Phase 2b asks the kernel whether any AXIOM is declared under Proofs/. Phase 3
pins the cones of the named certificates. Between them sat every other
declaration in the corpus — around three thousand of them — and a helper lemma
quietly acquiring a hash oracle in its cone moved nothing either phase looked
at.
Phase 2c closes that. Ported from ltl-accumulator-verified, where a nine-attack
self-test proved a source-regex enumerator evadable by attributed, private,
indented and `instance` declarations and by a nested-namespace basename
collision. Reading the compiled environment sees what the kernel saw; no name
shape hides. Every constant contributes module, name, kind and full axiom cone,
and the observed set must equal inventory-allowlist.txt exactly in BOTH
directions, with a count trailer so a truncated run cannot pass as an empty
diff.
FOUR THINGS THIS BUILD GOT WRONG, each caught by a check rather than by review:
- The number of inventory drivers is a per-repo FACT, not an assumption.
dalek and anza cannot import their corpus as one environment (Proofs.Basic
and Proofs.ConstSpecs both declare CurveFieldProofs.zero_spec); risc0 and
betrusted have no Proofs.Basic at all. Determined by compiling a probe.
check.sh now DISCOVERS its drivers from the filesystem instead of naming
two, and the generator refuses to split out a module the repo lacks.
- The split let one real declaration hide behind another's entry. Keyed on
name alone, the two zero_specs produced byte-identical records, so 3022
declarations were covered by 3021 allowlist entries. Caught by the count
trailer. Every record now carries its originating module.
- The gate's success line said "single sanctioned axiom", inherited from the
accumulator's policy. This corpus permits NONE. A success message
describing a different rule is how an assertion stops meaning anything.
- selftest-axgate.sh lifted Phase 2b with a range ending at "Phase 3", so
inserting Phase 2c between them made it swallow the new phase and die on
variables only check.sh defines — surfacing as the BASELINE case failing,
a self-test blaming a gate for its own extraction bug. Both self-tests now
stop at the next phase marker whatever it is called, and refuse to run if
they capture more than one phase. The guard is the fix; the range was the
symptom.
WHAT THIS IS NOT, recorded in TRUSTED-BASE.md at the same length as the claim:
- No independent cone walker. The accumulator cross-checks collectAxioms
against a hand-written walker. Ported here it was wrong in BOTH directions
on mathlib's inductive shapes: EdPoint gave [] against the kernel's three
axioms, and once extended, ProjPoint gave three against the kernel's none.
Two implementations disagreeing both ways are a second wrong answer, not a
check. These cones rest on collectAxioms alone.
- Thirteen Proofs/Scalar* modules are inventoried by nothing — the
second-button seam, still open. Phase 2c names every uncovered module on
every run so the omission is visible rather than inferred.
selftest-inventory.sh exercises the shipping gate with six cases, each
asserting a specific diagnostic, including the one that matters: a cone
widened by one oracle while name, module and kind stay put. Negative-tested by
disabling the gate's diff, which turns two cases red including one for the
wrong reason, correctly reported as such.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four repositories (four buttons, four
harness, four inventory, four axgate, four binding self-tests), zero red. The
four check-scalar.sh greens from the preceding sweep stand: that script neither
reads the pin file nor changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every gate this repository has was executed by scripts that nothing pinned.
Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed the compiler
wrapper alone and its button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds over
deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver
disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is
worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound — and every gate
added this week made that gap more valuable to an attacker, not less.
Phase 0c requires every harness file to match HARNESS.sha256. Two design
points carry the weight:
- WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY and lives in check.sh, never in the
map being consulted. If the required set were read from the pin file,
deleting an entry would silently un-pin that file. It is instead derived
from the filesystem, so a deleted entry is a set mismatch and a build
failure. That is the exact defect SLH-DSA round-6 found, closed here by
construction.
- Membership self-derives from the executable bit: anything this script can
shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone
pins it deliberately. Load-bearing files that are not executable — the
audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be
discovered that way and are listed explicitly.
lean-guard is inside the set, which finally makes the standing "lean-guard
stays hash-pinned" rule a property of the repository rather than a convention.
selftest-harness.sh replays five cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic:
an edited lean-guard, a new unpinned executable, a deleted pin entry, a
missing pin file, and a positive control. It was itself negative-tested — with
the hash comparison removed it goes red on exactly that case while cheerfully
reporting "10 harness files match their pins".
