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https://github.com/saymrwulf/betrusted-curve25519-dalek-source.git
synced 2026-09-04 20:24:07 +00:00
byte-oriented x25519 function
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parent
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commit
d3b7ccf030
3 changed files with 46 additions and 47 deletions
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ exclude = [
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travis-ci = { repository = "dalek-cryptography/x25519-dalek", branch = "master"}
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[dependencies.curve25519-dalek]
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version = "^1.0.0-pre.1"
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version = "1"
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default-features = false
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[dependencies.rand_core]
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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ fn bench_diffie_hellman(c: &mut Criterion) {
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c.bench_function("diffie_hellman", move |b| {
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b.iter_with_setup(
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|| EphemeralSecret::new(&mut csprng),
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|alice_secret| EphemeralSecret::diffie_hellman(alice_secret, &bob_public),
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|alice_secret| alice_secret.diffie_hellman(&bob_public),
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)
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});
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}
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@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ use rand_core::RngCore;
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use rand_core::CryptoRng;
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/// A DH ephemeral public key.
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#[repr(C)]
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pub struct EphemeralPublic(pub (crate) MontgomeryPoint);
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impl From<[u8; 32]> for EphemeralPublic {
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@ -34,8 +33,6 @@ impl From<[u8; 32]> for EphemeralPublic {
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}
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/// A DH ephemeral secret key.
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#[repr(C)]
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#[derive(Default)] // we derive Default in order to use the clear() method in Drop
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pub struct EphemeralSecret(pub (crate) Scalar);
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/// Overwrite ephemeral secret key material with null bytes when it goes out of scope.
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@ -46,13 +43,11 @@ impl Drop for EphemeralSecret {
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}
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impl EphemeralSecret {
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/// The diffie_hellman function performs scalar multipication on a montegomery point.
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/// This is the implementation for the x25519 function, as specified in RFC7748.
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/// Utility function to make it easier to call `x25519()` with
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/// an ephemeral secret key and montegomery point as input and
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/// a shared secret as the output.
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pub fn diffie_hellman(self, their_public: &EphemeralPublic) -> SharedSecret {
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let k: Scalar = clamp_scalar(self.0.as_bytes());
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let point: MontgomeryPoint = MontgomeryPoint(*their_public.0.as_bytes());
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SharedSecret(k * point)
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SharedSecret(self.0 * their_public.0)
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}
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/// Generate an x25519 `EphemeralSecret` key.
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@ -63,7 +58,7 @@ impl EphemeralSecret {
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csprng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
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EphemeralSecret(clamp_scalar(&bytes))
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EphemeralSecret(clamp_scalar(bytes))
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}
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}
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@ -78,7 +73,6 @@ impl<'a> From<&'a EphemeralSecret> for EphemeralPublic {
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}
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/// A DH SharedSecret
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#[repr(C)]
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pub struct SharedSecret(pub (crate) MontgomeryPoint);
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/// Overwrite shared secret material with null bytes when it goes out of scope.
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@ -105,7 +99,7 @@ impl SharedSecret {
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/// # Returns
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///
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/// A `Scalar`.
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fn clamp_scalar(scalar: &[u8; 32]) -> Scalar {
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fn clamp_scalar(scalar: [u8; 32]) -> Scalar {
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let mut s: [u8; 32] = scalar.clone();
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s[0] &= 248;
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@ -115,58 +109,63 @@ fn clamp_scalar(scalar: &[u8; 32]) -> Scalar {
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Scalar::from_bits(s)
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}
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/// The x25519 function, as specified in RFC7748.
