Merge branch 'release/1.0.0-pre.0'

This commit is contained in:
Isis Lovecruft 2018-11-06 02:12:08 +00:00
commit 12c5777b23
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: AB41313533E8E812
4 changed files with 32 additions and 51 deletions

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "ed25519-dalek"
version = "0.8.1"
version = "1.0.0-pre.0"
authors = ["Isis Lovecruft <isis@patternsinthevoid.net>"]
readme = "README.md"
license = "BSD-3-Clause"
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ exclude = [ ".gitignore", "TESTVECTORS", "res/*" ]
travis-ci = { repository = "dalek-cryptography/ed25519-dalek", branch = "master"}
[dependencies.curve25519-dalek]
version = "0.20"
version = "1.0.0-pre.0"
default-features = false
[dependencies.rand]
@ -24,19 +24,12 @@ version = "0.5"
default-features = false
features = ["i128_support"]
[dependencies.digest]
version = "^0.7"
[dependencies.generic-array]
# same version that digest depends on
version = "0.9"
[dependencies.serde]
version = "^1.0"
optional = true
[dependencies.sha2]
version = "^0.7"
version = "^0.8"
optional = true
[dependencies.failure]
@ -48,7 +41,7 @@ version = "0.2"
[dev-dependencies]
hex = "^0.3"
sha2 = "^0.7"
sha2 = "^0.8"
bincode = "^0.9"
criterion = "0.2"

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@ -89,18 +89,6 @@ can read qhasm, making it more readily and more easily auditable. We're of
the opinion that, ultimately, these features—combined with speed—are more
valuable than simply cycle counts alone.
# Warnings
ed25519-dalek and
[our elliptic curve library](https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek)
(which this code uses) have received *one* formal cryptographic and security
review. Neither have yet received what we would consider *sufficient* peer
review by other qualified cryptographers to be considered in any way, shape,
or form, safe.
**USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.**
### A Note on Signature Malleability
The signatures produced by this library are malleable, as discussed in
@ -130,7 +118,7 @@ To install, add the following to your project's `Cargo.toml`:
```toml
[dependencies.ed25519-dalek]
version = "^0.8"
version = "1"
```
Then, in your library or executable source, add:
@ -146,7 +134,7 @@ enabled by default, instead do:
```toml
[dependencies.ed25519-dalek]
version = "^0.8"
version = "1"
features = ["nightly"]
```
@ -163,7 +151,7 @@ To enable [serde](https://serde.rs) support, build `ed25519-dalek` with:
```toml
[dependencies.ed25519-dalek]
version = "^0.8"
version = "1"
features = ["serde"]
```

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@ -30,9 +30,8 @@ use sha2::Sha512;
use clear_on_drop::clear::Clear;
use digest::Digest;
use generic_array::typenum::U64;
use curve25519_dalek::digest::Digest;
use curve25519_dalek::digest::generic_array::typenum::U64;
use curve25519_dalek::constants;
use curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY;
@ -186,7 +185,9 @@ impl Drop for SecretKey {
impl SecretKey {
/// Expand this `SecretKey` into an `ExpandedSecretKey`.
pub fn expand<D>(&self) -> ExpandedSecretKey where D: Digest<OutputSize = U64> + Default {
pub fn expand<D>(&self) -> ExpandedSecretKey
where D: Digest<OutputSize = U64> + Default
{
ExpandedSecretKey::from_secret_key::<D>(&self)
}
@ -556,7 +557,7 @@ impl ExpandedSecretKey {
let mut upper: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
h.input(secret_key.as_bytes());
hash.copy_from_slice(h.fixed_result().as_slice());
hash.copy_from_slice(h.result().as_slice());
lower.copy_from_slice(&hash[00..32]);
upper.copy_from_slice(&hash[32..64]);
@ -620,7 +621,7 @@ impl ExpandedSecretKey {
context: Option<&'static [u8]>) -> Signature
where D: Digest<OutputSize = U64> + Default
{
let mut h: D = D::default();
let mut h: D;
let mut prehash: [u8; 64] = [0u8; 64];
let R: CompressedEdwardsY;
let r: Scalar;
@ -634,7 +635,7 @@ impl ExpandedSecretKey {
let ctx_len: u8 = ctx.len() as u8;
// Get the result of the pre-hashed message.
prehash.copy_from_slice(prehashed_message.fixed_result().as_slice());
prehash.copy_from_slice(prehashed_message.result().as_slice());
// This is the dumbest, ten-years-late, non-admission of fucking up the
// domain separation I have ever seen. Why am I still required to put
@ -648,24 +649,25 @@ impl ExpandedSecretKey {
//
// This is a really fucking stupid bandaid, and the damned scheme is
// still bleeding from malleability, for fuck's sake.
h.input(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions");
h.input(&[1]); // Ed25519ph
h.input(&[ctx_len]);
h.input(ctx);
h.input(&self.nonce);
h.input(&prehash);
h = D::default()
.chain(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions")
.chain(&[1]) // Ed25519ph
.chain(&[ctx_len])
.chain(ctx)
.chain(&self.nonce)
.chain(&prehash[..]);
r = Scalar::from_hash(h);
R = (&r * &constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE).compress();
h = D::default();
h.input(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions");
h.input(&[1]); // Ed25519ph
h.input(&[ctx_len]);
h.input(ctx);
h.input(R.as_bytes());
h.input(public_key.as_bytes());
h.input(&prehash);
h = D::default()
.chain(b"SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions")
.chain(&[1]) // Ed25519ph
.chain(&[ctx_len])
.chain(ctx)
.chain(R.as_bytes())
.chain(public_key.as_bytes())
.chain(&prehash[..]);
k = Scalar::from_hash(h);
s = &(&k * &self.key) + &r;
@ -784,7 +786,7 @@ impl PublicKey {
let mut digest: [u8; 32] = [0u8; 32];
h.input(secret_key.as_bytes());
hash.copy_from_slice(h.fixed_result().as_slice());
hash.copy_from_slice(h.result().as_slice());
digest.copy_from_slice(&hash[..32]);
@ -886,7 +888,7 @@ impl PublicKey {
h.input(ctx);
h.input(signature.R.as_bytes());
h.input(self.as_bytes());
h.input(prehashed_message.fixed_result().as_slice());
h.input(prehashed_message.result().as_slice());
k = Scalar::from_hash(h);
R = EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &(-A), &signature.s);

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@ -258,8 +258,6 @@
#![deny(missing_docs)] // refuse to compile if documentation is missing
extern crate curve25519_dalek;
extern crate generic_array;
extern crate digest;
extern crate failure;
extern crate rand;
extern crate clear_on_drop;