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* refactor and merge curve and ed crates * fmt * ci * fmt again * ci * Update bench.rs * fix ubuntu
359 lines
13 KiB
Rust
359 lines
13 KiB
Rust
// -*- mode: rust; -*-
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//
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// This file is part of ed25519-heea, a fork of ed25519-zebra.
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// Original ed25519-zebra code: Copyright (c) Zcash Foundation contributors
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// Modifications for HEEA: Copyright (c) 2025 curve25519-sol contributors
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// See LICENSE-APACHE and LICENSE-MIT for licensing information.
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//
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// Modifications from ed25519-zebra:
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// - Added `verify_heea`, an accelerated verification path using the HEEA
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// scalar decomposition from curve25519-sol's `HEEADecomposition` trait.
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// See "Accelerating EdDSA Signature Verification with Faster Scalar Size
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// Halving" (TCHES 2025) for the algorithm.
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// - `verify` and all ZIP-215 consensus logic are unchanged from ed25519-zebra.
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use crate::{
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edwards::{CompressedEdwardsY, EdwardsPoint},
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scalar::Scalar,
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traits::{HEEADecomposition, IsIdentity},
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};
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use core::convert::{TryFrom, TryInto};
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use sha2::{Sha512, digest::Update};
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use zeroize::DefaultIsZeroes;
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use ed25519::{Signature, signature::Verifier};
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#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
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use pkcs8::der::asn1::BitStringRef;
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#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
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use pkcs8::spki::{
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AlgorithmIdentifierRef, DecodePublicKey, EncodePublicKey, SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef,
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};
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#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
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use pkcs8::{Document, ObjectIdentifier};
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use super::Error;
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/// The length of an ed25519 `VerificationKey`, in bytes.
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pub const VERIFICATION_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
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/// A refinement type for `[u8; 32]` indicating that the bytes represent an
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/// encoding of an Ed25519 verification key.
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///
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/// This is useful for representing an encoded verification key, while the
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/// [`VerificationKey`] type in this library caches other decoded state used in
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/// signature verification.
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///
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/// A `VerificationKeyBytes` can be used to verify a single signature using the
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/// following idiom:
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/// ```
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/// use core::convert::TryFrom;
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/// # use curve25519::ed_sigs::*;
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/// # let msg = b"Zcash";
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/// # let sk = SigningKey::new(rand::rng());
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/// # let sig = sk.sign(msg);
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/// # let vk_bytes = VerificationKeyBytes::from(&sk);
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/// VerificationKey::try_from(vk_bytes)
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/// .and_then(|vk| vk.verify(&sig, msg));
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/// ```
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))]
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pub struct VerificationKeyBytes(pub(crate) [u8; VERIFICATION_KEY_LENGTH]);
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impl core::fmt::Debug for VerificationKeyBytes {
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fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
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fmt.debug_tuple("VerificationKeyBytes")
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.field(&self.0)
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.finish()
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}
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}
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impl AsRef<[u8]> for VerificationKeyBytes {
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fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
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&self.0[..]
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for VerificationKeyBytes {
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type Error = Error;
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fn try_from(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<VerificationKeyBytes, Self::Error> {
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if slice.len() == 32 {
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let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
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bytes[..].copy_from_slice(slice);
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Ok(bytes.into())
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} else {
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Err(Error::InvalidSliceLength)
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}
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}
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}
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impl From<[u8; 32]> for VerificationKeyBytes {
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fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> VerificationKeyBytes {
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VerificationKeyBytes(bytes)
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}
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}
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impl From<VerificationKeyBytes> for [u8; 32] {
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fn from(refined: VerificationKeyBytes) -> [u8; 32] {
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refined.0
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}
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
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impl<'a> TryFrom<SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef<'a>> for VerificationKeyBytes {
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type Error = Error;
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fn try_from(spki: SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef) -> Result<VerificationKeyBytes, Error> {
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Ok(VerificationKeyBytes::try_from(spki.subject_public_key.as_bytes().unwrap()).unwrap())
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}
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}
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/// A valid Ed25519 verification key.
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///
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/// This is also called a public key by other implementations.
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///
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/// This type holds decompressed state used in signature verification; if the
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/// verification key may not be used immediately, it is probably better to use
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/// [`VerificationKeyBytes`], which is a refinement type for `[u8; 32]`.
