# Ed25519 Proof of Knowledge of Seed (POKOS)

This crate is an experimental implementation testing (post-quantum) Proof of Knowledge (PoK) on an Ed25519 seed (see https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1368). It constructs a zero-knowledge proof that a prover knows a seed used to derive an Ed25519 secret key—without revealing the seed or the key itself.

This mechanism is useful for seamless blockchain migration, specifically on networks like Solana that natively rely on Ed25519 for account authentication. Because accounts are intrinsically tied to these public keys, a traditional transition to post-quantum signatures would require users to transfer assets and state to entirely new addresses. However, because EdDSA keys are deterministically derived from a seed (per RFC 8032), that seed can act as a reusable witness in a Post-Quantum Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (PQ-NIZK) proof. This allows a user to authorize a new quantum-safe key under their original on-chain identity, protecting dormant accounts and avoiding the friction of a network-wide asset migration even if the legacy public key has already been exposed.

The goal is not simply to prove knowledge of an Ed25519 secret key. The seed, or a commitment to it, is intended to be reused in a separate protocol that derives post-quantum keys from the same root. Consequently, the proof must constrain the entire seed derivation path, rather than merely validating the final Ed25519 key material.

## Protocol shape

The public statement is `(commit_of_seed, hash_of_sk)`.  The prover holds the
secret `seed` and proves the following derivation chain in zero knowledge:

```
commit_of_seed = SHA512("ed25519-pokos/commit/v1"   || seed)
prf_output     = SHA512("ed25519-pokos/derive-sk/v1" || seed)
sk_seed        = prf_output[0..32]
hash_of_sk     = SHA512("ed25519-pokos/hash-sk/v1"  || sk_seed)
```

Each domain label is zero-padded to 32 bytes, then concatenated with the
32-byte payload to form a single 64-byte message hashed in one SHA-512 block.

All three SHA-512 evaluations are proved by a single Plonky3 STARK over the
SHA-512 compression function.  The outer proof envelope is then signed by the
Ed25519 key derived from `sk_seed`, binding the proof to the key owner without
exposing either the seed or the secret key.

## Security tradeoff

This is a **temporary** construction.  It does not prove `sk → pk` inside the
circuit; that link is enforced externally by the Ed25519 signature over the
proof transcript.

- The ZK proof ties `seed → sk`.
- The Ed25519 signature ties `sk → pk`.

This is weaker than a fully end-to-end statement because the linkage to `pk` is
not proven inside the circuit — it is enforced by an external signature.

In the pre-quantum setting this is sufficient: only the legitimate owner of `sk`
can produce a valid signature.  In a post-quantum setting, once an adversary can
recover `sk` from `pk`, the signature no longer adds meaningful security.  At
that point the temporary authentication layer becomes unnecessary anyway, and the
system can rely on the revealed `sk` directly.

This construction should be read as a temporary engineering compromise, not as
the ideal final statement.

## Fully sound version

The fully sound end-to-end statement would use these public inputs:
- `commit_of_seed`
- `pk`

And prove:
- `commit_of_seed` commits to some seed
- the seed is transformed into the Ed25519 secret key `sk` by the specified PRF
- the corresponding Ed25519 public key derived from `sk` is exactly `pk`

This directly binds the seed commitment to the Ed25519 public key inside the
proof, with no external signature required.

## Why the fully sound version is not used here

The main bottleneck is proving Ed25519 group operations inside the circuit under
emulated arithmetic.  Our proof-of-concept for the fully end-to-end version
exceeds **1 billion gates**.  The dominant cost is in-circuit elliptic-curve
arithmetic for the `sk → pk` derivation.