TRUSTED-BASE.md states the limit at equal length to the claim: pinning a
harness from inside that harness is circular, and an author who edits a script
and refreshes its pin in the same commit passes every phase. What the pin
changes is that the edit can no longer be SILENT — it must appear in the diff
at the commit being reviewed. A green button says "this is the apparatus that
was reviewed", never "this apparatus is trustworthy".
Also fixed, found by this sweep: both self-tests compared the working tree
against its starting state with `diff <(echo "$VAR") <(command)`, which is
asymmetric — for a clean tree the variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank
line the command does not. It reported a difference precisely when nothing was
wrong, and only surfaced once P1-a was committed and Proofs/ became clean.
Both now compare as strings.
Verified green: 20 runs across the four ed25519 repositories (four buttons,
four harness self-tests, four axiom-gate self-tests, four binding self-tests,
four scalar buttons), zero red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.
Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.
Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.
Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.
selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.
Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.
All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.
TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1's anti-smuggling check reads source text. Measured today on Lean
v4.30.0-rc2, four distinct declarations compile cleanly and slip past its
anchored pattern:
` axiom cheat : ...` one leading space
`@[simp] axiom cheat : ...` line starts with the attribute
`unsafe axiom cheat : ...` `unsafe` absent from the modifier list
`axiom` <newline> ` cheat` no space follows the keyword
Any of them yields a repository that proves False while the button prints
ALL GREEN. Only the tab variant is blocked, and by Lean, not by us.
Hardening the pattern would fix the exhibited syntax rather than the class,
which is the mistake this estate has made before. Phase 2b stops parsing text
and asks the kernel instead: it reads every compiled Proofs/*.olean with
readModuleData and rejects any declaration that is an axiom.
Design notes:
- reads compiled artifacts rather than importing the modules, because
Proofs.Basic and Proofs.ConstSpecs deliberately reuse `zero_spec` and a
whole-corpus import is impossible by construction;
- membership is self-deriving from the filesystem, so Scalar* and
AxiomCheck are covered too — both are skipped by the CERTS audit and by
the dead-file gate;
- fails closed on absence: a missing .olean would make the scan vacuous, so
the count of compiled modules must equal the count of shipped sources;
- removes its temp source AND artifact on both paths, since a bare `rm`
after the call never runs under `set -e` when the gate goes red — exactly
how this repo accumulated 101 orphan .olean files;
- ~3 s for the whole corpus, against ~53 s for one module-importing run.
Phase 1's grep stays as a fast first line of defence. Phase 2b is the gate
that is load-bearing.
selftest-axgate.sh attacks the shipping gate, lifted out of check.sh at run
time rather than copied. It asserts the specific diagnostic, so a rejection
for an unrelated reason fails too, and it was itself negative-tested: with
the gate's throwError removed, the self-test goes red on exactly that case.
No proof, statement, specification or certificate is touched. No attested
commit is altered — the log binds specific commit hashes, all of which remain
ancestors of HEAD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 and 3b mktemp an audit file, compile it, then removed only the .lean —
leaving the .olean behind on every run. check-scalar.sh:38 has always done this
correctly (`rm -f "$AUD" "${AUD%.lean}.olean"`); the main script was the odd one
out. Estate-wide that had accumulated 101 orphan compiled modules with no
sibling source (dalek 44, anza/risc0/betrusted 19 each), invisible to git
because *.olean is gitignored. All swept.
The litter was inert — the names are not valid Lean identifiers, so nothing
could import them. It matters as a pattern: an audit whose verdict can depend on
untracked build state is the class of defect that took eight review rounds to
close in the sibling SLH-DSA repository (there: an orphan .olean with its source
deleted satisfied an import and the button went green). A build-hygiene phase
that purges compiled artifacts and bans stray files is the proper fix and is
queued as part of the protocol port; this commit stops the bleeding.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- README: pyramid-diagram apex row upgraded to the proven full lift
(accepted <=> decompress(R) = [k](-A)+[s]B), status table names all
four button-enforced tiers, apex section gains the phase-2 tier table
(half-lift / point equation / full lift) + the decompress-chain
summary; source pin updated to the pushed patch commit.
- TRUSTED-BASE item 5: rewritten from the single byte-apex certificate
to the FOUR enforced tiers (decompress_of_canonical noted as
standard-three-only).
- gen/CurveField/FunsExternal.lean: stale root-namespace
edwards.decompress.step_1/step_2 axioms removed (dead weight left
behind by un-opaquing; outside every cone, but they forced
fully-qualified unfolds - see control FAILURES.md).
