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The previous design routed every Crisis message through a `Mothership` that
also held every agent's LamportGraph, ran the byzantine scan from a
privileged vantage, and built proofs from its own view. That made the
mothership a chokepoint — exactly what a BFT layer is supposed to remove.
This commit redistributes responsibility along the lines you'd expect from
a real open protocol:
Each `CrisisAgent` now owns:
- its own `LamportGraph` (the agent's view of the network)
- `emit_claim(claim) → Message`: wraps a Claim into a fully-valid Crisis
Message built from the agent's OWN graph state, with chain link + cross
references + mined PoW nonce
- `receive(message)`: extends my graph if integrity holds; idempotent
- `gossip_to(peer) → int`: shares everything I have with peer until
quiescence (Algorithm 4 in the paper, in-process flavor)
- `detect_mutations() → list[LocalAlarm]`: scans MY graph for same-id
spacelike vertex pairs via the existing
`LamportGraph.find_mutations`, filtered by application-layer
`statement_id` so cross-detector AlarmClaims canonicalize
The `Mothership` shrinks to coordinator-only:
- bootstrap (register honest agents; trigger boundary open with a joiner)
- clock (call each agent's `next_turn()` per turn)
- first-hop routing (sender's emission → declared target subset)
- all-pairs gossip rounds between turns
- emit_alarms_from_detectors(): poll each agent for its LocalAlarms,
wrap any returned alarms into AlarmClaim payloads, broadcast them as
Crisis Messages over the gossip layer
Gone (regression-tested in `test_no_chokepoint.py`):
- `Mothership._graphs`, `Mothership.all_graphs()`, `Mothership.graph_of()`
- `alarm.scan_for_mutations(mothership)`
- any path where the mothership reads an agent's internal state
New voting layer (`crisis_agents/vote.py`):
- `AlarmClaim`: a Crisis-payload dataclass discriminated by `kind="alarm"`.
Wraps the accused process_id, statement_id, witness_digests, and
detection turn. Round-trips through JSON same as Claim.
- `quorum_for(n) = ceil(2n/3)`: classic BFT threshold.
- `tally_alarms(graph, threshold)`: groups AlarmClaim vertices by
(accused, statement_id, witness_pair), counts unique signer
process_ids, ratifies groups meeting the threshold. Deterministic
ordering so two equal graphs produce equal `RatifiedAlarm` lists.
- `RatifiedAlarm`: the network-level consensus on byzantine behavior.
Multi-signer proofs (`crisis_agents/proof.py`):
- schema_version bumped 1 → 2.
- ProofDocument now embeds every signer's process_id_hex and the
quorum threshold that was met. Self-consistency check enforces
distinct signers, witness pairs, and signer count ≥ threshold.
Byzantine scenario rewrite:
- `MockByzantineAgent` now takes an `intro_claim` for its first turn (a
benign broadcast). The intro is technically necessary: the agent's two
contradictory variants both chain to the intro vertex, so they can
propagate through gossip — without it, the second variant would fail
the chain constraint in any graph already holding the first.
- `fact_check` scenario: closed phase still has 3 honest agents emitting
6 claims each into the closed log; Crisis phase grew to 2 turns (intro
+ equivocation) so the byzantine can establish its same-id anchor
before equivocating.
End-to-end CLI output reframed around six phases:
1. closed team (no Crisis)
2. boundary opens
3. emission + gossip
4. decentralized detection (each agent reports its own findings)
5. alarms emitted + gossiped + ratified by quorum
6. proof emission
Tests (51 fresh + 5 carried over for boundary):
- `test_mothership.py`: per-agent graph ownership, broadcast vs.
targeted delivery semantics, gossip propagation, regression guards
against the removed centralization attributes.
- `test_alarm.py`: every honest agent independently detects the same
mutation; the byzantine doesn't detect itself; witness pairs are
canonical across detectors.
- `test_vote.py`: AlarmClaim round-trip, quorum formulas, tally
determinism, mothership convenience method matches direct tallying.
