4 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
mrwulf	a69a08cde6	verification: --audit-only mode, and the guard that keeps it from becoming evidence (T1) ... Gate work dominates this estate's wall-clock: on 2026-07-29, 3.9 hours of a session went to Lean re-elaborating proofs nobody had edited while the audit phases themselves took about fifteen seconds. --audit-only runs every gate against the artifacts a previous full run left behind: ~60s against ~1280s. IT IS SAFE ONLY BECAUSE IT REFUSES. - It requires every shipped .lean to be BYTE-IDENTICAL to a basis recorded by a previous full run. Not mtimes: `touch` defeats those, and a stale-artifact check that fails open is worse than no shortcut at all, because a green button would then describe a corpus that is no longer on disk. - The basis is gitignored build state, so a fresh clone cannot inherit permission to skip compiling. - The closing banner differs and says in words that the run is not evidence. selftest-auditonly.sh exercises seven cases: no basis, an edited comment character, a deleted source, a new source, a missing artifact, a truncated basis, and — asserted as a PASS — every source's mtime touched with bytes unchanged, which pins the bytes-not-mtimes decision rather than leaving it implicit. Negative-tested: with the basis comparison disabled a changed source is wrongly accepted, exit 0 and zero refusals, so the guard is load-bearing. A PHASE TERMINATOR, because this broke twice. Every self-test lifts a phase from check.sh by scanning to the next phase marker. The last phase had no marker after it, so a lift ran to end-of-file and swallowed whatever was appended later — first Phase 2c into the axgate lift, then T1's tail into the binding lift, where it referenced $AUDIT_ONLY and died under `set -u`. Both surfaced as the BASELINE case failing: a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. The phases now end at an explicit sentinel and both lifters stop there, so nothing appended below can silently become part of the last phase from a lifter's point of view. TRUSTED-BASE.md records what an audit-only transcript does and does not establish, and — because it cost a confusing red run today — that lean-guard's memory clamp presents as `FAIL: Proofs/<module>` while being a resource condition, not a broken proof. Verified green: 8 full button runs (four check.sh, four check-scalar.sh) and 20 self-tests across the four repositories, zero red. One earlier run failed on the memory clamp because the author ran a test suite concurrently; re-run on a quiet machine, green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 19:16:21 +02:00
mrwulf	3bad795029	verification: pin the whole declaration surface (P1-b) ... Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is declared under Proofs/. Phase 3 pins the cones of the named certificates. Between them sat every other declaration in the corpus — around three thousand of them — and a helper lemma quietly acquiring a hash oracle in its cone moved nothing either phase looked at. Phase 2c closes that. Ported from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack self-test proved a source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private, indented and `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename collision. Reading the compiled environment sees what the kernel saw; no name shape hides. Every constant contributes module, name, kind and full axiom cone, and the observed set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt exactly in BOTH directions, with a count trailer so a truncated run cannot pass as an empty diff. FOUR THINGS THIS BUILD GOT WRONG, each caught by a check rather than by review: - The number of inventory drivers is a per-repo FACT, not an assumption. dalek and anza cannot import their corpus as one environment (Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec); risc0 and betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all. Determined by compiling a probe. check.sh now DISCOVERS its drivers from the filesystem instead of naming two, and the generator refuses to split out a module the repo lacks. - The split let one real declaration hide behind another's entry. Keyed on name alone, the two zero_specs produced byte-identical records, so 3022 declarations were covered by 3021 allowlist entries. Caught by the count trailer. Every record now carries its originating module. - The gate's success line said "single sanctioned axiom", inherited from the accumulator's policy. This corpus permits NONE. A success message describing a different rule is how an assertion stops meaning anything. - selftest-axgate.sh lifted Phase 2b with a range ending at "Phase 3", so inserting Phase 2c between them made it swallow the new phase and die on variables only check.sh defines — surfacing as the BASELINE case failing, a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. Both self-tests now stop at the next phase marker whatever it is called, and refuse to run if they capture more than one phase. The guard is the fix; the range was the symptom. WHAT THIS IS NOT, recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md at the same length as the claim: - No independent cone walker. The accumulator cross-checks collectAxioms against a hand-written walker. Ported here it was wrong in BOTH directions on mathlib's inductive shapes: EdPoint gave [] against the kernel's three axioms, and once extended, ProjPoint gave three against the kernel's none. Two implementations disagreeing both ways are a second wrong answer, not a check. These cones rest on collectAxioms alone. - Thirteen Proofs/Scalar* modules are inventoried by nothing — the second-button seam, still open. Phase 2c names every uncovered module on every run so the omission is visible rather than inferred. selftest-inventory.sh exercises the shipping gate with six cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic, including the one that matters: a cone widened by one oracle while name, module and kind stay put. Negative-tested by disabling the gate's diff, which turns two cases red including one for the wrong reason, correctly reported as such. Verified green: 20 runs across the four repositories (four buttons, four harness, four inventory, four axgate, four binding self-tests), zero red. The four check-scalar.sh greens from the preceding sweep stand: that script neither reads the pin file nor changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-30 01:20:20 +02:00
mrwulf	b55391bd29	verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c) ... Every gate this repository has was executed by scripts that nothing pinned. Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed the compiler wrapper alone and its button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds over deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound — and every gate added this week made that gap more valuable to an attacker, not less. Phase 0c requires every harness file to match HARNESS.sha256. Two design points carry the weight: - WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY and lives in check.sh, never in the map being consulted. If the required set were read from the pin file, deleting an entry would silently un-pin that file. It is instead derived from the filesystem, so a deleted entry is a set mismatch and a build failure. That is the exact defect SLH-DSA round-6 found, closed here by construction. - Membership self-derives from the executable bit: anything this script can shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone pins it deliberately. Load-bearing files that are not executable — the audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be discovered that way and are listed explicitly. lean-guard is inside the set, which finally makes the standing "lean-guard stays hash-pinned" rule a property of the repository rather than a convention. selftest-harness.sh replays five cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited lean-guard, a new unpinned executable, a deleted pin entry, a missing pin file, and a positive control. It was itself negative-tested — with the hash comparison removed it goes red on exactly that case while cheerfully reporting "10 harness files match their pins". TRUSTED-BASE.md states the limit at equal length to the claim: pinning a harness from inside that harness is circular, and an author who edits a script and refreshes its pin in the same commit passes every phase. What the pin changes is that the edit can no longer be SILENT — it must appear in the diff at the commit being reviewed. A green button says "this is the apparatus that was reviewed", never "this apparatus is trustworthy". Also fixed, found by this sweep: both self-tests compared the working tree against its starting state with `diff <(echo "$VAR") <(command)`, which is asymmetric — for a clean tree the variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank line the command does not. It reported a difference precisely when nothing was wrong, and only surfaced once P1-a was committed and Proofs/ became clean. Both now compare as strings. Verified green: 20 runs across the four ed25519 repositories (four buttons, four harness self-tests, four axiom-gate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons), zero red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 20:13:01 +02:00
mrwulf	c848a490ff	verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a) ... Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads `loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical. Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements. Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31 certificates, 68 specification constants per repository. Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms, and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4, risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy. Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests (6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem, so a new model file fails closed. selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the shipping gate rather than a copy. Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0` after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code — widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so. All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons. TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-29 00:38:22 +02:00