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///
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/// ## Zcash-specific consensus properties
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///
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/// Ed25519 checks are described in [§5.4.5][ps] of the Zcash protocol specification and in
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/// [ZIP 215]. The verification criteria for an (encoded) verification key `A_bytes` are:
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///
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/// * `A_bytes` MUST be an encoding of a point `A` on the twisted Edwards form of
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/// Curve25519, and non-canonical encodings MUST be accepted;
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///
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/// [ps]: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#concreteed25519
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#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))]
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(try_from = "VerificationKeyBytes"))]
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(into = "VerificationKeyBytes"))]
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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pub struct VerificationKey {
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pub(crate) A_bytes: VerificationKeyBytes,
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pub(crate) minus_A: EdwardsPoint,
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}
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impl From<VerificationKey> for VerificationKeyBytes {
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fn from(vk: VerificationKey) -> VerificationKeyBytes {
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vk.A_bytes
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}
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}
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impl AsRef<[u8]> for VerificationKey {
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fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
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&self.A_bytes.0[..]
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}
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}
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impl Default for VerificationKey {
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fn default() -> VerificationKey {
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let identity: EdwardsPoint = Default::default();
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let identity_bytes = identity.compress().to_bytes();
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VerificationKey {
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A_bytes: VerificationKeyBytes::from(identity_bytes),
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minus_A: -identity,
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}
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}
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}
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impl DefaultIsZeroes for VerificationKey {}
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impl From<VerificationKey> for [u8; 32] {
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fn from(vk: VerificationKey) -> [u8; 32] {
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vk.A_bytes.0
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<VerificationKeyBytes> for VerificationKey {
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type Error = Error;
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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fn try_from(bytes: VerificationKeyBytes) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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// * `A_bytes` and `R_bytes` MUST be encodings of points `A` and `R` respectively on the
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// twisted Edwards form of Curve25519, and non-canonical encodings MUST be accepted;
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let A = CompressedEdwardsY(bytes.0)
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.decompress()
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.ok_or(Error::MalformedPublicKey)?;
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Ok(VerificationKey {
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A_bytes: bytes,
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minus_A: -A,
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})
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for VerificationKey {
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type Error = Error;
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fn try_from(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<VerificationKey, Error> {
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VerificationKeyBytes::try_from(slice).and_then(|vkb| vkb.try_into())
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}
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}
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impl TryFrom<[u8; 32]> for VerificationKey {
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type Error = Error;
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fn try_from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
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VerificationKeyBytes::from(bytes).try_into()
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}
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
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impl EncodePublicKey for VerificationKey {
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/// Serialize [`VerificationKey`] to an ASN.1 DER-encoded document.
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fn to_public_key_der(&self) -> pkcs8::spki::Result<Document> {
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let alg_info = AlgorithmIdentifierRef {
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oid: ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.101.112"), // RFC 8410
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parameters: None,
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};
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SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef {
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algorithm: alg_info,
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subject_public_key: BitStringRef::from_bytes(&self.A_bytes.0[..])?,
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}
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.try_into()
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}
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
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impl DecodePublicKey for VerificationKey {
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/// Deserialize [`VerificationKey`] from ASN.1 DER bytes (32 bytes).
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fn from_public_key_der(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, pkcs8::spki::Error> {
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let spki = SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef::try_from(bytes).unwrap();
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let pk_bytes = spki.subject_public_key.as_bytes().unwrap();
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Ok(Self::try_from(pk_bytes).unwrap())
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}
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}
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impl Verifier<Signature> for VerificationKey {
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/// Verify a [`Signature`] object against a given [`VerificationKey`].
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fn verify(
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&self,
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message: &[u8],
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signature: &Signature,
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) -> Result<(), ed25519::signature::Error> {
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self.verify(signature, message)
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.map_err(|_| ed25519::signature::Error::new())
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}
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}
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impl VerificationKey {
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/// Verify a purported `signature` on the given `msg`.
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///
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/// ## Zcash-specific consensus properties
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///
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/// Ed25519 checks are described in [§5.4.5][ps] of the Zcash protocol specification and in
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/// [ZIP215]. The verification criteria for an (encoded) signature `(R_bytes, s_bytes)` with
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/// (encoded) verification key `A_bytes` are:
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///
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/// * `A_bytes` and `R_bytes` MUST be encodings of points `A` and `R` respectively on the
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/// twisted Edwards form of Curve25519, and non-canonical encodings MUST be accepted;
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///
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/// * `s_bytes` MUST represent an integer `s` less than `l`, the order of the prime-order
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/// subgroup of Curve25519;
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///
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/// * the verification equation `[8][s]B = [8]R + [8][k]A` MUST be satisfied;
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///
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/// * the alternate verification equation `[s]B = R + [k]A`, allowed by RFC 8032, MUST NOT be
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/// used.