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pub fn x25519(k: [u8; 32], u: [u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
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(clamp_scalar(k) * MontgomeryPoint(u)).to_bytes()
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod test {
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use super::*;
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fn do_rfc7748_ladder_test1(input_scalar: &Scalar,
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input_point: &MontgomeryPoint,
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expected: &[u8; 32]) {
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let result = EphemeralSecret::diffie_hellman(EphemeralSecret(*input_scalar), &EphemeralPublic(*input_point));
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fn do_rfc7748_ladder_test1(input_scalar: [u8; 32],
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input_point: [u8; 32],
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expected: [u8; 32]) {
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let result = x25519(input_scalar, input_point);
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assert_eq!(result.0, MontgomeryPoint(*expected));
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assert_eq!(result, expected);
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}
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#[test]
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fn rfc7748_ladder_test1_vectorset1() {
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let input_scalar: Scalar = Scalar::from_bits([
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let input_scalar: [u8; 32] = [
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0xa5, 0x46, 0xe3, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x52, 0x7c, 0x9d,
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0x3b, 0x16, 0x15, 0x4b, 0x82, 0x46, 0x5e, 0xdd,
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0x62, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0xc1, 0xfc, 0x5a, 0x18,
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0x50, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x44, 0xba, 0x44, 0x9a, 0xc4, ]);
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let input_point: MontgomeryPoint = MontgomeryPoint([
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0x50, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x44, 0xba, 0x44, 0x9a, 0xc4, ];
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let input_point: [u8; 32] = [
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0xe6, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x67, 0x58, 0x30, 0x30, 0xdb,
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0x35, 0x94, 0xc1, 0xa4, 0x24, 0xb1, 0x5f, 0x7c,
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0x72, 0x66, 0x24, 0xec, 0x26, 0xb3, 0x35, 0x3b,
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0x10, 0xa9, 0x03, 0xa6, 0xd0, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x4c, ]);
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0x10, 0xa9, 0x03, 0xa6, 0xd0, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x4c, ];
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let expected: [u8; 32] = [
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0xc3, 0xda, 0x55, 0x37, 0x9d, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0x90,
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0x8e, 0x94, 0xea, 0x4d, 0xf2, 0x8d, 0x08, 0x4f,
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0x32, 0xec, 0xcf, 0x03, 0x49, 0x1c, 0x71, 0xf7,
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0x54, 0xb4, 0x07, 0x55, 0x77, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x52, ];
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do_rfc7748_ladder_test1(&input_scalar, &input_point, &expected);
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do_rfc7748_ladder_test1(input_scalar, input_point, expected);
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}
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#[test]
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fn rfc7748_ladder_test1_vectorset2() {
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let input_scalar: Scalar = Scalar::from_bits([
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let input_scalar: [u8; 32] = [
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0x4b, 0x66, 0xe9, 0xd4, 0xd1, 0xb4, 0x67, 0x3c,
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0x5a, 0xd2, 0x26, 0x91, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x6a, 0xf5,
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0xc1, 0x1b, 0x64, 0x21, 0xe0, 0xea, 0x01, 0xd4,
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0x2c, 0xa4, 0x16, 0x9e, 0x79, 0x18, 0xba, 0x0d, ]);
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let input_point: MontgomeryPoint = MontgomeryPoint([
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0x2c, 0xa4, 0x16, 0x9e, 0x79, 0x18, 0xba, 0x0d, ];
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let input_point: [u8; 32] = [
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0xe5, 0x21, 0x0f, 0x12, 0x78, 0x68, 0x11, 0xd3,
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0xf4, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x9d, 0x05, 0x38, 0xae, 0x2c,
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0x31, 0xdb, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x6f, 0xc0, 0x3c, 0x3e,
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0xfc, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x49, 0xc7, 0x15, 0xa4, 0x93, ]);
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0xfc, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x49, 0xc7, 0x15, 0xa4, 0x93, ];
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let expected: [u8; 32] = [
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0x95, 0xcb, 0xde, 0x94, 0x76, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x7d,
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0x7a, 0xad, 0xe4, 0x5c, 0xb4, 0xb8, 0x73, 0xf8,
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0x8b, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x68, 0x79, 0x9f, 0xa1, 0x52,
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0xe6, 0xf8, 0xf7, 0x64, 0x7a, 0xac, 0x79, 0x57, ];
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do_rfc7748_ladder_test1(&input_scalar, &input_point, &expected);
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do_rfc7748_ladder_test1(input_scalar, input_point, expected);
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}
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#[test]
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@ -174,14 +173,14 @@ mod test {
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fn rfc7748_ladder_test2() {
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use curve25519_dalek::constants::X25519_BASEPOINT;
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let mut k: Scalar = Scalar::from_bits(X25519_BASEPOINT.0);
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let mut u: MontgomeryPoint = X25519_BASEPOINT;
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let mut result: SharedSecret;
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let mut k: [u8; 32] = X25519_BASEPOINT.0;
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let mut u: [u8; 32] = X25519_BASEPOINT.0;
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let mut result: [u8; 32];
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macro_rules! do_iterations {
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($n:expr) => (
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for _ in 0..$n {
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result = EphemeralSecret::diffie_hellman(EphemeralSecret(k), &EphemeralPublic(u));
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result = x25519(k, u);
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// OBVIOUS THING THAT I'M GOING TO NOTE ANYWAY BECAUSE I'VE
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// SEEN PEOPLE DO THIS WITH GOLANG'S STDLIB AND YOU SURE AS
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// HELL SHOULDN'T DO HORRIBLY STUPID THINGS LIKE THIS WITH
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@ -190,8 +189,8 @@ mod test {
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// NEVER EVER TREAT SCALARS AS POINTS AND/OR VICE VERSA.