By contrast, this construction avoids that expensive step: instead of proving
`sk → pk` in circuit it exposes `hash_of_sk` and delegates the `sk → pk` link
to an external Ed25519 signature.  The result is far more practical:

| Construction | Proof size (default settings) |
|---|---|
| This crate (temporary) | ~401 KB |
| Fully end-to-end | not yet practical |

## Crate layout

```
src/
  lib.rs               — public types, constants, and re-exports
  prover.rs            — key derivation, statement assembly, proof generation
  verifier.rs          — STARK verification, Ed25519 auth check, serialization
  private_seed_chain.rs — public witness/layout types for the three-segment chain
  sha512/              — Plonky3 AIR, trace builder, constraints, proof API
    air.rs             — Sha512RoundAir (implements the Plonky3 Air trait)
    circuit.rs         — Sha512Circuit: reference hash, block compression, trace gen
    private_seed_chain.rs — STARK prover/verifier for the seed chain
    proof_api/         — STARK config, FRI settings, serialization
```

The `prover` and `verifier` modules are intentionally separated so that a
verifier binary need not link any prover code.

## Wire format

`serialize_proof` / `deserialize_proof` produce a versioned byte sequence:

```
[magic: 8 bytes "EPKOS001"]
[commit_of_seed: 64 bytes]
[hash_of_sk: 64 bytes]
[sha512_proof_len: 8 bytes big-endian u64] [sha512_proof: N bytes]
[authentication_key: 32 bytes]
[authentication_signature: 64 bytes]
```

## Usage

```rust
use ed25519_pokos::{Seed, gen_pokos, verify_pokos, serialize_proof, deserialize_proof};

// ── Prover ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let seed: Seed = [7_u8; 32];
let proof = gen_pokos(seed)?;

// Inspect the public statement without running the verifier:
println!("commit_of_seed: {:02x?}", proof.statement.commit_of_seed);
println!("hash_of_sk:     {:02x?}", proof.statement.hash_of_sk);

// Serialize for transport:
let proof_bytes = serialize_proof(&proof);

// ── Verifier (can run in a separate process / binary) ─────────────────────
let proof = deserialize_proof(&proof_bytes)?;
verify_pokos(&proof)?;
# Ok::<(), String>(())
```

Run the bundled example:

```bash
cargo run --release -p ed25519-pokos --example gen_verify_pokos
```

Sample output (fixed seed `[7u8; 32]`, timings vary by machine):

```
commit_of_seed: [01, ff, 79, 8a, 05, 6f, b4, a4, 25, 13, 16, d5, 9e, a3, fe, 21, e9, 1e, 56, dd, 6b, cb, 69, db, 03, dd, 27, f2, 06, 8d, 9a, a2, ca, c0, cc, f2, 6f, d3, 9f, 4c, cb, ac, 00, 8a, d8, c1, c0, 70, f8, 51, d2, c4, 64, b0, e7, bb, de, 4f, 86, bb, 0e, 2f, e1, dc]
hash_of_sk: [52, 5c, 52, 0a, 8a, 61, bf, 28, df, 5b, a5, 4e, 31, fe, 53, 2d, 43, 3a, 35, 91, 5d, 6e, 78, 71, 4f, 01, 4c, de, c7, d8, 5f, 48, 9e, 91, a4, 3a, c9, be, 1b, ce, 63, a1, 15, 79, 84, 14, b4, ef, 06, c6, ec, c9, 60, 78, 0a, 52, 0c, ff, 48, d8, 75, fd, 6a, 67]
proving_time_ms: 55
verification_time_ms: 13
air_trace_rows: 512
air_trace_cols: 1076
proof_bytes: 400848
verification: ok
```

The trace shape and proof envelope bytes are stable unless the AIR or the
default `Sha512ProofSettings` change.

## Current implementation status

- The STARK proves all three SHA-512 relations in a single concatenated
  three-segment proof.
- The authentication key and signature use the Ed25519 implementation in this
  repo (`curve25519` crate).
- The `sk → pk` link is **not** proved inside the circuit; it remains external
  and is enforced by the Ed25519 signature over the proof statement.
- The proof settings (`Sha512ProofSettings`) are configurable, but the
  verifier enforces minimum security thresholds and rejects proofs produced
  with weaker parameters.