anza-cryptography-source/curve25519/solana-ed25519/src/ed_sigs/verification_key.rs
zz-sol 1587b4c24f
refactor and merge curve and ed crates (#6)
* refactor and merge curve and ed crates

* fmt

* ci

* fmt again

* ci

* Update bench.rs

* fix ubuntu
2026-03-26 08:09:10 -04:00

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// -*- mode: rust; -*-
//
// This file is part of ed25519-heea, a fork of ed25519-zebra.
// Original ed25519-zebra code: Copyright (c) Zcash Foundation contributors
// Modifications for HEEA: Copyright (c) 2025 curve25519-sol contributors
// See LICENSE-APACHE and LICENSE-MIT for licensing information.
//
// Modifications from ed25519-zebra:
// - Added `verify_heea`, an accelerated verification path using the HEEA
// scalar decomposition from curve25519-sol's `HEEADecomposition` trait.
// See "Accelerating EdDSA Signature Verification with Faster Scalar Size
// Halving" (TCHES 2025) for the algorithm.
// - `verify` and all ZIP-215 consensus logic are unchanged from ed25519-zebra.
use crate::{
edwards::{CompressedEdwardsY, EdwardsPoint},
scalar::Scalar,
traits::{HEEADecomposition, IsIdentity},
};
use core::convert::{TryFrom, TryInto};
use sha2::{Sha512, digest::Update};
use zeroize::DefaultIsZeroes;
use ed25519::{Signature, signature::Verifier};
#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
use pkcs8::der::asn1::BitStringRef;
#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
use pkcs8::spki::{
AlgorithmIdentifierRef, DecodePublicKey, EncodePublicKey, SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef,
};
#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
use pkcs8::{Document, ObjectIdentifier};
use super::Error;
/// The length of an ed25519 `VerificationKey`, in bytes.
pub const VERIFICATION_KEY_LENGTH: usize = 32;
/// A refinement type for `[u8; 32]` indicating that the bytes represent an
/// encoding of an Ed25519 verification key.
///
/// This is useful for representing an encoded verification key, while the
/// [`VerificationKey`] type in this library caches other decoded state used in
/// signature verification.
///
/// A `VerificationKeyBytes` can be used to verify a single signature using the
/// following idiom:
/// ```
/// use core::convert::TryFrom;
/// # use curve25519::ed_sigs::*;
/// # let msg = b"Zcash";
/// # let sk = SigningKey::new(rand::rng());
/// # let sig = sk.sign(msg);
/// # let vk_bytes = VerificationKeyBytes::from(&sk);
/// VerificationKey::try_from(vk_bytes)
/// .and_then(|vk| vk.verify(&sig, msg));
/// ```
#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))]
pub struct VerificationKeyBytes(pub(crate) [u8; VERIFICATION_KEY_LENGTH]);
impl core::fmt::Debug for VerificationKeyBytes {
fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
fmt.debug_tuple("VerificationKeyBytes")
.field(&self.0)
.finish()
}
}
impl AsRef<[u8]> for VerificationKeyBytes {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.0[..]
}
}
impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for VerificationKeyBytes {
type Error = Error;
fn try_from(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<VerificationKeyBytes, Self::Error> {
if slice.len() == 32 {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes[..].copy_from_slice(slice);
Ok(bytes.into())
} else {
Err(Error::InvalidSliceLength)
}
}
}
impl From<[u8; 32]> for VerificationKeyBytes {
fn from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> VerificationKeyBytes {
VerificationKeyBytes(bytes)
}
}
impl From<VerificationKeyBytes> for [u8; 32] {
fn from(refined: VerificationKeyBytes) -> [u8; 32] {
refined.0
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
impl<'a> TryFrom<SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef<'a>> for VerificationKeyBytes {
type Error = Error;
fn try_from(spki: SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef) -> Result<VerificationKeyBytes, Error> {
Ok(VerificationKeyBytes::try_from(spki.subject_public_key.as_bytes().unwrap()).unwrap())
}
}
/// A valid Ed25519 verification key.
///
/// This is also called a public key by other implementations.
///
/// This type holds decompressed state used in signature verification; if the
/// verification key may not be used immediately, it is probably better to use