- check.sh Phase 3b success echo aligned to "apex + full-lift" (echo
only; the enforcing greps covered all four tiers already).
Validated by the pass-4 sweep: 9/9 buttons green (this repo's check.sh
+ check-scalar.sh among them), logs retained in the pass workspace.
Full record: formal-verification-control/COHERENCE-PASS-4.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(verify_accepts_iff_decompress, button-enforced)
Port of the risc0 decompress chain (identical v4 gen shape: same
instance naming, same RangeFrom+closure from_bytes extraction):
- source patch cee0e17: decompress step_2 negate-then-conditional-assign
(the documented sqrt_ratio_i rewrite); extract.sh: decompress
un-opaqued, re-extracted - the step_1/step_2 external axioms vanish
from the template, decompress is transparent.
- Proofs/DecompressSpec.lean: dalek port, instance rename
Shared0FieldElement51 -> SharedAFieldElement51.
- Proofs/FromBytesSpec.lean: the v4 closure-loader walk
(range_from_index_spec + closure_call_spec; window/telescope math
identical to dalek).
- Proofs/DecompressMain.lean: decompress_of_canonical (standard three)
+ verify_accepts_iff_decompress (corollary verbatim):
accept <=> decompress(R) = [k]*(-A) + [s]*B (as points).
check.sh: 4-tier Phase 3b; full-lift cone exactly [3 standard +
Signature + sha512_hash3 + to_bytes + Error + Error.new]. Full button
green fresh.
THE FULL POINT-LEVEL LIFT NOW HOLDS ON ALL FOUR PYRAMIDS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
verify_accepts_iff_point_eq, button-enforced
Port of dalek's PointEqSpec (the encoding-injectivity mathematics is
fork-independent; compiled first try): for any valid on-curve point Q
whose canonical encoding is the signature's R bytes, the verifier
accepts IFF Q equals the recomputed point as denoted affine points -
the literal point-level EdDSA verification equation, no decompress
needed. enc_point_inj carries the standard three axioms; the equation
itself carries exactly this fork's enforced apex boundary, and Phase 3b
now audits all three tiers (byte apex, half-lift, point equation).
Full button green fresh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verbatim port of the risc0 fork's phase-2 files (identical v4 shape:
as_bytes serializers, inlined affine conversion, single sha512_hash3
oracle bind) - every proof compiled unchanged. verify_accepts_iff_point:
accept IFF the signature's R bytes are the canonical encoding of the
recomputed [k](-A) + [s]B over the certified model. Five new standard
certificates; Phase 3b enforces the hash3 + wire-format boundary on both
apex and half-lift. Full button green fresh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- README: the pyramid diagram claimed the cofactored ZIP-215 equation,
which is NOT the proven statement - corrected to the actual theorem
(accepted IFF compress([s]B-[k]A) = R, byte-for-byte) and the signature
row now names verify_accepts_iff; new "The signature apex (phase 1)"
section states the theorem, this repo's glue architecture, the exact
button-enforced axiom cone, and the phase-2 deferral.
- TRUSTED-BASE: item 5 rewritten from an aspirational hash paragraph to
the structural boundary - certificate name, exact allowed cone, and the
Phase 3b enforcement that fails the build on any deviation.
- Dead pre-merge artifacts removed: gen/CurveScalar, CurveScalar.llbc,
extract-scalar.sh (the merged gen/CurveField universe is the single
model; check-scalar.sh remains the scalar button, header updated).
- lean-guard: Guard 3a retry ladder (LEAN_MEM_WAIT_SEC) - a clamped run
that dies on memory retries as headroom improves, converting ambient
memory pressure from a deterministic abort into a delayed pass.
Fresh green buttons after these changes: check.sh (incl. Phase 3b apex
audit) + check-scalar.sh, both at shipped defaults, coherence pass 3
sweep 2026-07-05.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Third pyramid capped. Identical shape to the risc0 fork (both are
sha2-0.10 stacks): the hash oracle is the single monomorphic
sha512_hash3(R, A, m) call, extraction runs --no-default-features.
- gen/CurveSig: extracted verify glue, definitionally welded to the
proven CurveField model (every curve and scalar call resolves to a
certified definition; only the hash and wire formats are opaque).
- Proofs/SigApexSpec.lean (unchanged from dalek): verify_loop_full with
the standard three-axiom cone, and verify_accepts_iff — the verifier
accepts IFF compress([s]B - [k]A) = R byte-for-byte.