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///
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/// [ps]: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#concreteed25519
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/// [ZIP215]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215
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pub fn verify(&self, signature: &Signature, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Error> {
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let k = Scalar::from_hash(
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Sha512::default()
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.chain(&signature.r_bytes()[..])
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.chain(&self.A_bytes.0[..])
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.chain(msg),
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);
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self.verify_prehashed(signature, k)
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}
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/// Verify a signature using the heea half-size scalar optimization.
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///
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/// This implements the algorithm from "Accelerating EdDSA Signature Verification
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/// with Faster Scalar Size Halving" (TCHES 2025).
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///
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/// The standard verification equation sB = R + hA is transformed to:
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/// τsB = τR + ρA where ρ ≡ τh (mod ℓ)
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///
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/// Both ρ and τ are approximately half the size of h.
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///
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/// We then decompose τs into two 128-bit scalars:
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/// τs = τs_hi * 2^128 + τs_lo
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///
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/// The verification equation becomes:
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/// τs_lo B + τs_hi (2^128 B) = τR + ρA
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/// which can be done via 4-variable MSM with half-size scalars.
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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pub fn verify_heea(&self, signature: &Signature, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Error> {
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// Compute the hash scalar h (called k in the standard implementation)
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let h = Scalar::from_hash(
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Sha512::default()
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.chain(&signature.r_bytes()[..])
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.chain(&self.A_bytes.0[..])
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.chain(msg),
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);
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// Generate half-size scalars ρ and τ such that ρ ≡ τh (mod ℓ)
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// in order to have rho and tau approximately half the size of h
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// it is possible that we compute ρ ≡ -τh (mod ℓ)
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// this is indicated by `flip_h` flag being true,
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// in which case we will need to negate A later
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// let (rho, tau, flip_h) = crate::heea::generate_half_size_scalars(&h);
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let (rho, tau, flip_h) = h.heea_decompose();
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// Extract s from the signature
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let s = Option::<Scalar>::from(Scalar::from_canonical_bytes(*signature.s_bytes()))
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.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
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// Decode R from the signature
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let neg_R = -CompressedEdwardsY(*signature.r_bytes())
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.decompress()
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.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
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// Standard verification checks: sB = R + hA
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// Transformed verification: -τsB + τR + ρA == 0
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//
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// We verify:
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// [8] τs B + [8] τ (-R) + [8] ρ (-A) == 0
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// Compute τs
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let ts = tau * s;
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let A = if flip_h { -self.minus_A } else { self.minus_A };
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// Compute the multi-scalar multiplication
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let result = EdwardsPoint::vartime_triple_scalar_mul_basepoint(&tau, &neg_R, &rho, &A, &ts);
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// Check if [8] τs B + [8] τ (-R) + [8] ρ (-A) == 0
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if result.mul_by_cofactor().is_identity() {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
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}
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}
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/// Verify a signature with a prehashed `k` value. Note that this is not the
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/// same as "prehashing" in RFC8032.
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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pub(crate) fn verify_prehashed(&self, signature: &Signature, k: Scalar) -> Result<(), Error> {
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// `s_bytes` MUST represent an integer less than the prime `l`.
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let s = Option::<Scalar>::from(Scalar::from_canonical_bytes(*signature.s_bytes()))
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.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
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// `R_bytes` MUST be an encoding of a point on the twisted Edwards form of Curve25519.
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let R = CompressedEdwardsY(*signature.r_bytes())
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.decompress()
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.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
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// We checked the encoding of A_bytes when constructing `self`.
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// [8][s]B = [8]R + [8][k]A
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// <=> [8]R = [8][s]B - [8][k]A
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// <=> 0 = [8](R - ([s]B - [k]A))
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// <=> 0 = [8](R - R') where R' = [s]B - [k]A
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let R_prime = EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &self.minus_A, &s);
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if (R - R_prime).mul_by_cofactor().is_identity() {
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Ok(())
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} else {
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Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
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}
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}
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}
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