- `test_proof.py`: build_proof from RatifiedAlarm; multi-signer JSON
round-trip; tampered-witness/below-quorum/duplicate-signer rejection.
- `test_no_chokepoint.py` (the centerpiece): after the full lifecycle,
every honest agent's ratified-alarm set is byte-identical. A single
byzantine accuser alone cannot ratify. Forbidden attributes don't
exist on Mothership.
Full suite: 163 tests, all green in 0.80s.
CrisisViz: untouched by this refactor. The `crisis_data.json` pipeline
the visualizer consumes is produced by the orthogonal
`crisis.demo.Simulation`, which this commit doesn't touch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
82 lines
3 KiB
Python
82 lines
3 KiB
Python
"""The centerpiece: assert there is no privileged observer.
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After the full lifecycle — closed phase, boundary open, equivocation, gossip,
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alarm emission, alarm gossip — *every honest agent's* ratified-alarms set must
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be identical. If we ever re-introduce a chokepoint (a single observer holding
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state nobody else can see), this test should fail.
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"""
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from crisis_agents.agent import MockAgent, MockByzantineAgent
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from crisis_agents.claim import Claim
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from crisis_agents.mothership import Mothership
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def _claim(sid: str, verdict: str = "true", evidence: str = "ok") -> Claim:
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return Claim(statement_id=sid, verdict=verdict, confidence=0.9, # type: ignore[arg-type]
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evidence=evidence, timestamp_logical=0)
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def _intro(name: str = "delta") -> Claim:
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return Claim(statement_id=f"intro:{name}", verdict="unknown", confidence=1.0,
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evidence=f"{name} joining the team", timestamp_logical=0)
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def test_all_honest_agents_agree_on_ratified_alarms():
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m = Mothership()
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m.add_agent(MockAgent("a", [[]]))
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m.add_agent(MockAgent("b", [[]]))
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m.add_agent(MockAgent("c", [[]]))
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m.open_boundary(MockByzantineAgent(
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"d", _intro(),
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scripted_pairs=[(
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_claim("s03", verdict="true", evidence="to_ac"),
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_claim("s03", verdict="false", evidence="to_b"),
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)],
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split_a={"a", "c"},
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split_b={"b"},
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))
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m.run_crisis_phase(num_turns=2, gossip_rounds_per_turn=1)
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m.emit_alarms_from_detectors()
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m.run_gossip_round()
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# The headline assertion: three independent vantage points; same result.
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ratified_per_agent = {
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name: m.ratified_alarms_from(name)
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for name in ("a", "b", "c")
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}
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assert ratified_per_agent["a"] == ratified_per_agent["b"]
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assert ratified_per_agent["b"] == ratified_per_agent["c"]
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assert len(ratified_per_agent["a"]) == 1
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def test_no_chokepoint_attribute_on_mothership():
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"""Smoke-check: the mothership doesn't expose any privileged collection
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of per-agent graphs. Each agent owns its own state.
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"""
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m = Mothership()
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# If anyone re-adds these, the test fails loudly.
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for forbidden in ("all_graphs", "graph_of", "_graphs",
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"scan_for_mutations", "detect_byzantine"):
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assert not hasattr(m, forbidden), (
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f"Mothership grew back a chokepoint: {forbidden}"
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)
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def test_byzantine_alone_cannot_ratify():
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"""If only the byzantine emits an AlarmClaim (against a fictitious target),
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no quorum is reached.
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"""
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m = Mothership()
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m.add_agent(MockAgent("a", [[]]))
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m.add_agent(MockAgent("b", [[]]))
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m.add_agent(MockAgent("c", [[]]))
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# No equivocation script — boundary opens cleanly.
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m.open_boundary(MockByzantineAgent("d", _intro(), [], set(), set()))
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m.run_crisis_phase(num_turns=1, gossip_rounds_per_turn=1)
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m.emit_alarms_from_detectors()
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m.run_gossip_round()
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# No honest agent should have ratified anything.
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for name in ("a", "b", "c"):
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assert m.ratified_alarms_from(name) == []
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