- check.sh Phase 3b enforces the apex cone to be EXACTLY
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound, ed25519.Signature,
verifying.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.to_bytes,
signature.error.Error, signature.error.Error.new].
- extract.sh gains the reproducible CurveSig stanza (same recipe
verified byte-exact on the risc0 fork this session).
Full check.sh green: all standard certificates + the apex audit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replicates dalek's gen merge: extract.sh co-extracts the Scalar52 backend
and scalar::from_bytes_mod_order[_wide] into the CurveField model, pins
RUSTFLAGS --cfg curve25519_dalek_backend="serial" (SIMD dispatch compiles
out; get_selected_backend becomes a real definition), and upgrades
unwrap_u8 to the documented Choice-model definition. ScalarDenote repoints
by one import line; both buttons green over the merged gen.
Prepares the verify-glue integration (CurveSig) on this fork.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The complete non_adjacent_form(5) verification (four stages):
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoadSpec.lean` (generated) — the LE byte-to-word load.
- `Proofs/DsmNafMath.lean` — the digit loop's arithmetic core: window-read
lemmas (single/cross-word), the exact ZZ invariant steps (Nat.mod_mul
telescope), the carry-kill argument from V < 2^253, and the exit theorem.
- `Proofs/DsmNafLoopSpec.lean` — the w=5 digit loop by induction on the
remaining-bits measure: per-step 64-bit window read (4-way word split),
digit write via hcast/wrapping_sub (exact value window - 32*carry',
oddness, |d| < 16), invariant carried through even/odd steps.
- `Proofs/DsmNafSpec.lean` — the public spec: both entry masserts
DISCHARGED; the digits satisfy the NAF conditions and
sum naf[k]*2^k = V EXACTLY (integers, no modular slack)
for any scalar whose LE byte value V is below 2^253.
And the campaign's brick 4, `Proofs/DsmMulSpec.lean`:
- `run_basepoint` — the transpiled ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT is the standard
base point: valid extended coordinates (X*Y = Z*T) and the curve equation,
kernel-checked via denominator-free 121666-scaled witnesses. Includes the
generic witness lemmas fp_mul_eq_of_witness / onCurve_of_witness.
- `vartime_double_base_mul_spec` — THE PHASE-1 COMPUTATIONAL SPEC of
vartime_double_base::mul: for canonical scalars and a valid on-curve A,
the result is valid, on-curve, and denotes
dsmFold (naf a) (naf b) (edPt A) edBasePt edId 256
with both digit arrays proven exact NAF encodings. Phase 2 (group
semantics [a]A + [b]B) requires Edwards associativity — deferred and
documented; nothing assumes it.
Also: removed a vestigial pre-re-extraction axiom stub
(backend.serial.scalar_mul.vartime_double_base.mul) from FunsExternal —
a root-level leftover that shadowed the real namespaced definition during
name resolution in proof files. Never referenced by any certificate (the
#print-axioms audit guards against that); deleted for hygiene.
CERTS += naf_load_spec, naf_exit, naf_digit_loop_spec,
non_adjacent_form_spec, run_basepoint, vartime_double_base_mul_spec —
each audited to exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound].
Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three new proof files over the CurveField extraction, composing the proven
group-law layer (no new axioms, no associativity assumed — computational
layering over the abstract `edAdd`):
- `Proofs/DsmTableSpec.lean` — `NafLookupTable5::from(&A)`: the 8 entries
are valid `ProjectiveNielsPoint` caches of valid on-curve points denoting
the odd multiples A, 3A, ..., 15A as the `edOdd` double-and-add recursion.
7 explicit loop peels over edwards_as_projective_niels_spec /
add_projniels_law / compl_as_extended_law, seeded by edwards_double_law.
`select`: both masserts (x odd, x < 16) DISCHARGED — panic-freedom is
proven, not assumed; post enumerates all 8 digit cases.
- `Proofs/DsmStepSpec.lean` — `proj_double_law` (the projective doubling
denotes `edAdd P P`; same Z^2-scaled linear_combination discipline as the
extended-coordinate law), `compl_as_projective_law` ((X:Z),(Y:T) to
(XT:YZ:ZT) preserves the point), `naf_select_entry` (digit-indexed lookup
returns THE entry: NafEntryOf r A ((x-1)/2)), and `dsm_step_p_law` /
`dsm_step_b_law`: the three-way NAF digit step denotes `edDigit` — add
the d-th odd multiple, add its negation, or pass through.