/// [`VerificationKeyBytes`], which is a refinement type for `[u8; 32]`.
///
/// ## Zcash-specific consensus properties
///
/// Ed25519 checks are described in [§5.4.5][ps] of the Zcash protocol specification and in
/// [ZIP 215]. The verification criteria for an (encoded) verification key `A_bytes` are:
///
/// * `A_bytes` MUST be an encoding of a point `A` on the twisted Edwards form of
/// Curve25519, and non-canonical encodings MUST be accepted;
///
/// [ps]: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#concreteed25519
#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize))]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(try_from = "VerificationKeyBytes"))]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(into = "VerificationKeyBytes"))]
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
pub struct VerificationKey {
pub(crate) A_bytes: VerificationKeyBytes,
pub(crate) minus_A: EdwardsPoint,
}
impl From<VerificationKey> for VerificationKeyBytes {
fn from(vk: VerificationKey) -> VerificationKeyBytes {
vk.A_bytes
}
}
impl AsRef<[u8]> for VerificationKey {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.A_bytes.0[..]
}
}
impl Default for VerificationKey {
fn default() -> VerificationKey {
let identity: EdwardsPoint = Default::default();
let identity_bytes = identity.compress().to_bytes();
VerificationKey {
A_bytes: VerificationKeyBytes::from(identity_bytes),
minus_A: -identity,
}
}
}
impl DefaultIsZeroes for VerificationKey {}
impl From<VerificationKey> for [u8; 32] {
fn from(vk: VerificationKey) -> [u8; 32] {
vk.A_bytes.0
}
}
impl TryFrom<VerificationKeyBytes> for VerificationKey {
type Error = Error;
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
fn try_from(bytes: VerificationKeyBytes) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
// * `A_bytes` and `R_bytes` MUST be encodings of points `A` and `R` respectively on the
// twisted Edwards form of Curve25519, and non-canonical encodings MUST be accepted;
let A = CompressedEdwardsY(bytes.0)
.decompress()
.ok_or(Error::MalformedPublicKey)?;
Ok(VerificationKey {
A_bytes: bytes,
minus_A: -A,
})
}
}
impl TryFrom<&[u8]> for VerificationKey {
type Error = Error;
fn try_from(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<VerificationKey, Error> {
VerificationKeyBytes::try_from(slice).and_then(|vkb| vkb.try_into())
}
}
impl TryFrom<[u8; 32]> for VerificationKey {
type Error = Error;
fn try_from(bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
VerificationKeyBytes::from(bytes).try_into()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
impl EncodePublicKey for VerificationKey {
/// Serialize [`VerificationKey`] to an ASN.1 DER-encoded document.
fn to_public_key_der(&self) -> pkcs8::spki::Result<Document> {
let alg_info = AlgorithmIdentifierRef {
oid: ObjectIdentifier::new_unwrap("1.3.101.112"), // RFC 8410
parameters: None,
};
SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef {
algorithm: alg_info,
subject_public_key: BitStringRef::from_bytes(&self.A_bytes.0[..])?,
}
.try_into()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "pkcs8")]
impl DecodePublicKey for VerificationKey {
/// Deserialize [`VerificationKey`] from ASN.1 DER bytes (32 bytes).
fn from_public_key_der(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, pkcs8::spki::Error> {
let spki = SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef::try_from(bytes).unwrap();
let pk_bytes = spki.subject_public_key.as_bytes().unwrap();
Ok(Self::try_from(pk_bytes).unwrap())
}
}
impl Verifier<Signature> for VerificationKey {
/// Verify a [`Signature`] object against a given [`VerificationKey`].
fn verify(
&self,
message: &[u8],
signature: &Signature,
) -> Result<(), ed25519::signature::Error> {
self.verify(signature, message)
.map_err(|_| ed25519::signature::Error::new())
}
}
impl VerificationKey {
/// Verify a purported `signature` on the given `msg`.
///
/// ## Zcash-specific consensus properties
///
/// Ed25519 checks are described in [§5.4.5][ps] of the Zcash protocol specification and in
/// [ZIP215]. The verification criteria for an (encoded) signature `(R_bytes, s_bytes)` with
/// (encoded) verification key `A_bytes` are:
///
/// * `A_bytes` and `R_bytes` MUST be encodings of points `A` and `R` respectively on the
/// twisted Edwards form of Curve25519, and non-canonical encodings MUST be accepted;
///
/// * `s_bytes` MUST represent an integer `s` less than `l`, the order of the prime-order
/// subgroup of Curve25519;
///
/// * the verification equation `[8][s]B = [8]R + [8][k]A` MUST be satisfied;
///
/// * the alternate verification equation `[s]B = R + [k]A`, allowed by RFC 8032, MUST NOT be
/// used.
///
/// [ps]: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf#concreteed25519
/// [ZIP215]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215
pub fn verify(&self, signature: &Signature, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Error> {
let k = Scalar::from_hash(
Sha512::default()
.chain(&signature.r_bytes()[..])
.chain(&self.A_bytes.0[..])
.chain(msg),
);
self.verify_prehashed(signature, k)
}
/// Verify a signature using the heea half-size scalar optimization.
///
/// This implements the algorithm from "Accelerating EdDSA Signature Verification
/// with Faster Scalar Size Halving" (TCHES 2025).
///
/// The standard verification equation sB = R + hA is transformed to:
/// τsB = τR + ρA where ρ ≡ τh (mod )
///
/// Both ρ and τ are approximately half the size of h.
///
/// We then decompose τs into two 128-bit scalars:
/// τs = τs_hi * 2^128 + τs_lo
///
/// The verification equation becomes:
/// τs_lo B + τs_hi (2^128 B) = τR + ρA
/// which can be done via 4-variable MSM with half-size scalars.
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
pub fn verify_heea(&self, signature: &Signature, msg: &[u8]) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Compute the hash scalar h (called k in the standard implementation)
let h = Scalar::from_hash(
Sha512::default()
.chain(&signature.r_bytes()[..])
.chain(&self.A_bytes.0[..])
.chain(msg),
);
// Generate half-size scalars ρ and τ such that ρ ≡ τh (mod )
// in order to have rho and tau approximately half the size of h
// it is possible that we compute ρ ≡ -τh (mod )
// this is indicated by `flip_h` flag being true,
// in which case we will need to negate A later
// let (rho, tau, flip_h) = crate::heea::generate_half_size_scalars(&h);
let (rho, tau, flip_h) = h.heea_decompose();
// Extract s from the signature
let s = Option::<Scalar>::from(Scalar::from_canonical_bytes(*signature.s_bytes()))
.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
// Decode R from the signature
let neg_R = -CompressedEdwardsY(*signature.r_bytes())
.decompress()
.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
// Standard verification checks: sB = R + hA
// Transformed verification: -τsB + τR + ρA == 0
//
// We verify:
// [8] τs B + [8] τ (-R) + [8] ρ (-A) == 0
// Compute τs
let ts = tau * s;
let A = if flip_h { -self.minus_A } else { self.minus_A };
// Compute the multi-scalar multiplication
let result = EdwardsPoint::vartime_triple_scalar_mul_basepoint(&tau, &neg_R, &rho, &A, &ts);
// Check if [8] τs B + [8] τ (-R) + [8] ρ (-A) == 0
if result.mul_by_cofactor().is_identity() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
}
}
/// Verify a signature with a prehashed `k` value. Note that this is not the
/// same as "prehashing" in RFC8032.
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
pub(crate) fn verify_prehashed(&self, signature: &Signature, k: Scalar) -> Result<(), Error> {
// `s_bytes` MUST represent an integer less than the prime `l`.
let s = Option::<Scalar>::from(Scalar::from_canonical_bytes(*signature.s_bytes()))
.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
// `R_bytes` MUST be an encoding of a point on the twisted Edwards form of Curve25519.
let R = CompressedEdwardsY(*signature.r_bytes())
.decompress()
.ok_or(Error::InvalidSignature)?;
// We checked the encoding of A_bytes when constructing `self`.
// [8][s]B = [8]R + [8][k]A
// <=> [8]R = [8][s]B - [8][k]A
// <=> 0 = [8](R - ([s]B - [k]A))
// <=> 0 = [8](R - R') where R' = [s]B - [k]A
let R_prime = EdwardsPoint::vartime_double_scalar_mul_basepoint(&k, &self.minus_A, &s);
if (R - R_prime).mul_by_cofactor().is_identity() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(Error::InvalidSignature)
}
}
}