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Aeneas-compat: rename verify params signature->sig (namespace shadowing)

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The extractor's generated Lean would otherwise shadow the signature:: crate
namespace with the parameter binder, turning module paths into invalid field
projections. Pure rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mrwulf 2026-07-04 18:00:28 +02:00
parent ecbf7672e4
commit 30f3e9aded
1 changed files with 9 additions and 7 deletions
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16
ed25519-dalek/src/verifying.rs
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@ -716,32 +716,34 @@ pub(crate) fn sha512_finalize_bytes(h: Sha512) -> [u8; 64] {
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
pub(crate) fn recompute_r_sha512(
key: &VerifyingKey,
signature: &InternalSignature,
sig: &InternalSignature,
message: &[u8],
) -> CompressedEdwardsY {
let mut h = sha512_new();
sha512_update(&mut h, signature.R.as_bytes());
sha512_update(&mut h, sig.R.as_bytes());
sha512_update(&mut h, key.compressed.as_bytes());
sha512_update(&mut h, message);
let k = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&sha512_finalize_bytes(h));
let minus_A: EdwardsPoint = -key.point;
EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &minus_A, &signature.s).compress()
EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &minus_A, &sig.s).compress()
}
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
pub(crate) fn verify_sha512(
key: &VerifyingKey,
message: &[u8],
signature: &ed25519::Signature,
sig: &ed25519::Signature,
) -> Result<(), SignatureError> {
let signature = InternalSignature::try_from(signature)?;
let expected_R = recompute_r_sha512(key, &signature, message);
// (parameter named `sig`, not `signature`: the extractor's generated
// code would otherwise shadow the `signature::` crate namespace)
let sig = InternalSignature::try_from(sig)?;
let expected_R = recompute_r_sha512(key, &sig, message);
// AENEAS-COMPAT: explicit byte comparison (the derived PartialEq routes
// through machinery the extractor cannot interpret). Semantics identical
// to `expected_R == signature.R`.
let e = expected_R.as_bytes();
let r = signature.R.as_bytes();
let r = sig.R.as_bytes();
let mut equal = true;
let mut i = 0;
while i < 32 {