- `Proofs/DsmLoopSpec.lean` — the 256-iteration Straus loop by GENUINE
induction on the counter (one symbolic body walk, no unrolling):
`dsm_loop_spec` — from the identity, the loop returns a valid on-curve
point denoting `dsmFold ... edId 256`, the abstract double-and-add fold
of both digit arrays over the table points. Digit and table hypotheses
are exactly what the NAF spec and naf_table_spec provide (layering).
check.sh wired: PROOFS + AUDIT_IMPORTS + 7 new CERTS (naf_table_spec,
naf_select_spec, proj_double_law, compl_as_projective_law, dsm_step_p_law,
dsm_step_b_law, dsm_loop_spec), each `#print axioms`-audited to exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Full check.sh green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
extract.sh now opens crate::backend::serial::scalar_mul::vartime_double_base
(the other scalar_mul strategies stay opaque): non_adjacent_form (with its
loops), NafLookupTable5 (from/select), the curve-model helpers and
vartime_double_base::mul itself land in gen/CurveField - the same
namespace as the proven edwards operations, so the coming double-and-add
induction can consume EdDouble/EdAddProjNiels/EdConvert directly.
Zero sorries, zero external axioms (the pinned sources carry documented
compat refactors: single-assignment loop helpers, param-rooted while,
always-256-iterations, index-based LE load).
Full check.sh pressed fresh over the regenerated model: every existing
field and group-law certificate still green and axiom-clean - the scope
extension is purely additive.
The apex brick of the scalar layer: for any 64 bytes (the opaque SHA-512
digest), [from_bytes_wide bytes] = (LE 512-bit value) mod l, with
canonical 52-bit-bounded output. Composition: bytes_unpack_spec (8x8
loops) -> split_words_lo/hi_spec (exact div/mod per limb, disjoint ORs
as additions) -> wide_split_telescope (isolated omega) -> montgomery_mul
by R and RR (R cancels as a unit, RR restores it) -> the canonical add.
The two kernel-capacity walls found and crossed en route (control repo
FAILURES.md updated):
- a montgomery_mul inside any walk motive replays its 400-line body at
every kernel step (fix: named prefix functions in the pinned source);
- straight-line IndexMut closure chains make kernel defeq exponential in
depth (fix: struct-literal construction - the split halves now build
Scalar52([...]) directly). Full certificate: 77 s kernel-inclusive.
Regenerated gen (sources factor from_bytes_wide -> from_bytes_wide_parts
-> split_words_lo/hi; documented pure refactors, cargo-checked).
check-scalar.sh: 13 proof files, 13 kernel audits, all exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Button pressed fresh: green.
Toward Scalar::from_hash: bytes_unpack_spec proves the from_bytes_wide
word-unpack loops pack 64 little-endian bytes into 8 words exactly.
- Proofs/ScalarBytesSpec.lean (3308 lines): bytes_word_loop_spec_0..7,
each split head/tail at j=4 (the 8-fold monolith grows exponentially
in elaboration - METHOD 4). Disjoint-bit ORs become additions via
core's Nat.two_pow_add_eq_or_of_lt with explicit calc bridges (the
default simp set literalizes 2^8 -> 256 and breaks pow-form rewrites;
simp only everywhere).
- Proofs/ScalarUnpackSpec.lean: bytes_unpack_spec composes the eight
inner lemmas through the outer loop (iterator start needs a term-level
equality rewrite per peel).
The from_bytes_wide main walk itself is proven at elaboration level
(fail-probe verified end to end) but its single-decl kernel certificate
replays >30min; it ships next as a phase-split (plan in the control
repo's method notes). check-scalar.sh: 12 proof files, 12 kernel audits,
all exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Button green.
Canonicity pass (the layer is now closed under its own preconditions):
- sub_val_spec post carries the exact value equation
(exists beta <= 1, scVal r + scVal b = scVal a + ell*beta, with the
underflow guard beta = 1 -> scVal a < scVal b)
- add/montgomery_reduce/mul/aggregate posts all carry scVal r < ell:
canonical inputs give canonical outputs everywhere. Needed because
from_bytes_wide (hash-to-scalar) feeds Montgomery outputs into add.