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//
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// ↓↓ DON'T DO THIS ↓↓
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u = MontgomeryPoint(k.as_bytes().clone());
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k = Scalar::from_bits(result.0.to_bytes());
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u = k.clone();
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k = result;
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}
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)
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}
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@ -204,19 +203,19 @@ mod test {
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// 7c3911e0ab2586fd864497297e575e6f3bc601c0883c30df5f4dd2d24f665424
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do_iterations!(1);
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assert_eq!(k.as_bytes(), &[ 0x42, 0x2c, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0x62, 0x27, 0xd7, 0xbc,
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0xa1, 0x35, 0x0b, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0xb7, 0x27, 0x9f,
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0x78, 0x97, 0xb8, 0x7b, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x4b, 0x78,
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0x3c, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x03, 0x11, 0xae, 0x30, 0x79, ]);
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assert_eq!(k, [ 0x42, 0x2c, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0x62, 0x27, 0xd7, 0xbc,
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0xa1, 0x35, 0x0b, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0xb7, 0x27, 0x9f,
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0x78, 0x97, 0xb8, 0x7b, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x4b, 0x78,
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0x3c, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x03, 0x11, 0xae, 0x30, 0x79, ]);
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do_iterations!(999);
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assert_eq!(k.as_bytes(), &[ 0x68, 0x4c, 0xf5, 0x9b, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x09, 0x55,
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0x28, 0x00, 0xef, 0x56, 0x6f, 0x2f, 0x4d, 0x3c,
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0x1c, 0x38, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x93, 0x60, 0xe3, 0x87,
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0x5f, 0x2e, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x53, 0x2c, 0x51, ]);
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assert_eq!(k, [ 0x68, 0x4c, 0xf5, 0x9b, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x09, 0x55,
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0x28, 0x00, 0xef, 0x56, 0x6f, 0x2f, 0x4d, 0x3c,
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0x1c, 0x38, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x93, 0x60, 0xe3, 0x87,
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0x5f, 0x2e, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x53, 0x2c, 0x51, ]);
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do_iterations!(999_000);
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assert_eq!(k.as_bytes(), &[ 0x7c, 0x39, 0x11, 0xe0, 0xab, 0x25, 0x86, 0xfd,
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0x86, 0x44, 0x97, 0x29, 0x7e, 0x57, 0x5e, 0x6f,
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0x3b, 0xc6, 0x01, 0xc0, 0x88, 0x3c, 0x30, 0xdf,
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0x5f, 0x4d, 0xd2, 0xd2, 0x4f, 0x66, 0x54, 0x24, ]);
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assert_eq!(k, [ 0x7c, 0x39, 0x11, 0xe0, 0xab, 0x25, 0x86, 0xfd,
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0x86, 0x44, 0x97, 0x29, 0x7e, 0x57, 0x5e, 0x6f,
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0x3b, 0xc6, 0x01, 0xc0, 0x88, 0x3c, 0x30, 0xdf,
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0x5f, 0x4d, 0xd2, 0xd2, 0x4f, 0x66, 0x54, 0x24, ]);
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}
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}
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