a point R, and the second half as an integer S, in the range
+    /// > 0 <= s < L.  Decode the public key A as point A'.  If any of the
+    /// > decodings fail (including S being out of range), the signature is
+    /// > invalid.
+    ///
+    /// However, by the time this was standardised, most libraries in use were
+    /// only checking the most significant three bits.  (See also the
+    /// documentation for `PublicKey.verify_strict`.)
     #[inline]
     pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Signature, SignatureError> {
         if bytes.len() != SIGNATURE_LENGTH {