Hash-to-scalar foundation (toward Scalar::from_hash / EdDSA verify):
- extraction scope + from_bytes_wide (brings constants::R); regenerated gen
- source repos carry a documented Aeneas-compat patch: the bare
`hi[4] = words[7] >> 20` extracts ill-typed at pin bf13c42e; masked
(semantic no-op, words[7] >> 20 < 2^44)
- Proofs/ScalarWideSpec.lean: R constant lemmas (R = 2^260 mod ell,
witness 2^260 = R + 255*ell) and montgomery_mul_spec, the single
Montgomery round: [r]*2^260 = [a]*[b], canonical bounded output
check-scalar.sh: 10 proof files, 11 kernel audits, all exactly
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]. Button pressed fresh: green.
This v4.1.x fork implements Scalar52::sub with TWO loops (loop0 = borrow
chain; loop1 adds L &&& underflow_mask — the arithmetic-mask constant-time
conditional), a genuinely different code path from upstream v5's
subtle-based conditional_add_l. Verified per R2 against this fork's own gen:
- sub_loop_spec (= loop0): borrow chain, verbatim technique from dalek
- sub_loop1_zero_spec / sub_loop1_one_spec: the masked-L add, both mask
values (0 / 2^64-1), full carry chains
- sub_val_spec: denote(sub a b) = denote a - denote b in ZMod l; the
underflow mask um = ((borrow>>>63) XOR 1) - 1 resolved per case
- add_loop_spec + add_val_spec: denote(add a b) = denote a + denote b
(v4 add_loop extracts token-identical to v5; composition through this
fork's own sub_val_spec)
check-scalar.sh: full manifest, 5/5 kernel axiom audit
[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound], green at 300-400s/4096MB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- check.sh: proofs memory default 6144 -> 8192 (ReduceSpec's norm_num
step peaks above 6144; guard aborted gracefully — R3 was broken, S1
held). Matches pasta's calibration.
- check.sh: dead-file gate now exempts Scalar* (delegated to
check-scalar.sh); the gate had been un-passable since the scalar layer
landed, masked by the memory failure.
- check.sh: axiom-audit phase routed through lean-guard (cgroup + flock;
was raw lean -M), audit temp file moved into the workspace (lake env
rejects /tmp inputs — the /tmp phase had never run green).
- check-scalar.sh: NEW Phase 3 kernel axiom audit — ScalarProofs.L_val
must report exactly [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound].
- README: signature layer '⏳ planned' (was 'in progress' with nothing
started); planned certificate names marked as such.
Validated: full check.sh + check-scalar.sh green end-to-end in the pass-2
sweep (see formal-verification-control/COHERENCE-PASS-2.md).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Transpile the Scalar52 limb backend (backend::serial::u64::scalar
add/sub/mul/square/montgomery_*) from Rust to Lean via Charon/Aeneas,
scoped at the function level to the iterator-free arithmetic core.
- verification/extract-scalar.sh: function-level Charon/Aeneas extraction
- verification/gen/CurveScalar/{Types,Funs}.lean: transpiled model (27 defs).
This fork (v4.1.2) implements Scalar52::sub's constant-time conditional add
with a pure arithmetic mask (constants::L[i] & underflow_mask), so the
extraction pulls in NO external functions or types (unlike v5 dalek, which
routes sub through subtle, and v4.1.3, which uses a local black_box).
- verification/gen/CurveScalar/{TypesExternal,FunsExternal}.lean: decl-free
stub modules kept so the check manifest is uniform across forks.
- verification/Proofs/ScalarDenote.lean: semantic foundation — Scalar52
denotation into ℤ/ℓℤ, limb-bound invariant, and L_val (the transpiled
constants::L denotes exactly the group order ℓ, kernel-checked).
- verification/check-scalar.sh: guarded compile of the gen modules plus the
denotation foundation.
check-scalar.sh passes: gen compiles; denotation + L = ℓ proven.
add/sub/mul remain in progress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extraction widened to backend::serial::curve_models + edwards (v4 Aeneas).
Ed* proof suite shared with the risc0 twin EXCEPT proj_double_spec: upstream
reordered ProjectivePoint::double's instructions between v4.1.2 (this fork)
and v4.1.3 (risc0), so the step sequence was resequenced to match THIS
fork's generated body — the proofs track each fork's actual code, not a
template. All 20 proofs pass under lean-guard; both certificates axiom-clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ported from the locally verified Hermes working copy; FeQ and Square2Spec
(dead files in the published replica) now compile and are in the check
manifest. Basic.lean (never compiled under v4 Aeneas) removed rather than
shipped dead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
