# curve25519 (`solana-ed25519`) **A pure-Rust implementation of group operations on Ristretto and Curve25519, forked from [curve25519-dalek] with HEEA scalar decomposition and a reduced backend set.** > For the original curve25519-dalek documentation see [README_dalek.md](README_dalek.md). This crate is part of the [cryptography](https://github.com/anza-xyz/cryptography/) workspace. --- ## Changes from curve25519-dalek ### HEEA Scalar Decomposition A new `HEEADecomposition` trait and implementation have been added in: - [`src/scalar/heea.rs`](src/scalar/heea.rs) – `curve25519_heea_vartime`, the core half-extended Euclidean algorithm - [`src/traits.rs`](src/traits.rs) – `HEEADecomposition` trait (`heea_decompose`) - [`src/backend/serial/scalar_mul/vartime_triple_base.rs`](src/backend/serial/scalar_mul/vartime_triple_base.rs) – `mul_128_128_256`, a four-variable MSM optimised for two 128-bit and one 256-bit scalar Given a 256-bit hash scalar `h`, `heea_decompose` returns `(ρ, τ, flip_h)` such that: ```text flip_h = false: ρ ≡ τ·h (mod ℓ) flip_h = true: ρ ≡ -τ·h (mod ℓ) ``` This allows verification of `sB = R + hA` to be rewritten as a 4-point MSM over ~128-bit scalars, reducing the number of point doublings required and yielding roughly **~15% faster** verification in practice. See the [TCHES 2025 paper] for the full algorithm description. ### Reduced Backends Only the following backends are maintained in this fork: | Backend | Selection | Notes | |---|---|---| | `serial` | Automatic fallback | Pure Rust, 64-bit word size on 64-bit targets | | `simd` / AVX2 | Runtime on x86-64 | Vectorised 4-wide field arithmetic | | CUDA | Opt-in (`curve25519-cuda` crate) | GPU MSM via SPPARK/BLST | The `fiat` (formally-verified fiat-crypto) and `unstable_avx512` backends present in upstream have been removed. --- ## Ed25519 Signatures (`ed_sigs`) This crate includes a **ZIP-215-compliant Ed25519 signature implementation** in the `ed_sigs` module, forked from [ed25519-zebra] and extended with HEEA-accelerated verification. > For the original ed25519-zebra documentation see [README_zebra.md](README_zebra.md). ### `verify_zebra`: fast-path signature verification `VerificationKey::verify_zebra` is the HEEA implementation used by the default `VerificationKey::verify` method. Both accept the same arguments and produce identical ZIP-215 results. The HEEA method (TCHES 2025) transforms the standard 2-point MSM: ```text [8][s]B = [8]R + [8][h]A (standard) ``` into a 4-point MSM over half-size (~128-bit) scalars: ```text flip_h = false: τs_lo·B + τs_hi·(2¹²⁸·B) = τ·R + ρ·A flip_h = true: τs_lo·B + τs_hi·(2¹²⁸·B) = τ·R - ρ·A ``` where `ρ ≡ τ·h (mod ℓ)` when `flip_h` is false, `ρ ≡ -τ·h (mod ℓ)` when `flip_h` is true, and `τs = τs_hi·2¹²⁸ + τs_lo`. All four scalars are ≤128 bits and the two basepoints (`B` and `2¹²⁸B`) use precomputed lookup tables, giving approximately **~15% faster** verification compared to the standard path. ### ZIP 215 ZIP-215-compliant Ed25519 validation rules are fully preserved from ed25519-zebra: - Non-canonical point encodings are accepted for `A` and `R`. - `s` must be a canonical integer less than the group order `ℓ`. - The cofactor-cleared equation `[8][s]B = [8]R + [8][h]A` is used (not the RFC 8032 variant). See [ZIP 215] for full details. --- ## Use ```toml curve25519 = { package = "solana-ed25519", git = "https://github.com/anza-xyz/cryptography" } ``` ### Ed25519 signing and verification ```rust,no_run use core::convert::TryFrom; use curve25519::ed_sigs::{SigningKey, VerificationKey}; let msg = b"curve25519-sol"; // Generate key and sign let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[1u8; 32]); let sig = sk.sign(msg); let vk = VerificationKey::from(&sk); // Standard ZIP-215 verification with heea acceleration vk.verify(&sig, msg).expect("valid signature"); ``` ### Batch verification ```rust,ignore use curve25519::ed_sigs::batch; let mut verifier = batch::Verifier::new(); for (vk_bytes, sig, msg) in items { verifier.queue((vk_bytes, sig, msg)); } verifier.verify(rand::thread_rng()).expect("all valid"); ``` ### HEEA decomposition example ```rust,ignore use curve25519::traits::HEEADecomposition; use curve25519::scalar::Scalar; use sha2::{Sha512, Digest}; // h is a typical 256-bit hash scalar let h = Scalar::from_hash(Sha512::new().chain_update(b"some message")); // Decompose into two ~128-bit scalars let (rho, tau, flip_h) = h.heea_decompose(); // flip_h == false: rho ≡ tau·h (mod ℓ) // flip_h == true: rho ≡ -tau·h (mod ℓ) ``` --- ## Feature Flags | Feature | Default? | Description | |---|:---:|---| | `alloc` | ✓ | Multiscalar multiplication, batch inversion, batch compress, and the Ed25519 batch module. | | `zeroize` | ✓ | `Zeroize` for all scalar and point types. | | `precomputed-tables` | ✓ | Precomputed basepoint tables (~400 KB, ~4× faster basepoint mul). | | `rand_core` | ✓ | `Scalar::random`, `RistrettoPoint::random`, `SigningKey::new`, and randomized batch verification. | | `digest` | ✓ | Hash-to-curve, `Scalar::from_hash`, and Ed25519 hashing. | | `std` | | Enables `std::error::Error` impl on `ed_sigs::Error`. | | `serde` | | Serialization for all point, scalar, and key types. | | `pkcs8` | | PKCS#8 DER encoding/decoding for Ed25519 keys. | | `pem` | | PEM encoding/decoding for Ed25519 keys (requires `pkcs8`). | | `legacy_compatibility` | | `Scalar::from_bits` (broken arithmetic, use only if required). | | `group` | | `group` and `ff` crate trait impls. | | `group-bits` | | `ff::PrimeFieldBits` for `Scalar`. | | `lizard` | | Bytestring-to-Ristretto-point injection. | --- ## Backends ### Serial (default) Pure-Rust, available on all targets. 64-bit arithmetic on 64-bit platforms. ### AVX2 (automatic on x86-64) Runtime CPU-feature detection via `cpufeatures`. 4-wide vectorised field elements in radix-25.5 representation. Automatically selected when the CPU supports AVX2; falls through to `serial` otherwise. To hard-code AVX2 at compile time: ```sh RUSTFLAGS='-C target-feature=+avx2' cargo build --release ``` ### CUDA (opt-in) See the [`curve25519-cuda`](../curve25519-cuda) crate. Provides GPU-accelerated multi-scalar multiplication using the [SPPARK] library. --- ## Safety All point types enforce validity invariants at the type level (no invalid `EdwardsPoint` can be constructed). All secret-operand operations use constant-time logic via the [`subtle`] crate. Variable-time functions are explicitly marked `vartime`. The SIMD backend uses `unsafe` internally for SIMD intrinsics, guarded by runtime CPU-feature checks. --- ## MSRV Rust **1.85.0** (Edition 2024). --- ## References - [TCHES 2025 paper] – _Accelerating EdDSA Signature Verification with Faster Scalar Size Halving_ - [curve25519-dalek] – upstream curve25519 library (isis lovecruft, Henry de Valence) - [ed25519-zebra] – upstream Ed25519 library (Zcash Foundation) - [ZIP 215] – Ed25519 validation rules for Zcash - [Original curve25519-dalek README](README_dalek.md) - [Original ed25519-zebra README](README_zebra.md) [TCHES 2025 paper]: https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11971 [curve25519-dalek]: https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek [ed25519-zebra]: https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/ed25519-zebra [ZIP 215]: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0215 [SPPARK]: https://github.com/supranational/sppark [subtle]: https://docs.rs/subtle